

Localisation
of Aid in Lebanon

**MAPPING
OF THE AID
ECOSYSTEM
IN LEBANON**

2021



Supported by



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ABOUT BIOFORCE INSTITUTE AND EXPERTISE FRANCE

Bioforce is an International Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisation, founded in 1983 by Doctor Charles MERIEUX in Lyon, France and has been committed to capacity development in the humanitarian sector for over 30 years now. Bioforce has been highly committed to strengthening local actors (whether it be individuals or organisations) as one crucial way of improving the overall quality of the humanitarian response. Bioforce was extremely supportive of the outputs of the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, especially on the objectives linked to localisation within the Grand Bargain.

Expertise France is the French public international cooperation agency. It designs and implements projects which aim to contribute to the balanced development of partner countries, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda and the priorities of France's external action. The agency achieves this goal by implementing projects in the main areas of public action: Democratic, economic and financial governance; Stability, international security and peace; Sustainable development, climate and agriculture; Health and human development.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



In 2016, the international community agreed to sign the “Grand Bargain” in order to increase development-assistance efficiency and bridge the widening financing gap between humanitarian and development needs. Donors and aid providers made a commitment to the “Localisation of Aid”, meaning that they will channel a larger share of international aid funding to national and local responders. It aims to reposition local NGOs at the centre of humanitarian actions, improve the sustainability of their actions, and ensure that crisis-response actions meet local needs. Five years after the World Humanitarian Summit, the moment has come to analyse the successes achieved and challenges faced by the humanitarian community against the commitments of this agreement.

Implemented by Bioforce, the mapping of the aid ecosystem in Lebanon is part of the Shabake Project carried out by Expertise France and funded by l’Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Denmark’s development cooperation (Danida). The Shabake Project was designed within the framework of the localisation agenda to strengthen Lebanese NGO capacities so that local recipients can take the lead in responding to crises impacting Lebanon.

Lebanon has a long history of internal and regional crises affecting its stability. During the last two years, the population of Lebanon has seen its situation dramatically worsen due to financial and economic decline, political fragility, massive protests and the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak that has left poverty levels among displaced populations and vulnerable Lebanese on the rise. Finally, the Beirut Port Explosion in August

2020, which was the third biggest explosion the world has experienced after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has devastated the country’s general economy and the society’s capacity to cope. The situation has affected the availability of basic services such as fuel, electricity, healthcare and clean water, most of which were previously provided through the private sector (OCHA). Major needs identified in the aftermath of the explosion were related to the significant impact on lives and livelihoods, basic living conditions and coping mechanisms. At the end of 2020, 19% of Lebanese nationals reported the loss of their main sources of income (OCHA).

Local and national organisations have been at the forefront of the multiple responses which exacerbated the challenges faced to implement their programmes. The first responders the day after the Beirut explosion and until today are citizens’ initiatives along with NGOs and Civil Society Organisations on a volunteer basis, even though the army has been appointed to coordinate the response. There has been a consensus on the fact that the Lebanese society with all its layers and representations (not only including LNNGOs) replaced the state in the aftermath of the explosion. Some volunteer groups, formed to help people through the economic crisis, were ready to respond quickly, organising volunteers to distribute food and other items. This had led to an increase in the leadership of local actors, advancing to some extent the localisation agenda.

Since 2011, Lebanon has witnessed the arrival of an important number of international partners responding to the Syrian crisis which took over the humanitarian coordination in

close partnership with the government. Today the Lebanon Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), donors and partners represent more than 200 agencies and organisations (OCHA 2020). A coordination forum for international actors, known as the Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF) was also formed with around 60 International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). Two humanitarian response plans coordinate the multi-sectoral response in complementarity; The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP 2021) which address the impact of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon and the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) which responds to the needs of the most vulnerable among the Lebanese and migrants affected by the crisis. The purpose of this study was to understand the efforts of the aid ecosystem stakeholders towards the localisation agenda in Lebanon and the effects of the multiple crises of 2020 in the inclusion of the Lebanese civil society in the development and humanitarian landscape. The report covers five of the six components of the NEAR localisation Framework¹: 1) Partnerships; 2) Capacity; 3) Funding; 4) Coordination and 5) Policy, influence and visibility. Per component, it proposes a country-based analysis covering trends of the current state, the barriers and recommendations.

KEY FINDINGS

In Lebanon there has been progress towards the inclusion of local and national organisations. Throughout this study, evidence was gathered recording the achievements of local actors to meaningfully participate within the aid ecosystem and the willingness of the humanitarian stakeholders to foster their level of participation. However, barriers remain. This section highlights the main findings of this study, there are additional trends within the body of the report.

LOCALISATION


Aid in Lebanon is not localised, yet progress has been achieved for some actors. From the perception of local actors, the humanitarian aid system is not localised. From the perception of international actors, efforts have been made, and the localisation agenda in Lebanon is evolving. There are different degrees of inclusion of LNNGOs depending on their size, location and other factors. Localisation has already been achieved by a reduced number of LNNGOs meaningfully enjoying the same rights as international actors. However, this is not the rule. The sector as a whole has not changed.

The humanitarian system needs to change structurally for localisation to be achieved. Country-based efforts are necessary but it is crucial to admit that at some levels the process of localisation is inefficient as long as bureaucratic and paternalistic practices continue to prevail within the system. The most recurrent trend of the study was the need of a structural change. The whole essence of the sector needs to be rethought to change the power dynamics among the stakeholders. Traditional behaviour from the international community in a system highly dominated by Western practices hinders the efficiency on which efforts can translate into relevant successes.

Localisation initiatives are not including the government as a key player. The current aid sector and its management has been described as chaotic by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). Although the ministry has developed multiple partnerships with the international community, it perceives alienation from both the local and the international community. There is a direction toward moving away from the government which was reinforced by the statements of the international community following the Beirut Blast. This behaviour leaves the sector with a missing key player which can hinder to a great extent the advancement of the localisation agenda.

6 ¹The “Localisation performance measurement framework” developed by the NEAR has six areas of measurement. The analysis of this research covered five of the six components, participation which is component six was not analysed.

RECOMMEN- DATIONS



Recommendation 1. There is a positive perception on localisation initiatives. However, a coordinated localisation framework gathering different initiatives could avoid duplication and enhance efficiency.

Recommendation 2. L/NAs must take ownership of the process of localisation. Any initiative to advance the localisation agenda should be designed by them, establishing priorities and activities.

Recommendation 3. The government and its institutions must be central to the aid system and not peripheral. This will ensure a more sustainable intervention on the long term.

PARTNERSHIPS

The quality and equitability of partnerships are questioned from both sides.

All actors perceive the current partnerships as far from being equitable, and highlighted that the power dynamics is not balanced with a greater weight given for internationals. The current situation is not very optimistic despite the improvements expressed by both actors.

Partnerships and intermediate INGOs are a necessary step but they should not be confused with localisation.

Localisation through partnerships seems to be a good compromise to ensure more involvement from L/NAs in the humanitarian response. Nevertheless, implementation through partnerships should not be confused with localisation. Through consultations, donors have recognised their incapacity to manage small grants and their preference to select partners who deliver at scale

interventions. This is leading to the monopoly of a very few large NGOs. However, donors largely motivate international actors to create partnerships, sometimes as a formal requirement or by providing additional points to the grant application.

Partnerships are based on a “donor-recipient” short-term approach that hinder meaningful collaboration.

The quality of the existing partnerships is mediocre. The main reason for that is the “donor-recipient” approach to partnerships focused on short-term deliverables rather than long-term vision. The short-term span affects the construction of strategic partnerships because a meaningful partnership takes time to build trust and understand the added value of each partner. Both national and international actors mentioned that the main barrier to forming equitable partnerships is the lack of equal power and resource sharing.

RECOMMEN- DATIONS



Recommendation 1. The humanitarian community should disseminate advocacy messages of what constitutes a good partnership. It will increase the awareness of L/NAs to understand their rights within a partnership and understand their ability to raise their concerns.

Recommendation 2. The humanitarian community (local and international) should reinforce the message of complementarity between local and international actors. Partnerships are more efficient when local actors focus on their expertise and prove their added value in the response.

Recommendation 3. Develop a framework for strengthening partnering accountability and effectiveness.

FUNDING

Despite the fact that the primary source of funding for LNNGOs is channelled through INGOs, there is little accountability on the way these funds are transferred.

There is a willingness from international partners to increase direct funding channelled to L/NAs, however so far the primary funding source for LNNGOs is the second-layer-funding channelled through INGOs. However, this intermediary role is not framed by any “good practices” and is

not accountable enough. INGOs can unilaterally decide the funding they provide to their partner and whether it includes overhead costs or not. These practices enhance the unbalanced power, create dependency and instability for LNNGOs.

The process to access to direct funds is perceived as not transparent and inaccessible to small LNNGOs.

The main barrier which is also a difficult reality is that funds are only accessible to a very small group of large LNNGOs already known to donors and international stakeholders. This has created a new layer of power that is engendering more exclusion and less unity in the aid sector. Furthermore, the selection process of winning organisations is perceived as biased, corrupted, not at all transparent and already pre-defined even before the submission of proposals.

The quality of direct funding is preventing LNNGOs from investing in their professionalisation and from acquiring a strategic vision. Funds allocated to LNNGOs are not allowing them to ensure their sustainability, the continuity of their projects and to have a clear long-term strategy for their interventions. Some LNNGOs even mention having issues communicating with beneficiaries on the continuity of the projects as they have low levels of decision-making with regards to funding.

RECOMMEN- DATIONS

Recommendation 1. Donors should seek the possibility to allocate a specific amount of funding to support LNNGOs in managing due diligence requirements.

Recommendation 2. Donors and L/NAs should seek to create new alternative funding mechanisms and long-term solutions.

Recommendation 3. Increase communication from both sides. LNNGOs to promote their expertise and donors to promote the different funding opportunities available to LNNGOs.

CAPACITY

There is no clear consensus among L/NAs on whether they have the capacity to respond to multiples crises, yet their work is very much valued and recognised by international actors. For L/NAs who confirmed that the capacity is there, the main argument was that L/NAs understand better the contextual needs of the communities and thus can provide adequate solutions and interventions. However, for the other half, the lack of financial resources is the key impediment to their ability to respond to the multi-protracted crises.

Capacity strengthening initiatives seem to be standardised with limited innovative methodologies.

Capacity strengthening initiatives are implemented widely and are accessible but appear superficial and not tailored enough to respond to the structural needs of the LNNGOs. Trainings are perceived as a solution-for-all-problems and this is not considered realistic. The methodologies used seem to be outdated, making the support repetitive, dull and superficial. There is a need to have a greater focus on mentoring, on the job support and peer-to-peer learning focusing on specialised and advanced subjects such as advocacy, representation, leadership and governance. Tailored support based on an individual organisational analysis is the only way long lasting effects will remain within the LNNGOs.

There is no unified clear and purposeful vi-

sion for capacity strengthening initiatives in Lebanon. The current delivery of capacity strengthening initiatives is perceived as being designed in a top-down approach which is leading to the assumption that L/NAs do not have the skills and abilities to work in the field. Local actors are perceiving this approach as a message of superiority from international actors rather than a recognition of their existing capacity and a reinforcement of their leadership role. Both international and local actors are questioning the concept of capacity strengthening and its essence, arguing that the terminology is overused and reinforces the systems' paternalistic approach. A deeper and strategic reflection is needed to reimagine the purpose of those initiatives in line with the localisation agenda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Capacity strengthening implementers, must be sure that capacity support is aligned with the maturity of L/NAs while being as customised as possible.

Recommendation 2. Develop a national framework for capacity strengthening in order to increase the coordination between actors and avoid duplication.

Recommendation 3. Capacity strengthening support given by an international partner should systematically go through a self-assessment where L/NAs define their priorities.

COORDINATION

Coordination among local partners has demonstrated to be much more structured compared to previous years. Coordination among L/NAs is also evolving, a national forum (LHDF) is active since 2014 and some local forums are operational in the regions. Since the Beirut Blast additional coordination initiatives were created and some remain. The agility and flexibility of the coordination among LNNGOs mainly for referrals has been recognised as an advantage. However, competition for funding among LNNGOs has been mentioned as an issue.

The added value of coordination mechanisms is not recognised among LNNGOs. LNNGOs do not identify the added value that participating in coordination and sectorial meetings can bring to their organisation, and this is exacerbated for small LNNGOs. Coordination meetings are seen as superficial and not necessary. It is mainly perceived as information sharing rather than actual decision making. Some LNNGOs are unwilling to participate for the lack of trust in the system and the other stakeholders. Trust is one of the pillars of coordination. LNNGOs are reluctant to participate in meetings and even more to share information and needs assessments.

Coordination requires time and resources; more funding is needed to foster coordination and participation. The system has multiple meetings and dedicating a staff to attend meetings is challenging due to the fact that most staff are already overwhelmed and also to the limited number of staff who master the English language. The English predominance and the jargon culture remain a barrier to comfortably navigating the system according to interviewees of the study. For LNNGOs who are willing to take a more significant role in coordination mechanisms, additional support is needed in terms of funding. Active participation in meetings and co-lead roles have a cost and not all LNNGOs are able to absorb it.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Local and national actors should seek to support and promote the creation and/or consolidation of local coordination structures at the regional level.

Recommendation 2. Donors and international partners should financially support LNNGOs to participate actively in coordination mechanisms and to hold coordination roles.

Recommendation 3. The humanitarian community as a whole, but particularly, sector coordinators, should aim to increase the knowledge of the coordination structures and promote the added value of participating in coordination mechanisms.

POLICY, INFLUENCE AND VISIBILITY

It should not be expected that all LNNGOs play a lead role in policy, advocacy and standard-setting. Participants of the study feel the need to clarify that it should not be expected that all LNNGOs actively participate in decision-making forums. This is not the case for

INGOs and it is unrealistic to think this can be achieved in the Lebanese context. However, LN-NGOs and local forums that have the vocation and the willingness to influence the design of the humanitarian action should be supported to increase their advocacy capacities.

Humanitarian actions implemented by LN-NGOs are visible. However, their position on humanitarian issues is less. Social media is used by LNNGOs as an accountability tool to showcase their achievements in projects; for them visibility is not an issue. However, when discussing humanitarian issues, the views of LNNGOs is underrepresented for two main reasons. The first one, being the lack of participation in joint needs assessments and their reluctance to circulate their reports. The second one, is the incapacity to gather the views of LNNGOs from the governorates to be represented at the central level.



Weak levels of representation and advocacy skills of L/NAs hinder their capacity to influence. Local organisations do not have the privilege to build a strategic vision for their work and for the humanitarian response as a whole because they are working in survival mode. There needs to be a shift in priorities but this only can happen with more sustainable funding. There is a lack in advocacy skills from the L/NAs to effectively share their positions as well as the question on the faculty of coordination mechanisms to leave the space to an open dialogue where L/NAs can freely speak.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. Local coordination forums could be effective channels to raise local concerns and share LNNGOs views at a national level. It is necessary to strengthen the communication between local forums and the LHDF.

Recommendation 2. Donors and International partners should provide financial support to L/NAs to increase their representation and to strengthen their advocacy skills.

Recommendation 3. Continue to invite and promote the participation of Lebanese L/NAs in international forums including IASC meetings and global clusters meetings.



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ACRONYMS

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Response Plan
3RF	The Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework AAP Accountability to Affected Populations
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CBO	Community-Based Organisations
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANA	Damage Assessment Needs Analysis
Danida	Denmark’s development cooperation
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre
ECHO	European Commission
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FER	Forward Emergency Room
FTS	Funding Tracking System
GB	Grand Bargain
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoL	Government of Lebanon
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICA	Internal Capacity Assessment
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LCRP	Lebanese Crisis Response Plan
L/NA	Local/National Actor
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LHDF	Lebanese Humanitarian and Development Forum
LHF	Lebanon Humanitarian Fund
LHIF	Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum
LNNGO	Local and National Non-Governmental Organisation LRC Lebanese Red Cross
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment



NEAR Network for Empowered Aid Response
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO National Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PoP Principles of Partnership
PSEA Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SCHR Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination **UNDP** United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAR Urban Search And Rescue
VASyR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon **WHS** World Humanitarian Summit



INTRO- DUCTION



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Launched in 2017 by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), as part of the Minka initiative, the Shabake project in Lebanon implemented by Expertise France with funding from AFD and Denmark's development cooperation (Danida), was designed to strengthen the capacities of local and national civil society organisations in Lebanon within the broader context of the Grand Bargain particularly focusing on the localisation of aid.

In partnership with Bioforce, Expertise France, sought to improve its knowledge of the Lebanese Civil Society to produce evidence to advocate and contribute to the drafting of a multi-donor framework for localisation and capacity development in Lebanon. Lebanon is home to one of the most vibrant and dynamic civil societies in the Middle East. Its civil society is highly recognised by its capacity and historical involvement to respond to the country's crises. New organisations regularly rise to meet sudden crises while established LINGOs switch between thinking long term and resolving humanitarian needs, such as the ongoing Syrian Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the more recent Beirut Port Explosion.

Amid the multiples crises that hit Lebanon in the last two years, and due to the weakness of the government, Lebanese NGOs play an essential role. The localisation agenda is advancing at a slow pace. Needs are increasing exponentially, and the humanitarian community acknowledges that the country's reconstruction will be triggered only if the initiatives of the civil society and its government are supported. Localisation needs to be a priority in this context. Refer to Box 1 for the definition of localisation that was used in this study.

1.2. Purpose Of The Study, Complementarity And Key Questions

The purpose of this study was to understand the efforts of the aid ecosystem stakeholders towards the localisation agenda in Lebanon and the effects of the multiple crises of 2020 in the inclusion of the Lebanese civil society in the development and humanitarian landscape.

Bioforce and Expertise France have previously worked together on an initial in-depth mapping in late 2019/early 2020 in Lebanon. Due to the multiple crises that affected Lebanon and its humanitarian landscape back then, the availability of stakeholders was not enough to complete the analysis. Nevertheless, this study took into account the previous findings to ensure a continuum and achieve its completion. In addition, the study aims to add to the growing body of research on this topic, including studies from UNDP and UNHCR in 2019 analysing the progress on three components of localisation for 3RP countries (funding, partnerships, capacity and policy influence and coordination), and ICVA's 2021 analysis on localisation within the MENA region.

The following are the key objectives of this study:

1. To explore current trends and initiatives within the localisation agenda in Lebanon.
2. To assess the quality of the experiences and perspectives of recipients of capacity development activities.
3. To identify current national coordination platforms, forums and networks in Lebanon among local NGOs, and between local NGOs, governmental entities and donors, and to understand the extent of participation/leadership of local NGOs in these settings.
4. To identify the primary income streams for local NGOs, and the proportion of which are received from international funds (whether direct, through pooled funds, or single intermediaries.)
5. To understand the barriers that prevent local NGOs from accessing funding sustainably and partnering directly with institutional donors and international agencies.
6. To develop a specific case study on the response of civil society and international stakeholders to the Beirut Blast in light of all of the above objectives and the themes of coordination, strategic planning, leadership and the localisation of aid.

BOX 1 DEFINING LOCALISATION

Box 1. Defining localisation

While there is no global consensus on how localisation should be defined, the following definition was utilised for the purposes of this report:

Localising is a process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the leadership by local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action, in order to better address the needs of affected populations and to prepare national actors for future humanitarian responses.

This definition is from OECD (2017) 'Localising the response: World Humanitarian Summit – putting policy into practice, the commitments into action series.' The definition was developed following the World Humanitarian Summit and has relevance across other regions and contexts.



RESEARCH APPROACH

2. RESEARCH APPROACH



2.1. Methodology

In order to remain coherent with the global evidence-based research on localisation, the study was primarily framed and designed around three main references:

- *The “Localisation performance measurement framework” developed by NEAR,*
- *The Principles of Partnerships (PoP),*
- *The IASC guidance on localisation.*

The NEAR Framework has six areas of measurement as per TABLE 1 below, and the analysis of this research was able to cover them except for participation (component 6) due to insufficient data and information.

The study used a mixed methods approach embedded in a 4-step methodology. This included a Literature Review, 8 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with local NGOs operating in Lebanon, 23 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with local and international stakeholders, and a self-administered online survey with 104 responses. More details on the respondents can be found in section 2.2 below.

In addition, recommendations of the study were conceived in a collaborative approach through a validation workshop gathering 40 local and international stakeholders (See Annex 8).

TABLE 1 NEAR LOCALISATION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK

LOCALISATION PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK	
Partnerships	More genuine and equitable partnerships, and less sub-contracting
Funding	Improvements in the quantity and quality of funding for local and national actors L/NAs
Capacity	More effective support for strong and sustainable institutional capacities for L/NAs, and less undermining of those capacities by INGOs/UN
Coordination and complementarity	Greater leadership, presence and influence of L/NAs in humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms
Policy, influence and visibility	Increased presence of L/NAs in international policy discussions and greater public recognition and visibility for their contribution to humanitarian response
Participation	Fuller and more influential involvement of crisis-affected people in what relief is provided to them, and how

For the purpose of this study, having consistent and coherent definitions of local and national, state and non-state organisations was key. See Box 2 for the definitions.

BOX 2 DEFINING LOCAL ACTORS

Box 2. Defining local actors

The definitions developed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) localisation marker working group¹ are:

Local and national non-state actors are organisations engaged in relief that are headquartered and operating in their own aid recipient country and which are not affiliated to an international NGO. This study will refer to this kind of actors, including CSOs as “LNNGOs” as to be consistent with most available literature on localisation.

National and sub-national state actors are state authorities of the affected aid recipient country engaged in relief, whether at local or national level. The combination of these two actors: non-state and state national and local actors will be treated in this study as “L/NA” to remain consistent with the NEAR localisation framework.

Since there has not been a standard way to classify Civil Society Organisations in Lebanon, the below typologies for both local and international actors were adopted for the purpose of this study:

Local and National Actors are categorised as:

1. Government authorities at national and sub-national levels
2. National and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations, (CSOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) (headquarters in Lebanon only)
3. National and local private sector organisations
4. National and local research institutions
5. Local coordination forums that are initiated by a local actor and have only local actors as members

International Actors are categorised as:

1. International NGOs with headquarters outside Lebanon
2. International donors or agencies
3. UN Agencies
4. International coordination forums that are initiated by an international actor and have only international actors as members

2.2. About the respondents

This study has been informed by primary qualitative and quantitative research undertaken in Lebanon which was triangulated against information from the literature review and from all additional relevant documentation that came to light during the research period.

(a) Online Survey

An online survey was sent to around 630 humanitarian stakeholders which remained open approximately for a month from June 23 to July 30, 2021. To ensure the participation of diverse respondents, the survey was made available in English and Arabic. Overall, 104 individuals responded. Of the national respondents 91% represented National and Local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), CSOs and CBOs, 3% national private sector organisations, 2% governments authorities, 1% local research institutions, 1% local coordination forums. From the international respondents 56% were international NGOs, 25% UN agencies, and 19% international donors international NGOs (See Table 2).

The survey aimed to gather factual data and information from different stakeholders for the six NEAR components; as well as perceptions on the extent to which national and local actors lead and fully participate in the humanitarian response. Survey findings have been included within relevant sections of the report. The survey was developed using the Google Form Platform (See Annex 5).

TABLE 2 DETAILS OF THE ONLINE SURVEY RESPONDENTS		
RESPONDENT'S ORGANISATION TYPE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
Local actors	88	85%
International actors	16	15%
Total	104	100%


Most of the respondents from national organisations work in 2 to 5 governorates of Lebanon with the highest percentage (71%) having offices in North Lebanon and the least number having offices in El Nabatieh (26%). A relevant proportion of national organisations (20%) work in only one governorate; those can be categorised as local organisations. On the contrary, most of the international respondents work in 5 and more governorates.

The majority of respondents (84%) mentioned that they are working to support Host Community/Vulnerable Lebanese citizens. Others mentioned that they are working in the development sector (78%), followed by those working in the humanitarian sector (65%) (This was a multiple-choice question and respondents were allowed to choose multiple answers).

From the 91% LNNGOs that responded to the survey, the majority (83%) described the typology of their organisation as national/local NGO non-affiliated to an INGO followed by those who described their organisation as women-led organisation (36%). (See Figure 1).

FIGURE 1 TYPOLOGY OF LNNGOS


How would you describe the typology of your organisation as?



The majority of national respondents work for an organisation which implements projects (81%) and the majority of international respondents work for an organisation that funds programmes (44%). (See Figure 2).

FIGURE 2 ACTORS THAT ARE FUNDING AND/OR IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMMES

Does your organisation currently fund or implement programmes in Lebanon?



(b) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

Two main semi-structured questionnaires were developed to guide the Focus Group Discussions. The first one was mainly targeting LNNGOs that are actively engaged in the humanitarian and development landscape in Lebanon which includes the Syrian refugee response. The second one had additional and more focused questions targeting LNNGOs engaged in the Beirut Blast emergency response (whether they had a humanitarian mandate or not but had to adapt their activities and functioning due to the situation). (See Annex 2 for the full list of participants).

In accordance with the sampling, a total of 8 face-to-face FGDs were conducted across seven governorates in Lebanon. A total of 63 participants attended the FGDs, representing different categories of LNNGOs (See Table 3 below). To ensure representation of all regions in Lebanon and enrich the study with thematic analysis, it was initially planned to cover the eight governorates of Lebanon, namely: Akkar, Baalbeck-Hermel, Beirut, Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon, El-Nabatiyeh, and South Lebanon. However, due to the very limited non-politically affiliated LNNGOs present in the governorate of El-Nabatiyeh, it was decided to add one additional FGD in Beirut instead of the one in El-Nabatiyeh in order to maintain the overall target. This allowed to conduct one additional FGD in Beirut specifically for partners of Expertise France involved in the Shabake Project.

The data consultant led the discussions with participants mainly in Arabic and shifted between languages during discussions to enable participants to share their insights freely. All interviews were recorded and transcribed and translated into English for analysis purposes. The analysis did not need the use of a specific qualitative data software.

TABLE 3 DETAILS OF THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED

GOVERNORATE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
Akkar	8	13%
Baalbeck-Hermel	10	16%
Beirut	17	27%
Beqaa	6	9%
Mount Lebanon	8	13%
North Lebanon	6	19%
South Lebanon	8	13%
Total	63	100%

(c) Key Informant Interviews (KIs)

KIs targeted key players of the humanitarian system that provided insights on the barriers and the boosters for localisation in Lebanon. 25 remote interviews were conducted with individuals representing different national and international institutions working across the country (See TABLE 4 below). KIs were conducted in English, French and Arabic depending on the preference of the interviewees. All interviews were recorded and transcribed and translated into English for analysis purposes. A full list of interviewees is provided in Annex 1.

TABLE 4 DETAILS OF THE KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS		
RESPONDENT'S ORGANISATION TYPE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
Local actors	9	39%
International actors	16	61%
Total	25	100%

2.3. Constraints and Limitations

Although Bioforce anticipated numerous constraints and challenges pertaining to the COVID-19 restrictions, the shortage of fuel and the decrease in purchasing power; the researchers were able to overcome them and ensure a very high engagement of stakeholders throughout the study.

However, some limitations remain and are mainly:

- *Interpretation bias*. The data may have been influenced by differing interpretations of key terms used during the data collection process, including translation between languages.
- *Representation*. Most of the stakeholders involved in the research were from national and international NGOs. Input from government representatives, international organisations and donors was more difficult to capture due to the lower rate of their participation especially in the online survey as well as to the scope of the research which was not focused on this type of actor.
- *Scope of the research*. The data collected was sometimes focused on some aspects of localisation better than others. Additional research is likely to be required in order to develop some sections, especially the one pertaining to commitment number 6 "participation".



THE HUMAN- ITARIAN SITUATION IN LEBANON





3. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN LEBANON

3.1 The Lebanese humanitarian landscape

Lebanon has a long history of internal and regional crises affecting its stability (see Box 3). Two humanitarian response plans coordinate the multi-sectoral response in complementarity. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) which address the impact of the Syrian Crisis in Lebanon and the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) which responds to the needs of the most vulnerable among the Lebanese and migrants affected by the crisis. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) estimates that 2.4 million people in Lebanon (1.9 million Lebanese; 0.15 million and 0.22 million Palestine refugees) (ERP 2021) and that 1.5 million displaced Syrians (LCRP) will need humanitarian assistance in 2021 - 2022.

During the last two years, the population of Lebanon has seen its situation dramatically worsen due to financial and economic decline, political fragility, massive protests and the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak that has left poverty levels among displaced populations and vulnerable Lebanese on the rise. Finally, the Beirut Port Explosion in August 2020, which was the third biggest explosion the world has experienced after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has devastated the country's general economy and the society's capacity to cope.

In March 2021, 78% of the Lebanese population (3 million people) was estimated to be in poverty and 36% (1.38 million) in extreme poverty (ERP 2021). The situation has affected the availability of basic services such as fuel, electricity, healthcare and clean water, most of which were previously provided through the private sector (ERP 2021) or public – private partnerships. Major needs identified in the aftermath of the explosion were related to the significant impact on lives and livelihoods, basic living conditions and coping mechanisms. At the end of 2020, 19% of Lebanese nationals reported the loss of their main sources of income (ERP 2021).

Since 2011, Lebanon has witnessed the arrival of a significant number of international partners responding to the Syrian Crisis which took over the humanitarian coordination in close partnership with the government. Today the Lebanon Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), donors and partners represent more than 200 institutions (UNCT 2020). A coordination forum for international actors, known as the Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF) was also formed with around 60 International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs).

Lebanon has always had an active, diverse and large civil society compared to other Arab countries in the region. The exact number of operational local and national civil society organisations is difficult to define. Data found on the Daleel Madani Civil Society Database funded by Lebanon Support estimates approximately 1,000 local and national Non-Governmental Organisations (LNGOs) functioning in Lebanon. Of these 1,000 LNGOs, around, 70 LNGOs coordinate through the Lebanon Humanitarian and development Forum (LHDF), a local forum created in January 2014.

BOX 3 THE MULTI-FACETED CRISIS BEING FACED BY THE LEBANESE SOCIETY



Box 3. The Multi-faceted crisis faced by the Lebanese society

The multiple crises afflicting Lebanon have led to a severe deterioration in people's standard of living. The last couple of years have been particularly challenging for the Lebanese population which have seen the collapse of the economy, social protests, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Beirut Port explosion.

Refugee influxes: Lebanon has been the host country for large-scale refugee influxes during the region's most significant humanitarian crises, Palestinian refugees, Iraqi refugees, and most recently, displaced Syrians arriving in 2011. According to the 2020 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR), 89% of Syrian refugee families (nine out of ten) live in extreme poverty, increasing from 55% only a year before, with even worse conditions for female-headed households.

The economic crisis: On September 2019, Lebanon's political leaders declared a "state of economic emergency" as a result of the country's long standing structural problems, including the mounting public debt of US\$91 billion (close to 170% of Gross Domestic Product), and a high fiscal deficit (almost 10% of GDP). The Lebanese Pound has lost more than 90% of its value, leading to a year-on-year inflation of 120% between May 2020 and May 2021 (ERP 2021). Lebanese banks have locked depositors out of their accounts and blocked transfers abroad, affecting also LNNGOs (Aljazeera 2021).

The 2019 October revolution: Motivated by the structural corruption practices implemented by the Lebanese public sector and the constant request for a real reform from the citizens of Lebanon, on October 2019, hundreds of thousands of protestors asked for "accountability, an end to corruption, and the resignation of all political representatives" (Amnesty International 2020). This crisis has led to the progressive growth of CSOs' representation in the society. Advocacy papers argue that CSOs have become watchdogs against corruption and mismanagement (Atrache, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic: By January 2021, Lebanon reported 3,000 new COVID-19 cases every day, and more than 192,000 total infections were recorded with 1,500 deaths (APNews 2021). In Lebanon, for Syrian and Palestinian refugees, vulnerable Lebanese and other vulnerable groups, the lockdown destroyed the remaining few opportunities they had to earn a livelihood and has exacerbated vulnerabilities among both refugee and host communities. The humanitarian interventions were constrained to shift the majority of its activities online.

3.2. Impact of the crises on the localisation agenda

Over the last year, Lebanon has been affected by several crises. Civil and political unrest starting from the third quarter of 2019; economic crisis and financial collapse in early 2020; global COVID-19 pandemic which affected Lebanon from late spring of 2020; port explosion in Beirut in August 2020.

Survey respondents were asked about the impact on their organisations of the multiple crises. Focus Group Discussion participants were encouraged to discuss the main challenges to operate in this particular context. The purpose was to understand how the system functioned during a crisis and the impact on those organisations. Although there were some positive outcomes noted, the overall effect of these crises was negative and, in some cases, threatened the existence of these organisations.

Trend 1. *The multiple crises in Lebanon have exacerbated the challenges faced by LNNGOs to implement their programmes.* Most of the external challenges mentioned are new and are related to the economic crisis and the COVID-19 restrictions. The shortages at all levels (fuel, electricity, medicines, etc.) directly impacted LNNGOs' implementation of activities. Electricity shortage affected online activities which were adopted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and fuel shortage hindered the beneficiaries from accessing services. Their capacity to address the changing needs of the affected population was one of the foremost concerns of LNNGOs, as needs are increasing exponentially.

Trend 2. *The impact of the economic crises is threatening the capacity of LNNGOs to retain human resources.* Representatives of the LNNGOs consulted on this study expressed their concern as the depletion of earnings is diminishing the motivation of volunteers and is pushing experienced staff to seek work amid international organisations and agencies. From their side, international interviewees alerted that the Lebanese brain drain will affect the capacity of the civil society to influence the future of their country. For them, civil society is at stake. In a December 2020 assessment, the World Bank warned that brain drain was becoming an "increasingly desperate option" (World Bank 2020). 77% of Lebanese youth wish to get out, according to one survey (Foreign Policy 2021).

Trend 3. *While donors demonstrate efforts to promote the localisation agenda by increasing funding initiatives to reach LNNGOs as much as possible, LNNGOs are concerned about the inflexibility of donors to adapt to this particular context.* The degradation of the security, the banking restrictions, the dollarisation of the aid community and the changes in the implementation's methodologies are adding operational challenges. LNNGOs have reported the oblivion of donors and international partners of these challenges and their inflexibility to ease procedures under these circumstances.

Survey findings:

Respondents indicated that spending existing funds (57%), accessing new funds (66%) and undertaking planned activities (63%) had all become harder particularly for national respondents as a result of the ongoing economic/political crisis and civil unrest while there had been less of an impact on maintaining relationships with existing partners both for nationals (33%) and internationals (14%). For international respondents undertaking planned activities has become harder (50%) while there is not particular change in their ability to spend existing funds (50%). (See Figure 3).

FIGURE 3 IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS AND CIVIL UNREST

To what extent have each of the following been harder or easier for your organisation as a result of the recent economic/political crisis and civil unrest?




When responding to the impact of the Beirut Blast and the COVID-19 pandemic, survey’s respondents indicated that accessing beneficiaries was the most affected action with 42% of national respondents and 57% of international respondents selecting this option.

Surprisingly, there were more mixed responses concerning the impact on participating to coordination meetings and forming new partnerships. Although the option ‘neither harder nor easier’ was the most frequently selected, there were responses across the range with 31% of nationals declaring easier to participate in coordination meetings and 36% of internationals declaring easier to form new partnerships.

The least affected action was leadership in coordination meetings. The majority of respondents (42%) indicated that this was ‘neither harder or easier’ as a result of the Blast and the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Figure 4).

FIGURE 4 IMPACT OF THE BEIRUT BLAST AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

To what extent have each of the following been harder or easier for your organisation as a result of the Beirut Blast and the COVID-19 pandemic?



Overall, responses of the survey show that the multiple crises had a negative impact on the organisations’ work and that crises are affecting to a larger extent the work of local and national organisations. For the international community there were some positive outcomes on localisation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. One guidance note issued by the IASC claimed that localisation was “both a necessity and an opportunity for effectively meeting humanitarian needs and recovery efforts post COVID-19” (IASC 2020). However, the majority of respondents, felt that the COVID-19 pandemic had a negative effect on the work of their organisation with 71% for national respondents and 57% for international respondents. Only 20% of national respondents reported positive effects on their work. Considering the different components of the NEAR localisation framework, the integration of LNNGOs into the aid ecosystem was, at some level, impacted by the multiple crises. Where there has been a positive impact, the effects can be coupled with efforts of the humanitarian community reported on this study. Where negative impact has been observed, these are mainly related to operational challenges affecting international actors just as much.



GRAND BAR- GAIN AND THE LOCALISATION AGENDA IN LEBANON





4. GRAND BARGAIN AND THE LOCALISATION AGENDA IN LEBANON

4.1. *The Grand Bargain and the Lebanese humanitarian community*

The Grand Bargain, first proposed in a report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General, entitled “too Important to Fail – Addressing the Humanitarian Financing Gap” (Sharrock, D. et al, 2016), was formally launched at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in May 2016 where 52 aid organisations and donors became signatories. By July 2020, there had been a slight increase in the number of signatory members (*See Annex 4*) and currently totals 63 including: 25 Member states; 22 NGOs and NGO networks; 12 UN entities; the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross; and 2 Inter-governmental organisations.

The five-year mark of the Grand Bargain has led to calls for a refined Grand Bargain 2.0 to be executed within a two-year period, by mid-2023. Two enabling priorities, in line with the purpose of this study, complete the objectives of the Grand Bargain 2.0. These are: better-quality funding and improved support to local responders with increased engagement of affected populations (ODI/HPG 2021).

Trend 1. *The level of knowledge of the Grand Bargain depends on the exposure of LNNGOs to the humanitarian system.*

For international stakeholders, the Grand Bargain commitments are known with some level of expertise depending on the position “of the stakeholder” and the agency they work for. The knowledge of the localisation agenda is generalised among them, and all have some implications in initiatives towards a more localised aid ecosystem. On the contrary, local and national actors’ participants of this study showed a much lower level of knowledge, with a relatively higher level of awareness from LNNGOs implementing activities in the Lebanese capital.

Out of the 63 organisations participating in the Focus Group Discussions, 54 organisations responded to the question on the knowledge of the Grand Bargain and out of those, only seven (13%) knew about the Grand Bargain. In comparison, 26 organisations (48%) were familiar with the localisation agenda. Within the last five years, LNNGOs have indicated changes in the way of working with international counterparts. Although these changes are not perceived directly as a result of the Grand Bargain, they mentioned an increase in the cooperation with INGOs and their level of involvement in the humanitarian architecture. LNNGOs have the feeling that the credibility and the trust towards their work have improved. They have seen the number of capacity strengthening initiatives multiply. However, LNNGOs mentioned a feeling of inequality concerning international stakeholders. They

have noted that INGOs are now demanding more procedures and compliance than before. All these aspects will be treated broadly in section 5 of this study.


“Lebanon is in a better situation than other countries in terms of having a stronger ability to lift up national organisations and have a much stronger role to play within the country in terms of implementation of humanitarian and government work” (David Elkins).

Survey Findings:

During the 2019 survey respondents working for national organisations and independent respondents were asked how familiar they were with the Grand Bargain. The majority of respondents (62%) indicated that they were not familiar with the Grand Bargain with only 21% of respondents indicating that they were familiar with it. See Figure 5.

FIGURE 5
FAMILIARITY WITH THE GRAND BARGAIN

How familiar are you with the Grand Bargain?



This year’s survey, asked for the definition, 77% of the respondents identified the Grand Bargain as an agreement between the biggest donors and aid organisations that aims to increase the efficiency between donors and humanitarian organisations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. 12% of them defined the Grand Bargain as an agreement to increase funding to national actors and 12% as a geopolitical agreement between donors and countries see Figure 6.

FIGURE 6 FAMILIARITY WITH THE GRAND BARGAIN

In your opinion, what is the grand bargain?

The ‘Grand bargain’ is an agreement between the biggest donors and aid organisations that aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian organisations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action.

The ‘Grand bargain’ is about increasing funding to national actors.

The Grand bargain is about a geopolitical agreement between donors and countries.

Trend 2. Grand Bargain signatories operating in Lebanon and the humanitarian community are invested in achieving commitments of the Grand Bargain, and the Localisation agenda has a particular attention from them.

Out of the 63 signatories of the Grand Bargain and the 36 aid organisations (UN agencies, NGOs and ICRC/IFRC), the majority are involved in Lebanon directly or through partners or subsidiaries. In fact, 31 organisations have a presence or undertake direct programming in Lebanon.

A proportion of Grand Bargain signatories in Lebanon are operating, mixing direct implementation with increased complementarity through partnerships. For example, ICRC with the Lebanese Red Cross, CAFOD and CRS, both with Caritas Lebanon. From its side, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an INGO with the mandate of direct implementation, is putting organisational efforts to increase partnerships. They now have more than 15 partnerships, and the partnerships department handles the modalities of cooperation.

“It is a strategic objective for the organisation but is still a work in progress, we need to match the philosophy and mandate of NRC with not versus the objectives of the localisation agenda” (NRC). Four of the five aid organisations that are not present in Lebanon, namely the ICVA, NEAR, Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and InterAction, are networks or membership organisations or committees that do not undertake any direct programming. ICVA and recently the NEAR, have representatives in the MENA region that ensure the support to its members from Jordan. By working mainly on evidence-based research and data sharing within the humanitarian environment they aim to push the sector forward to reflect on the needed change.

With the shift of the humanitarian response leadership due to the Beirut Port explosion, international actors recognised the engagement of Najat Rochdi, the humanitarian coordinator (HC) and of the Humanitarian Country Teams (HCT) in making efforts to increase the level of inclusion and leadership of national stakeholders (See Box 4).

BOX 4 OCHA’S INVESTMENT IN THE LOCALISATION AGENDA

Box 4: OCHA’s investment in the localisation agenda

OCHA is working to ensure the engagement of local entities within the coordination mechanisms and structures in Lebanon. Two main elements are part of their priorities:

1. Strengthening the coordination forums and making sure that LHDF is well capacitated to interact with them.
2. Supporting the ability of the national entities to be part of the coordinated response and structures under the leadership of the HC/HCT.

“We work for them to have access to multilateral funding and for them to be part of the coordinated response plans. By being part of the coordinated response plan, local NGOs’ contribution can be integrated to the collective response and we also can support them in having access to multilateral funding. Localisation is a priority for us, it is not a project but is the way we try to do our job in Lebanon. We certainly can do better but is something we very much care about” (Severine Rey OCHA).




Survey findings:

Although international actors were underrepresented in the sample of the survey respondents, almost half of them (40%) are signatories of the Grand Bargain and 7% are planning to sign it. (See Figure 7)

FIGURE 7 GRAND BARGAIN SIGNATORIES


Is your organisation a signatory of the Grand Bargain?



While political willingness seems to increase and initiatives are presents, the Grand Bargain commitments are not being used as an accountability and reporting tool to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of the humanitarian interventions. The survey indicated that only 27% of national respondents and 56% of international respondents are using the Grand Bargain as an accountability and reporting tool. See Figure 8.

FIGURE 8 USE OF THE GRAND BARGAIN AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING TOOL

Is your organisation using the "Grand Bargain" as an accountability and reporting tool?



4.2. The level of understanding of the localisation agenda in the Lebanese context

Localisation is a product of a wide range of changes, particularly those related to the types of organisations that are leading or delivering humanitarian assistance, the ways in which these organisations are working and, the environment in which humanitarian action takes place. The processes leading to localisation are not new. Localisation has been incorporated as an approach into several significant frameworks and agreements since the early 1990s including the 1994 Code of Conduct for International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, the 2003 Good Humanitarian Donorship General Principles, the 2007 Principles of Partnership and the 2015/16 Charter for Change.

The second work stream of the Grand Bargain commits signatories to providing “more support and funding tools for local and national responders” and is commonly referred to as the localisation agenda.

The specific objectives of the agenda “to increase investment in local actors and to improve partnerships and coordination between international and local responders” (IFRC 2018). Signatories are committed to making “principled humanitarian action as local as possible and as international as necessary while continuing to recognise the vital role of international actors, in particular in situations of armed conflict”. The aim of workstream two is not to withdraw international actors from humanitarian response but to find a more appropriate balance that recognises the comparative advantage of various actors, allowing them to work in a way that is complementary, and that redresses power imbalances which lead to inefficiencies and ineffective actions.

There is not a common definition on localisation among the humanitarian stakeholders. Although not articulated in the Grand Bargain, the reasons for promoting localisation are the following (ICVA 2018):

- Strengthening inclusion of, accountability to, and acceptance by affected populations;
- Increasing resilience through linking preparedness, response and recovery efforts;
- Enhancing the speed, quality and scale of humanitarian response;
- Adding value through improving the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian action;
- Promoting diversity, innovation and contextual approaches.

This section aims to analyse the level of understanding of the concept and components of the localisation agenda among the humanitarian actors interviewed in this study. This understanding is the starting point to analyse the degree to which the Lebanese humanitarian response is localised.

Trend 1. *The level of understanding, the implications and the commitments of the localisation agenda differ from one stakeholder to another one.*


Most interviewees agreed that localisation objectives are not understood at the same level by all stakeholders. Interviewees mentioned the seven localisation components with different degrees of importance, including meaningful participation and decision making within the coordination. However, for L/NAs, discussions on the meaning are overdue, and it is now the time to plan and implement a localisation framework with clear objectives that can increase accountability.

This finding was confirmed during the validation workshop. Participants were asked if there is a common definition for the Lebanese stakeholders on what localisation is: 85% of the participants responded negatively and only 15% affirmatively (See Figure 9). This cleavage is coherent with the different discussions carried out during this study and shows the importance of clarifying what is expected from the localisation agenda with components and indicators.



FIGURE 9 COMMON DEFINITION OF WHAT LOCALISATION IS? VALIDATION WORKSHOP POLL

Is there a common definition of localisation in Lebanon?



Trend 2. *At some levels, there are contradictions in the way national and international stakeholders apprehend the localisation objectives.*

Participants of the study did not report tensions around localisation. However, during the discussions, differences in perceptions were identified. For some international interviewees, it was essential to clarify that localisation should not be reduced to the financial component and that it should not be understood as an immediate exit strategy from INGOs and other stakeholders. Complementarity of the work and sustainability of the humanitarian action were two words that were regularly mentioned. On the contrary, national organisations insisted on components that slightly differ from the international perception when defining localisation. For them it is important to ensure an exit strategy and a transition of leadership from international organisations to L/NAs in order to ensure the sustainability of the response using the locally available resources

Trend 3. *A country-based localisation framework led by L/NAs is the only way to advance the agenda and ensure progress.*

“Localisation can be achieved, but it will only be achieved by having a common work plan within the country focusing on localisation process. And having everyone who signed up for the Grand Bargain, sign on for that. Once you have that, then you can begin to hold people accountable. We have tools in place for accountability but we are not using them in a positive way within the national work plan” (David Elkins).

Local and international actors operating in Lebanon insisted that the process needs to be defined and led by national partners in complementarity with international actors. Nevertheless, the process is not straightforward about what needs to be done and by whom to achieve localisation.

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to identify who should lead the development and implementation of such a framework. A consensus was reached among all groups on the fact that L/NAs should lead this initiative with the support of international stakeholders. The concrete form of how this leadership would take place was not defined. The creation of a task force, a joint committee with LNNGOs and INGOs or a coalition of LNNGOs were mentioned. However, a point was raised to identify existing initiatives that can be supported to avoid duplication. Some mentioned the importance of including the government, and some insisted that it should be leading these types of exercises. Others have mentioned the need to create a separate ministry that will handle the humanitarian sector and pilot the localisation agenda.

The role of coordination forums is crucial in leading and piloting this framework. The LHDF can have the leadership on this task but needs financial support to assume it. LNNGOs insisted that by creating small coalitions, the view of small organisations can be taken into account in a consultative way to participate in the framework. This process of defining priorities for a contextualised localisation agenda must be as inclusive as possible.

“All is in agreement that localisation is a global commitment and there is a need for a greater effort to advance the role of local actors. However, the localisation should be clearly defined with clear objectives and clear indicators to measure progress. Furthermore, localisation as a process should be considered among all stakeholders in a shared responsibility and ensure that accountability is clear to those who are involved from UN, donors, INGOs, and LNNGOs themselves” (ICVA).

Recommendation at a glance:

Local actors should be supported in leading the definition of a country-specific localisation framework including the priorities and commitments of stakeholders.

5. PROGRESS ON LOCALISATION IN LEBANON

5.1. The overall perception of progress on localisation of aid

5.1.1 Current State

Trend 1. *From the perception of local actors, the humanitarian aid system is not localised. From the perception of international actors, efforts have been made, and the localisation agenda in Lebanon is evolving. However, the pace is slow, and there is still much to do.*


The Lebanese civil society has a lot of potential and the country is considered a fertile field to advance on the localisation agenda compared to other countries. There are different degrees of inclusion

of LNNGOs depending on their size, location and other factors. Localisation has already been achieved by a reduced number of LNNGOs meaningfully enjoying the same rights as international actors. In fact, these LNNGOs have already achieved most of the desired changes outlined in the NEAR localisation performance framework proving there is a shift in the system. However, this is not the rule. The sector as a whole has not changed. Aid in Lebanon is not localised.

During the validation workshop, participants were asked if the aid ecosystem in Lebanon, in their perception, is localised. 81% of the participants responded negatively to this question, and only 19% were affirmative (See Figure 10). This finding is much radical than the information gathered from the qualitative data. However, it accentuates the fact that actions need to be taken to advance the localisation agenda in Lebanon.



FIGURE 10 IS THE LEBANESE AID ECOSYSTEM LOCALISED? VALIDATION WORKSHOP POLL



Trend 2. For national and international actors interviewed, the humanitarian system needs to change structurally for localisation to be achieved.

Country-based efforts are necessary but it is crucial to admit that at some levels the process of localisation is inefficient as long as bureaucratic and paternalistic practices continue to prevail within the system. The most recurrent trend of the study was the need of a structural change. The whole essence of the sector needs to be rethought to change the power dynamics among the stakeholders. Traditional behaviour from the international community in a system highly dominated by Western practices hinders the efficiency on which efforts can translate into relevant successes. In fact, the decision-making power lies in the hands of international actors, who are perceived as having some colonial attitude.

The current structure of international headquarters guiding the INGOs' missions (in this case in Lebanon) and donors' constraints to fund national partners directly reinforce the power imbalance. For some interviewees, it was necessary to stress that there are some higher-level platforms where change needs to be discussed and that country-based discussions are essential but not enough.

" It is necessary to ultimately ask the question of the aid system itself. This system remains very western centred and somewhat paternalistic. We are making huge global efforts on this, the famous decolonisation of the aid system, but lots remain to be done" (Severine Rey, OCHA).




Survey Findings:

Survey respondents agreed with 82% that sustainability and resilience of L/NAs would increase if aid was more localised. (See Figure 11).

FIGURE 11 SUSTAINABILITY AND RESILIENCE OF L/NAS

To what extent do you agree that the sustainability and resilience of L/NAs would be increased if aid was more localised?

- To a limited extent ●
- To a good extent ●
- Not at all ●



Trend 3. *Localisation initiatives are not including the government and its institutions as a key player.*

Particular attention has been raised by participants of the study, mainly local actors, on the government’s role. The Government of Lebanon was rather active within the aid system with the development and adoption of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) following the Syrian Crisis. In particular, the LCRP aims to increase the focus on aid coordination under the general leadership, guidance and supervision of the Government, through the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) which has the legal mandate to oversee the response to the crisis, in partnership with the donor community, UN agencies, civil society actors including NGOs, the private sector, and academic institutions.

The role of MoSA is highlighted in the official LCRP report as well as in most of the publications discussing the response of the aid sector to the Syrian crisis. However, the management of the international aid flowing to Lebanon is not perceived as being overseen by MoSA nor managed by it. With very weak and low representation, the Government considers itself almost absent from the sector-meetings happening across the country and more importantly in Beirut, as mentioned during the interview with MoSA.

According to the OECD (2017), localisation is the process of recognising, respecting and strengthening the leadership of local authorities and the capacity of local civil society in humanitarian action. Participants of this study, insisted on the need to increase the government’s role while working together with international partners.

“There is no doubt that local and international partners are important. Their presence and their work contribute to the work of public administrations and the governmental authorities especially the Ministry of Social Affairs” (MoSA).

The current aid sector and its management has been described as chaotic by MoSA. Although the ministry has developed multiple partnerships with the international community, mainly the Italians, the British and the Americans, it perceives alienation from both the local and the international community. This behaviour leaves the sector with a missing key player which can hinder to a great extent the advancement of the localisation agenda.

“If we really want to achieve localisation, international donors need to first look at the national strategy that is already developed in Lebanon

and start working around that. In order to localise, we need to start working on the existing structures to give ownership to the local actors (government entities and NGOs) because they are the ones who will ensure sustainability on the long run” (Kassem Chaalan, Lebanese Red Cross).

The trend pertaining to the involvement of the government for the coming years does not seem to be positive. There is a direction toward moving away from the government which was reinforced by the statements of the international community following the Beirut Blast. The Ministry of Social Affairs has stated that the current aid system is unique in Lebanon compared to other hosting countries and there is no political will to change it nor to put the government at the centre of this dynamic.

5.1.2 Barriers To Achieving Localisation

Challenges and barriers to the localisation of aid in Lebanon cannot be generalised to include the reality of all L/NAs. However, the mapping identified two main trends within the challenges. The first one reflects the perceptions and attitudes from the system that can be blocking advancements. The second one covers the means needed to achieve localisation.

Barrier 1. *Challenges to meaningfully integrate the aid ecosystem will vary depending on the organisations’ maturity, it’s capacity to plan programs, access funding, respond at scale, and coordinate as a peer with international actors.*

On the one hand, in Lebanon around 10 to 20 organisations have been recognised by international stakeholders as key local actors making their way into the system but needing support and resources to increase their role in coordination mechanisms and decision-making processes. Examples of such organisations are AMEL, Rene Moawad Foundation, Akkar Network for Development, DPN, LOST, Imam Sadr Foundation, Nabad, etc. On the other hand, Lebanon has numerous middle or small size LNNGOs with recognised technical expertise implementing programs with a remarkable knowledge of the community needs. These LNNGOs need support to strengthen their organisation, design procedures, reinforce human resources capacity, and ensure their structure fits the system’s requirements for them to access funding and enhance their representation.

Although there has been a differentiation between small L/NAs and large L/NAs, both face approximately the same type of barriers, but for small NGOs they are more pronounced. Most middle/small NGOs are facing internal challenges that hinder their ability to interact with the humanitarian sector. Governance structure and professionalisation were mentioned as the most relevant barrier. In second place, some L/NAs reported facing difficulties in abiding by compliance and due-diligence mechanisms that prevent them from fully enjoying the benefits of the aid system.

In the third place, comes the lack of expertise in their sectors of interventions. However, this can come also from the fact that L/NAs are driven by funding opportunities and are juggling sectors of interventions without pursuing only actions related to their mandates and know-how.

With regards to the external factors that affects the integration of L/NAs in the aid system, three main barriers have been mentioned by the participants of the study. The first one is the lack of direct funding as they have the perception that funding is monopolised by INGOs. The second one is the complex regulations and procedures that are set by international actors. The third one is the lack of access to information related to funding, coordination efforts and capacity opportunities. This is due to the limited outreach done by donors and INGOs that is excluding many L/NAs from the system. In fact, INGOs are perceived as always working with the same big L/NAs and thus are systematically excluding others.

Barrier 2. *The process of localisation is not insisting enough on the importance of the complementarity of work among national and international stakeholders.*

The nature of localisation can be scary to some actors. This perception can block the pace of efforts to advance. An exit strategy from international stakeholders is not the purpose of localisation. At least, not as a first step. Localisation and humanitarian actions should aim to enhance efficiency and sustainability for the people they serve. In this sense, stakeholders of the aid ecosystem should seek complementarity taking advantage of the local know-how and capacities to increase the quality of their actions.

“ Localisation is a right for local actors, it doesn't take for me to come and say it is the time for local actors to respond. Actually, they have responded since always. Localisation is a right, but it needs collective efforts from all partners” (Anonymous, International Key Informant Interview).

In particular, a commitment from INGOs headquarters is required for complementarity efforts to be translated in the field. For example, HQ could either push missions to work in meaningful partnerships or refrain from responding to some projects if an identified local actor has the capacity to do it.

Barrier 3. *Time, resources and motivation are preventing localisation from happening.*

The main purpose of the humanitarian actors in Lebanon is to address the humanitarian needs of those in need. Time is of the essence; stakeholders are already overwhelmed by responding to the growing humanitarian needs. Interviewees have reported difficulties in dedicating the time to accompany L/NAs on a daily basis while the system doesn't provide incentives or motivations to provoke the change.

“We have underestimated the amount of time it takes to accompany local NGOs through the donors' processes. INGO are doing it but then they become the hotline for local NGOs and this takes time” (AFD).

Although localisation should not be reduced to the financing component, the most mentioned challenge by international actors is access to resources. Resources at different levels, for the large LNNGOs to enhance their representation, for the small to strengthen their structures, for international actors to support localisation in different ways. However, even though most interviewed donors are exploring ways to increase funding for local actors, the pace at which they are supporting localisation slow.

“ We cannot just ask local actors to be part of the structure. We have a duty to support them to be part of the structures. That comes with a cost, so donors cannot only push the Grand Bargain and then not dedicated the resources that go with it” (Severine Rey, OCHA).



Recommendations at a glance:

Any initiative on localisation in Lebanon needs to be designed with L/NAs to ensure the different particularities of L/NAs are taken into consideration.

Disseminate advocacy messages on the need for complementarity among international and national partners.

5.1.3 Initiatives and recommendations

Since 2016, Grand Bargain signatories have been reflecting and implementing initiatives on localisation. In Lebanon, both international and national actors insist on L/NAs to take the lead in prioritising the pathway to localisation. International actors should play a crucial role in facilitating this process and adapting the system as much as possible to match the realities of the Lebanese civil society.

Recommendation 1. There is a positive perception on localisation initiatives. However, a coordinated localisation framework gathering different initiatives could avoid duplication and enhance efficiency.


Although international actors seem to be more positive than national respondents, there is a general feeling that localisation initiatives will have a good impact on the humanitarian response as a whole. Survey respondents were asked to what extent localisation initiatives in Lebanon will empower civil society capacity with regards to their humanitarian interventions. 82% of national actors and 93% of international actors agreed to a good extent. On the contrary, there is a disagreement on the effects of localisation initiatives on L/NAs' ability to lead or influence decision making in the response where 23% of national actors' respondents answered to a limited extend while 93% of international actors' respondent to a good extent.

On the International actors' side, 20% of them don't believe localisation initiatives will increase L/NAs involvement in humanitarian action and 17% of national actors believe that but to a limited extend. See Figure 12.



FIGURE 12 IMPACT OF THE LOCALISATION INITIATIVES

To what extent do you think localisation initiatives in Lebanon will...



Recommendation 2. L/NAs must take ownership of the process of localisation. Any initiative to advance the localisation agenda should be designed by them, establishing priorities and activities.

International and national actors insisted on the need that L/NAs have to take ownership of the process of localisation. Any initiative to advance the agenda should be designed by them, establishing priorities and activities. For this to happen, the Lebanon Humanitarian & Development NGOs Forum (LHDF) and the large NGOs can play a key role in leading the process and accompanying the other L/NAs.

For L/NAs to lead the process of localisation, they must feel comfortable raising their voices and have the appropriate space to do it. Large LNNGOs are now advising smaller LNNGOs to navigate the system as a reflection of the process they have gone through in securing a place in it. They are the most suitable to accompany them as they will understand what they are going through. However, this responsibility is time-consuming and LNNGOs taking this role need funding to assume it.

“The international actors must ensure the empowerment of local actors by sharing the space and supporting local actors to be included in decision making process and leadership position. Together (International and National Actors) can build a complementarity and meaningful partnership and aim for an effective and efficient response” (ICVA).

The role of international actors is essential. They need to prepare the path and facilitate practices for L/NAs to be part of the system. For instance, ensuring their inclusion in coordination mechanisms, proposing innovating funding mechanisms, adapting requirements for funding, and most and foremost, ensuring L/NAs are involved in discussions around localisation in international forums.

Recommendation 3. The government and its institutions must be central to the aid system and not peripheral. This will ensure a more sustainable intervention on the long term.

The majority of interviewees highlighted the importance of developing an aid system where the government and its institutions are central to it and not peripheral. This will ensure a more sustainable intervention on the long term. In addition to that, advancing the agenda and contextualising it, should take into consideration the existing national strategy and other existing structures and mechanism.

Recommendations at a glance:

To enhance the role of the LHDF and other local forums as representatives of local actor’s priorities for localisation.

To involve L/NAs in international discussions, exchange platforms and conferences on the subject of localisation.



This report uses the NEAR localisation framework definition for partnership that states as a desire change:

More genuine and equitable partnerships, and less sub-contracting. Equitable and complementary partnerships between L/NA and INGOs/UN to facilitate the delivery of timely, and effective humanitarian response.

5.2. PARTNERSHIPS

5.2.1 Current State

Trend 1. *The number of partnerships has increased between local/national organisations and international actors.*

In the Lebanese aid landscape, partnerships have increased, expanding the number of L/NAs exposed to humanitarian practices. There is a general recognition of L/NAs' capacity to play more than an implementer role. Local respondents mentioned that efforts are underway, and international actors are shifting away from the concept of "implementing partner/sub-contractor". There is evidence of international stakeholders building feedback mechanisms to evaluate and improve the quality of partnerships.


"There are some good partnerships between local and international NGOs with good frameworks. Most of them improved and evolved throughout the years but they are still only accessible to the club of the big 100 local NGOs in Lebanon" (Anonymous, National Key Informant Interview).

Survey Findings:

The majority of the respondents (91%) have ongoing partnerships, and most of those partnerships are formalised using partnership agreements (75%) and project grants (71%). Long term MOUs and cost-sharing agreements are less frequently stated with 41% and 20% respectively (See Figure 13). In the research conducted by UNDP on localisation within the MENA region, it stated that there is a large panel and types of partnership agreements. UN organisations and international NGOs use different templates for their partnership agreements and emphasise different aspects of conditionality and partnership (UNDP & UNHCR, February 2019).

FIGURE 13 TYPES OF AGREEMENTS WITHIN PARTNERSHIPS²


What kind of agreement does your organisation use when partnering with L/NA or with international organisations/agencies?



The most common partnerships formed by local/national organisations are with international organisations (83%), closely followed by partnerships with other national organisations (80%). There are less partnerships with the private sector (40%) and with other types of organisations (6%). From their side, international actors have built partnerships mainly with local organisations (94%), followed by 81% with other fellow international organisations, 31% with private actors and 25% with other types of organisations (universities, government...). See Figure 14. Local-to-local partnerships have been a tendency largely mentioned in the interviewees and is part of the recommendations to strengthened the role of L/NAs.

FIGURE 14 TYPES OF ACTORS WITHIN PARTNERSHIPS

Your partnerships are with what type of actors?



² Survey respondents were able to select multiple responses to the question. The percentages, therefore, add up to more than 100%.

Trend 2. *The quality and equitability of partnerships are questioned from both sides.*

There has been more space for dialogue with international organisations to better understand the rules and regulations of the system and this is because the capacity of L/NAs has improved over the years. However, most of the participants of the study, internationals and locals, perceive the current partnerships as not equitable, and highlight that the power dynamics is not balanced. The current situation is not very optimistic despite the improvements expressed by both actors.


The mechanisms in place to manage the partnerships depend on the INGOs perceptions of how it should be. Furthermore, L/NAs depend on the willingness of the INGOs to provide indirect costs to fund their structure and have to comply to the unilateral requirements imposed to them. Often, those requirements can be stricter than those requested by donors. Some donors, recognised to have little visibility on how partnerships are being implemented, and insisted that more accountability and reporting in the way partnerships are carry out could promote better practices.

“We need to be more involved in the designing of the needs assessment and in direct communication with international donors without barriers” (FGD, Participant, Mount Lebanon).

Although there are examples of good practices, the majority of L/NAs do not participate in decision-making during the phases of the project cycle, especially in the project and budget designs. More accountability on this aspect could motivate enhancement in the partnership’s quality, especially that the majority of L/NAs describe their partnerships as project-focused (59%) rather than strategic (31%). An interesting discrepancy in the perception of the partnerships is noted, for international actors (56%) the majority of them are strategic partnerships against (31%) of project- focused. See Figure 15.

FIGURE 15 TYPES OF PARTNERSHIPS FORMED

How would you describe the majority of the partnerships you have with international organisations/agencies or L/NA?



In order to break the power imbalance, L/NAs need to negotiate as peers with international actors. However, funding dependency hinders their availability to say no and negotiate. Unless the humanitarian landscape leaves place for negotiations, this will be a never-ending cycle.

Furthermore, although some L/NAs have a lot of expertise and experience, these are not very well taken into account by INGOs. For instance, following the responses of COVID-19 and the Beirut Blast, LNNGOs faced a lot of challenges on the field which increased their experience on how to overcome them. This has not been perceived or valued by INGOs and donors which continue to leave LNNGOs within the same power imbalance dynamic.

“When we face challenges with a project, we try to find solutions with our local partners. Sometimes it requires a contextual change which we implement based on the expertise and advice of our local partners. This is how the partnerships improve the response” (Anonymous, National Key Informant Interview).

Recommendations at a glance:

Reconsider and rethink the purpose of partnerships, especially from the international side. Partnerships should not be about ticking the boxes of good governance and accountability. There should rather be a genuine will to work in complementarity with local resources and increase the quality of the humanitarian interventions.

INGOs must aim at involving, as much as possible, L/NAs in project proposals' development, to determine the needs and the adequacy of the interventions in the best possible way.

The international community must increase evidence-based efforts and disseminate good practices to increase accountability on the quality of partnership.

Trend 3. *Partnerships and intermediate INGOs are a necessary step but it should not be confused with localisation.*

Partnerships are playing a double role for the localisation agenda. For local actors, INGOs serve as intermediaries and as a first stepping stone into the humanitarian and development system. L/NAs can access funds and implement projects, while learning how to apply procedures and interact with the system. For donors, insisting on INGOs to increase partnerships allows them to fund “as direct as possible” while international NGOs are absorbing the risks. Nevertheless, implementation through partnerships should not be confused with localisation. Through consultations, donors have recognised their incapacity to manage small grants and their preference to select partners who deliver at scale interventions. However, donors largely motivate international actors to create partnerships, sometimes as a formal requirement or by providing additional points to the grant application (See Box 5).

BOX 5 FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THIRD PARTIES

Box 5. Financial Support to Third Parties

A Financial Support to Third Parties (FSTP) is a financial mechanism whereby the European Commission promotes funds arriving to the Lebanese civil society. EU provides funding to one organisation as a grant applicant which in turn re-grant funds to reach out local CSOs and grassroots organisations.

“Where donors don’t have the capacity to manage a huge number of grants with local organisations they don’t know well, they transfer the risk to INGOs. While we understand their concerns, this practice is not sustainable in the long term” (NRC).



For now, localisation through partnerships seems to be a good compromise to ensure more involvement from L/NAs in the humanitarian response. However, this solution is perceived as being reserved for the very few large local NGOs that have successfully build good partnerships with international organisations throughout the years. Small LNNGOs encounter challenges to enhance their visibility, to succeed in the capacity assessments process³ and to be selected by international partners. A particular attention has been raised to avoid tendencies of monopoly (only

taking into account the few large NGOs) and to promote the enlargement of the LNNGOs selected to partner with international stakeholders.

“We could say that the objective of localisation is not only to remove the intermediaries but concretely to have more long-term funding. More funding in sectors that contribute to the economic recovery, not only of the humanitarian sector but also social businesses” (AFD).

Recommendations at a glance:

To avoid the concentration of a few LNNGOs actively participating in the system and reinforce the capacity of a more significant number of LNNGOs to respond to crises. International stakeholders should aim at increasing and expanding the number of L/NAs they partner with.

Local actors recognised as “large LNNGOs” should continue the dynamic of partnering with smaller actors. They are best suited to support their counterparts as it is a process they have already gone through.

5.2.2 Barriers To Form Equitable Partnerships

Barrier 1. *Partnerships are based on a “donor-recipient” short-term approach that hinder meaningful collaboration.*

Participants of the study particularly insisted that the quality of the existing partnerships is mediocre. The main reason for that is the “donor-recipient” approach to partnerships focused on short-term deliverables rather than long-term vision. The short-term span affects the construction of strategic partnerships because a meaningful partnership takes time to build trust and understand the added value of each partner. In addition, INGOs have constant turnovers that prevent long-term relations to happen efficiently.

³ *In this sense, capacity assessment refers to the tool used by most international actors to assess the processes, systems and level of risk of potential partners.*

In terms of partnerships, a distinction needs to be made regarding the two types of INGOs operating in Lebanon. There are those with a core business designed to work alongside national partners who are the actual implementers; and those who have the mandate and the organisational culture to implement directly. In both cases, INGOs are playing an intermediary role between donors and LNNGOs. The first type of INGOs have partnership expertise and use mechanisms to accompany the implementation of programs and the capacity strengthening of their national partners. They do not seem to be affected by the short-term humanitarian funding cycle and are inverting the leadership in partnerships (See Box 6). The other type is still learning the processes, applying guidelines, and trying to include and communicate with their partners in the best way possible. However, for the second type of international organisations (INGOs) to effectively implement the shift on long-lasting partnerships, a direction has to come from a more extensive organisational guidance. Headquarters of these organisations must propose the way and provide the necessary resources to manage partnerships. In the last three years, NRC has increased the number of partnerships.

“Complementary partnerships with local stakeholders are becoming ever more important for NRC. Where in previous years NRC would have focused primarily on direct implementation, strategically now there is a direction to work with local organisations where possible to enhance our interventions” (NRC).

BOX 6 TRÓCAIRE, BUILDING LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIPS IN LEBANON

Box 6. Trócaire, building long-term partnerships in Lebanon

Trócaire has over 45 years of experience working in partnership with local civil society organisations and has been present in Lebanon since 2012 to support partners responding to the Syrian Crisis.

Their partnership approach that fosters long-term relationships with civil society aims to accompany partners in the effective management of various programmes, ensuring quality and accountability to all stakeholders.

Under the OCHA LHF grant, Trócaire is the sub-grantee of its national partner Caritas Lebanon. Through this partnership, the aim is to provide technical support, to the national partner, on accountability to affected populations, including the integration of accountability into M&E tools and approaches, review and adaptation of policies, training on protection, PSEA and safeguarding, as well as support on information sharing and community-based feedback mechanisms.


Survey Findings:

When asked what factors hinder L/NAs from forming equitable partnerships with international organisations/agencies, both national and international actors mentioned the main barriers to be the lack of equal power and resource sharing with 63% and 75% respective-

ly. The third barrier that followed and that had also similar importance for both nationals and internationals is the different expectations from the partnerships with 55% and 44% respectively for nationals and internationals. Other barriers were also mentioned and were mostly focused on the lack of trust and transparency. See Figure 16 below.

FIGURE 16 FACTORS THAT HINDER THE FORMATION OF EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS

What factors hinder L/NAs from forming equitable partnerships with international organisations/agencies? (Tick all that apply)



Barrier 2. *Partnerships are adding layers which are decreasing direct communication with donors and are increasing the perception of risks.*

From the perception of L/NAs, partnerships are multi-layered with many partners coming between them and the donors which is decreasing communication and transparency. INGOs have mentioned from their side that one of the barriers to meaningful partnerships is the fact that they are absorbing the risk by serving as intermediaries between LNNGOs and donors. This has led donors to be highly dependent on UN and INGOs reports to understand the capacity, the needs and the strategies of LNNGOs in the field. Most of the time those reports lack account-

ability on the quality of partnerships formed which leaves donors blind about the cooperation surrounding their financed partnerships with INGOs. This multi-layered approach is affecting the donors, the INGOs and the LNNGOs who are trapped in a system, where there are not enough incentives for current practices and process to change. INGOs, besides being engaged in localisation, do not feel the need to change their current behaviour with concrete actions that required time and resources.

Moreover, having a gap in direct communication between L/NAs and donors is increasing the misunderstandings that are happening between local and international actors. This is particularly perceived around requirements and technicalities requested from INGOs and donors. Working on a simpler and more straightforward communication channel will eventually lead L/NAs to better understand donors' procedures requested by the international organisations and thus to execute them in a timely manner.

"As a donor, we try to communicate as much as possible with the local NGOs we partner with. However, for those CSOs that are not our partners, it is more difficult to be in contact with them. They do not feel understood or listened by donors because we do not have strong local 'Donors – CSOs' communication channels" (AFD).

Barrier 3. *Creating and forming new partnerships has many structural barriers.*

Donors have mentioned that they are relying more and more on INGOs to sub-grant funding, while pushing them to increase the number of local actors for implementation. However, this doesn't translate systematically to an increase in partnerships with local actors. In fact, for INGOs one of the structural barriers that affect the implementation of meaningful partnerships is the inability to include LNNGOs in the design of their interventions and in a participatory way, mainly because most of the time their annual strategy is set following the funding cycle. Furthermore, they have mentioned that within the culture of most INGOs, the definition of partnering with local actors is missing. Many INGOs are working on defining it and in establishing partnering procedures.

In fact, this feeds directly to another structural barrier mentioned by L/NAs during consultations. The system of funding L/NAs through INGOs is creating a fierce competition over funds between them which affects negatively their partnerships. This is leading to a lack of trust between L/NAs and INGOs, with more secrecy and less information sharing. In terms of negotiating new partnerships, often there is an overall inequitable distribution of overhead costs where INGOs are taking bigger shares along with a load of rigid procedures and reporting requirements. For some international actors, headquarters needs to be more involved in promoting localisation for partnerships to be successful in the field.

Survey Findings:


Barriers are not only felt when managing partnerships but also when forming new ones. When asked during the online survey, what factors hinder L/NAs from creating new partnerships with international organisations/agencies, the majority of local actors mentioned the lack of opportunity to access new partnerships (73%) followed by the barriers of rigid policies and procedures (52%) and the lack of resources (47%). From the perception of international respondents, the main barrier for L/NAs to create new partnerships with them is their lack of capacity, knowledge and experience (75%). They do however agree with nationals on the other two barriers which are mainly those of rigid policies and procedures (56%) and the lack of resources (56%).

See Figure 17 below.



FIGURE 17 FACTORS THAT HINDERS THE CREATION OF NEW PARTNERSHIPS

What factors hinder L/NAs from creating new partnerships with international organisations/agencies?



This report uses the NEAR localisation framework definition for funding that states as a desire change:

Improvements in the quantity and quality of funding for local and national actors (L/NAs). Increased number of L/NAs describing financial independence that allows them to respond more efficiently to humanitarian response.

5.3. FUNDING

5.3.1 Current State

Trend 1. There is a high probability that funds will increase or at least remain the same in the next five years.

Overall, the trend of funding throughout the last five years has been to the advantage of L/NAs and according to the interviews conducted with international actors, this trend will continue to increase positively. With the multiple protracted crises Lebanon is witnessing, local actors are also optimistic that this will attract additional funds to the humanitarian sector.

There is a willingness from international partners to increase funding channelled to L/NAs. In the last 5 years, international actors have stated that there was an increase in the




amount of funding for L/NAs compared to the amount of funding for pooled funds and for multi-year funding which stayed mostly the same.

Survey Findings:

In the Figure 18 below, the majority of the responses of international actors show that the amount of funding allocated to L/NAs has increased (56%) or stayed the same (38%) in the last five years. Very few donors (6%) have decreased their funding to L/NAs. It seems that donors did not make tremendous changes to their allocation of pooled funds since the majority stated (81%) that the amount stayed the same over the last five years. As for the amount of funds allocated to the multi-year funding, the numbers are a bit more optimistic with 38% stating that they increased their funding to this type of channel.

FIGURE 18 TRENDS OF FUNDING FROM INTERNATIONAL ACTORS


In the last 5 years, what were the main trends in funding from your organisation/agency?



In 2019 and according to the Financial Tracking Services of OCHA, direct funding to local and national actors in Lebanon was around 4% of total funds received. Of this 4%, the majority was received by the Government of Lebanon. Comparing with the numbers of 2020, the percentage has decreased from 4% to 2.27% with a remarkable decrease of the funds allocated to the Government. Although there is a very slight increase in the funds allocated to national and local NGOs, the percentage is still very far behind compared to the funds allocated to international NGOs (L2GP 2020).

As for the Country Based Pool Funds (CBPF), the numbers are better. As per Figure 19 below, the percentage of the CBPF allocated directly to local and national actors increased from 23% to 35% from 2019 to 2020. There has been a tremendous change in the funds allocated to the UN, with a decrease from 35% in 2019 to 0.03% in 2020. This has translated into an increase of the shares received from international NGOs (LHF 2020).

FIGURE 19 CBPF ALLOCATIONS IN 2019 & 2020



Trend 2. Although innovating funding mechanisms are being analysed, it is expected that international partners will continue to be favoured over L/NAs when funds are channelled from donors.

Although the international community is analysing different mechanisms to ensure funds are directly channelled to LNNGOs, this is not likely to change in the coming year. Donors will continue to favour international implementing partners, particularly in this time of crisis. The current financial and economic turmoil enhance the risks, and donors, being risk-averse, will probably continue working in a large majority with traditional partners.

“One issue is the lack of willingness from key institutional members to channel funding to local actors. There are still the trends of financing international actors and UN agencies because is less risky. There will always be a minimal risk on channelling funding to national actors. We try to advocate for donors to change the perception on risk. We insist on risk sharing instead of risk shifting” (ICVA).

From their perspective, L/NAs are conscious that the increase in funding for Lebanon will surely not be translated to an increase in direct funding. There might be a small amount of direct funding channelled directly to the large LNNGOs, however most of it will remain in the hands of INGOs as anticipated by international actors. The majority of the small to medium sized LNNGOs will remain excluded from that privileged access. In particular, the government and the public institutions will continue to remain the most alienated from the funding stream, especially that they have lost the trust of both the international community and the citizens.

“I think for the next three to five years; more funds will flow to Lebanon to support humanitarian interventions. And these funds will remain mainly in the hands of INGOs same as to what is happening today. And then the INGOs will do service provider agreements with local NGOs. As LRC we have overcome this problem and we are getting direct funding. However, this is not the always case for local NGOs” (Kassem Chaalan, Lebanese Red Cross).

The LHF continues to support national partners as a priority (See Box 14). Donors are aware that it is critical to increase direct funding in Lebanon, in this particular momentum, which will avoid long-term dependency on the humanitarian system while at the same time increase the capacity of civil society. However, the inaccessibility of funding lies in the traditional procedures and bureaucracy of donors. These practices are much larger than the Lebanese context and are being discussed on a much higher political level.

During Focus Group Discussions, LNNGOs provided a more detailed breakdown on the sources of funding, mentioning the Lebanese diaspora, universities, corporate donors, embassies and other fundraising/crowdfunding efforts. It is interesting to mention that some LNNGOs are looking to launch income-generating activities in order to diversify their funding streams and rely less on donors.


Survey Findings:

For most L/NAs that responded to the online survey, the most important sources of funding that covers most of their overall funding are indeed international organisations as well as international donors. In fact, 38% of respondents mentioned that international organisations cover between 25%- 75% of their overall funding. For 24% of the respondents, this source covers even more to reach approximately 75%-100% of their overall funding.

With regards to the international donors, 36% of national respondents confirm that this source of funding covers 25%-75% of their overall funding, while for 32% of national respondents it covers up to 25% which is less compared to the INGOs (See Figure 20).

FIGURE 20 MAIN SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR L/NAs

Approximately what percentage of your organisation's funds comes from the below sources?




Overall, between 2019 and 2021, despite the difference in the nature of the crises that affected Lebanon, L/NAs stated that the majority of international donors did not change, the same ones are still operating in Lebanon with a slight change in the topics and the projects funded. However, other types of funding have emerged.

The group of funding sources that comes next in line and that covers a smaller percentage of the overall funding of L/NAs are private donations (54%) followed by revenue generated by the organisation itself (41%) and the private sector (38%). The sources of funding that are the least contributing to the overall funding of L/NAs are governmental funding (85%) followed by funding from other L/NAs (65%) and membership fees (60%). See Figure 21.

FIGURE 21 MAIN SOURCES OF FUNDING FOR L/NAs

Approximately what percentage of your organisation's funds come from the below sources?



Trend 3. *Despite the fact that the primary source of funding for LNNGOs is channelled through INGOs, there is little accountability on the way these funds are transferred.*

The primary funding source for LNNGOs is the second-layer-funding channelled through INGOs. However, this intermediary role is not framed by any “good practices” and is not accountable enough. INGOs can unilaterally decide the funding they provide to their partner and if it includes overhead costs. These practices enhance the unbalanced power, create dependency and instability for LNNGOs. INGOs’ role as intermediaries’ actors between donors and LNNGOs avoids donors’ procedures to systematically block funding from being granted to L/NAs. INGOs are needed for donors to ensure accountability and compliance are respected, reports are provided, and audits are executed in a mannerly way. For now, INGOs are assuming the risk and absorbing the burden of donor’s procedures while doing their best to support the capacity strengthening of their local partners. However, more accountability is needed to ensure the intermediary role is carried on respecting minimum standards. As mentioned in the partnerships section, the EU commission has launched “the financial support to third party” to reach out to local CSOs and enhance partnership among actors from civil society. For those donors that can’t channel funds directly, new funding mechanisms and strategies are being explored to overcome donor practices and impediments to fund directly LNNGOs. RDPP was stated as an example (Box 7 RDPP), the Shabake project was also mentioned.

BOX 7 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION PROGRAMME

Box 7. Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP)

The European Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) was launched in 2014 as a multi-donor European initiative supporting Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq to better understand, plan, and mitigate the impact of the forced displacement of Syrian refugees on host communities. The programme focuses on three thematic areas: (A) livelihoods towards durable solutions, (B) upholding and expanding protection space, and (C) research and advocacy. RDPP was established as a nexus instrument, recognising that forced displacement often become protracted and therefore need to be addressed with a longer-term humanitarian-development nexus approach from the onset. The evaluation and learning process from phase I concluded the importance to focus to a greater extend on local partners and to include dedicated support to the institutional and organisational capacity development of the local partner organisations.

The initiative was deployed over two main phases. The first one launched between 2014 and 2018 and the second between 2018 and 2021. The second most recent phase that will end in December 2021 is supported by the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Ireland and Switzerland, with an overall budget of 54.1 million Euros.

The multi-donor initiative had a direct positive effect on the rules and regulations required from local actors. In fact, the participating donors from the beginning of the RDPP decided to have a joint platform with equal representation, which was beneficial to both the local sub-contracted partners as well as the RDPP itself. This led to an increase in the accessibility of local actors to submit proposals which was immediately felt in phase 2 of the call for proposals. One of the points the evaluation of phase I mentions as being positive and different is the closeness of the team in the region, which has enabled a flexible approach and open dialogue.

“The aim of phase 2 was to increase participation of local actors. We identify partners mainly through open calls for partnerships. To support our localisation engagement principle, local partners were given additional points in the scoring of the proposals to provide them a better chance in the selection process, while at the same time keeping the scoring criteria transparent and fair. Compared to the first phase, the participation of local NGOs increased drastically, both in terms of proposals but also in terms of funds allocated to them”. (RDPP).

5.3.2 Barriers to increase funding directly channelled to LNNGOs

Barrier 1. *The capacity of LNNGOs to navigate donors’ procedures are limiting their access to funds.*

The professionalisation of LNNGOs is an issue. The lack of structures and resources to comprehend and absorb donor’s procedures hinder their capacity to receive funding individually. Risk management including counter-terrorism measures, due diligence and auditing requirements can in some cases discourage organisations from seeking funding from donors. For international actors, access to funding for LNNGOs in Lebanon is not a problem. It depends on their capacity to comply with donor’s requirements. However, the disadvantage of LNNGOs is evident. Some donors request a certain number of years implementing projects equivalent to the grant they are applying for to prove their capacity. L/NAs perceive the process as complex with eligibility criteria that are impossible to reach for many, which makes the opportunity reserved for the “visible few”. Moreover, the increase in competition between INGOs and local organisations doesn’t make it easy for L/NAs who have less resources to dedicate for writing proposals in English and no headquarters to support the process.

“The LHF has a particular focus on local actors. My team spends a lot of time accompanying LNNGOs to apply. The team goes way beyond the normal process in supporting them. And we still have very disappointing low level of success... for our most recent allocation in 2021, 25% of funding went directly to LNNGOs. This is relatively high and in line with CBPF global targets but is lower than what we had aimed for with the LHF as our annual funding target for local partners this year is 50%. Unfortunately, the quality is often not there. And one of the reasons is that you would need someone trained in writing proposals in a way that meets the criteria” (OCHA).

Survey Findings:

When asked about the barriers that prevents L/NAs from accessing funds, the main three reasons mentioned were their lack of knowledge of funds availability and mechanisms (73%), followed by the difficulty in developing funding proposals (61%) and the rigidity of the application process (60%). The responses were very similar to those mentioned by the international actors. The latter also gave a high importance to the barrier regarding the lack of knowledge on funds availability and mechanisms (94%). This barrier was followed by the rigidity of the application process (81%) and the perception of risk (75%). Is it interesting to mention that the perception of risk was also highlighted in the responses of local actors, however the weight was more on the neutral side, with 47% mentioning that they neither agree nor disagree of the fact that risk is a barrier. Figure 22 and 23 below show as well the perception of both actors regarding other barriers, in particular the lack of sufficient funds available which also was relatively high.

FIGURE 22 MAIN BARRIERS FOR L/NAs TO ACCESS FUNDS

To what extent do you agree that the listed barriers prevent L/NAs from accessing funding from donors?





FIGURE 23 MAIN BARRIERS FOR L/NAs TO ACCESS FUNDS

To what extent do you agree that the listed barriers prevent L/NAs from accessing funding from donors?



Barrier 2. The process to access direct funds is perceived as not transparent and inaccessible to small LNNGOs.

The main barrier which is also a difficult reality is that funds are only accessible to a very small group of large LNNGOs already known to donors and international stakeholders. Having funds allocated usually to the same small number of L/NAs increases the challenges for small and medium sized or-

organisations to penetrate the system and get access to those funds. In a comfortable position, donors and international actors are benefiting large LNNGOs with greater financial stability, operational reach, and pre-existing partnerships. These behaviours do not increase localisation.

During the interviews, donors mentioned their inability to manage small grants. De facto, this excludes small to medium LNNGOs that do not have the experience or capacity to handle significant funds. On a more delicate note, the most expressed challenge during the Focus Group Discussions was the selection process of winning organisations that apply to a grant. The selection is perceived as biased, corrupted, not at all transparent and already pre-defined even before submission of proposals.

“There are specific channels to access international funds such as the UN sectors, LHDF, or any other network available. Therefore, the NGOs that are active in those networks increase their chances to access opportunities to those funds but those who aren’t could exclude themselves from this information. More efforts should be done on the outreach to increase the number of local NGOs in those networks.” (LHDF represented by Himaya).

Barrier 3. *The culture of risk aversion of donors hinders access to funding for LNNGOs.*

The culture of risk aversion from donors that are financing volatile contexts is somehow disproportioned to realities of the field. Their unawareness of the ground and of the capacities of LNNGOs increases their aversion to the unknown and to the potential risks that come with it. There are no formal channels of communication between donors and LNNGOs which impedes the expansion of the pool of implementing partners. Donors rarely visit intervention areas to observe actions that they do not finance.

“In Lebanon we don’t have a ministry of planning or a working group of donors to know who is doing what. There is a high risk of overlapping and of not complementing our initiatives with other donors” (Roula Abbas, EU).

This situation has been amplified as well due to the low visibility of LNNGOs. In fact, LNNGOs lack initiatives and resources to be more visible, communicate on their projects and ensure representation in national forums. The lack of visibility might be changing with social media and the Beirut port explosion media coverage. However, LNNGOs need to be more vocal about their achievements to increase trust from the international community. The lack of visibility leaves donors even more sceptical about enhancing direct funding and embracing a more open communication. Dialogues among donors, and between donors and LNNGOs is lacking. In Lebanon, there is no platform for donors to coordinate among themselves. From their side, LNNGOs lack information about appeals and available funding opportunities.

Barrier 4. *The quality funding is preventing LNNGOs from investing in their professionalisation and from acquiring a strategic vision.*

Funds allocated to LNNGOs are not allowing them to ensure their sustainability, the continuity of their projects and to have a clear long-term strategy of their interventions. Some LNNGOs even mention having issues communicating with beneficiaries on the continuity of the projects as they have low levels of decision-making in regards to funding.

The majority of the funds disbursed to LNNGOs do not have a proportion of unrestricted or indirect funds to be used at their discretion. In particular, when there are overhead costs, which is not always the case, the percentage is rather small. The level of allocation usually depends on the ability of the LNNGOs to negotiate, and funding dependence usually limits their negotiation capacity. The inexistent

ence of this kind of budget prevents LNNGOs from strengthening their structures and enhancing their engagement among coordination mechanisms.

In addition, most donors do not encourage funding to existing running services within LNNGOs. This concern was mainly raised by LNNGOs who have been providing services for the past 20 years and are currently on the verge of discontinuation.


Survey findings:

Multiple questions have been asked to both locals and internationals pertaining to the quality of funding available. When comparing the answers from both actors, similarities have been mainly highlighted as well as differences in the perception vis-a-vis the quality of funding. The three main issues raised by both locals and internationals, describe the quality of the funding to be insufficiently covering operating costs (66% for locals and 56% for internationals).

Moreover, the majority of locals and internationals consider the funding agreements not to be flexible enough (60% for locals and 63% for internationals), and lastly the funding itself was considered unstable and irregular among both locals and internationals (56% for locals and 75% for internationals). See Figure 24.

FIGURE 24 DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF FUNDING

To what extent do you agree with the following statement that describe the quality of funding provided to L/NAs?




With regards to the differences between locals and internationals, they were apparent in two main areas. The first area pertains to the difficulty of L/NAs to handle effectively large amounts of funds.

The majority of local actors disagree firmly with this perception (74%), which was not the case for the internationals who agreed that L/NAs are not able to handle large amounts (50%). Another apparent difference in perception highlighted that the majority of local actors disagree on the fact that financial transactions are not transparent and clear to all stakeholders (66%). This was not at all the case for internationals who agree that financial transactions are indeed not transparent enough (44%). See Figure 25 below.



FIGURE 25 DESCRIPTION OF THE QUALITY OF FUNDING

To what extent do you agree with the following statement that describe the quality of funding provided to L/NAs?



Recommendations at a glance:

Donors are reflecting on innovating options to enlarge the proportion of funding channelled to LNNGOs and the number of LNNGOs passing the due diligence processes. Promote donor coordination platform or at the very least regular exchanges on the issue of funding mechanisms and good practices to duplicate in the Lebanese context. A review of existing funding mechanisms is needed to identify areas where improvements are necessary.

International partners and donors should commit as much as possible to provide indirect and overhead costs to national partners. Transparency in the allocation of these funds should increase within the aid ecosystem, and a consensus on minimum standards for funding through intermediaries should be promoted.

Ensure LNNGOs are included in higher-level discussions on how to unblock direct funding, adapt procedures to field realities and how to increase funding to small-to-medium organisations.



PROGRESS ON LOCALISATION IN LEBANON

This report uses the NEAR localisation framework definition for capacity that states as a desire change:

More effective support for strong and sustainable institutional capacities for L/NAs, and less undermining of those capacities by INGOs/UN. L/NAs are able to respond effectively and efficiently to humanitarian crises, and have targeted and relevant support from INGOs/UN.



5.4. CAPACITY

5.4.1 Current state

Trend 1. *There is no clear consensus among L/NAs on whether they have the capacity to respond to multiples crises, yet their work is very much valued and recognised by international actors.*

The Lebanese civil society has acquired expertise in responding to humanitarian crises over the years. Interestingly enough, among L/NAs participating in the FGDs, there was no clear consensus on whether they have the capacity to respond to all humanitarian crises with 52% of FGD participants stating that the capacity is there and the other half stating that gaps exist.

However, international stakeholders of the aid ecosystem broadly recognise the technical capacity of L/NAs to respond to ongoing crises. At some level, they are even perceived as catalysing governments' flaws to provide basic services to Lebanese citizens. One of the main strengths of LNNGOs mentioned by interviewees is the human resources working in these organisations. The capacity of the Lebanese civil society can foster the localisation agenda within the aid ecosystem.

Nonetheless, some concerns were raised by international actors with regards to specific organisational gaps in L/NAs that are related to their lack of knowledge around procedures and their weak governance structure. These are mainly refraining them from fully interacting with the system. In addition, donors and INGOs are aware that the responses of L/NAs to all the crises are limited because of the restricted latitude and space given to them within the aid system.

“Actually, in the past with all the things that Lebanon went through, national actors were impressive, with managing COVID-19, the lockdowns, the security issues, etc. Their adaptation was really impressive. They were able to create new solutions, to see how to proceed with the project, how to meet their objectives to mitigate the risks they are facing. It was really something interesting to see” (RDPP).

Overall, discussions with local actors during FGDs stressed the fact that there is a high degree of capacity both in terms of resources and ability to respond to the humanitarian crises in the country. The quality of the human resources combined with the dense presence of L/NAs makes it possible for them to be on the frontline. A lesser degree was expressed towards the public sector that is considered weaker, corrupt and somehow absent from the aid ecosystem.

For L/NAs who confirmed that the capacity is there, the main argument was that L/NAs understand better the contextual needs of the communities and thus can provide adequate solutions and interventions. Strong capacity already exists among some L/NAs, particularly in contexts with a 30-year histo-



ry of previous crises, complemented with a high mobilisation readiness across the country and very skilled personnel. However, for the other half, capacity gaps do exist within local and national organisations. A lack of financial resources is a key impediment to their ability to respond to the multi-protracted crises. Other gaps were mentioned such as the lack of a unified holistic long-term plan, the weakness in the ability to coordinate and work together and finally the need for support to professionalise the work of L/NAs.

“Local organisations are not growing, and the big organisations are functioning because of international funds. However, what should be done is to strengthen the capacity of the organisations such as the “Social Development Centres” affiliated to MoSA, local NGOs and the municipalities because these are the ones that are sustainable and that are really working in a bottom-up approach and are aware of the needs and the reality” (Ministry of Social Affairs).

A key finding emerged also from the FGDs with LNNGOs which questioned whether L/NAs should be the ones responding to the crises instead of the government. Most of the respondents, stressed on the fact that L/NAs should not be replacing and taking the role of the government in responding the crisis.


“At first, I said no, not all the organisations can respond to the crises. However, I changed my mind because I think that if local organisations are able to partner with each other and complement the services they provide, then definitely local organisations have the capacity to respond to all humanitarian crises in Lebanon” (FGD, Participant, South Lebanon).

Survey Findings:

Very similar percentages have been reconfirmed when triangulating the data collected during the FGDs with the results of the online survey. In fact, the views of L/NAs vis-à-vis their own ability to respond to the humanitarian crises is not crystal clear. Almost half of local actors' respondents (47%) agree that they do have the ability to respond to crises while the other half is either disagreeing with the statement (31%) or being neutral (22%). This neutrality could be explained with the idea mentioned in the FGDs which questions whether L/NAs are the ones who should be responding to all crises in Lebanon. As mentioned in the analysis above, most of the participants of FGDs questioned this role, stating that it should be the government's responsibility. The views of international actors are not very far from local actors. In fact, 50% of international actors agreed that L/NAs can respond effectively and efficiently to humanitarian crises. While the rest of the respondents either disagree (38%) or are neutral (13%) (See Figure 26 below).

FIGURE 26 THE ABILITY OF L/NA_s TO RESPOND TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES

To what extent do you agree that L/NA_s have the ability to respond effectively and efficiently to humanitarian crises?



Efforts towards localisation need to take into account the actual strengths and weaknesses of L/NA_s. During consultations, local organisations have mentioned specific weakness and strengths that shed the light on their overall capacity. However, they varied since the participants were representing diverse institutions across seven governorates.

“We should also localise the capacity support provided. A better understanding of the context can offer solutions that are really adapted versus imposed solutions from another country” (Participant of the validation workshop).

The main three weaknesses observed were related to the capacity of managing security (51%), followed by the lack in the ability of having an organisational governance structure (30%) and lastly the Monitoring and Evaluation component was also mentioned as a weakness” (30%). However, the main strengths of L/NA_s lie in their ability to design programs (95%), to adopt the humanitarian principles (93%) and their capacity to manage finance 81%). See Table 5.

TABLE 5 MAIN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF L/NA_s

	STRENGTH	WEAKNESS
Designing projects and programs	95%	5%
Humanitarian principles	93%	8%
Managing Finance	81%	19%
Managing security	49%	51%
Organisational Governance Structures	70%	30%
Monitoring and Evaluation	70%	30%

Survey findings:

Similar data have been also analysed from the online survey confirming what was mentioned during the FGDs. Figures 27 and 28 below summarises the perception of both nationals and internationals with regards to the abilities of L/NAs.

FIGURE 27 STATEMENTS ABOUT L/NAs

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about L/NAs?





FIGURE 28 STATEMENTS ABOUT L/NAs

To what extent do you agree with the following statements about L/NAs ?



Trend 2. Capacity strengthening initiatives are contributing to the development of L/NAs, however most of the initiatives are supporting individuals rather than the structural capacities of the organisations.

The majority of local actors participating in the FGD consultations had received capacity strengthening support. Capacity strengthening initiatives have been assessed during the FGD consultations as extremely beneficial both on the level of the organisation and on the level of the individuals. On the organisational level, capacity strengthening support mostly contributed to improve the structure of the

organisations, provide crucial policies as well as practical technical tools for support departments (finance, procurement, M&E). On the personal level, participating staff benefitted mostly in terms of personal growth and changes in mind-set.


“Because of the capacity building initiatives that I participated in; I was able to move rapidly from being a trainee to becoming an actual trainer” (FGD, Participant, Baalbeck-Hermel).

Survey findings:

The data collected through the online survey confirms as well that capacity strengthening is indeed contributing positively to support local organisations. 75% of respondents disagree with the statement that mentions that there is no effect on the organisation following a capacity initiative. Only 5% agree with the statement. See figure 29.

FIGURE 29 EFFECTS OF THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT


I do not see the effects of the capacity development support on my organisation



Despite all the benefits mentioned above, the need for support is still there to enhance their professionalisation and strengthen the capacity of L/NAs to enter and navigate the aid system. L/NAs have mentioned in the survey, the most relevant support needed for them is to grow and become stronger. Fundraising and proposal writing (66%) was stated as the most needed, followed by Monitoring and Evaluation (55%) and specific technical trainings (44%) (See Figure 30). Other key areas were mentioned with lower percentages such as humanitarian sector coordination, designing programs and organisational governance structures.

FIGURE 30 KEY AREAS OF CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT NEEDED

What are the key areas in which your organisations needs capacity development support in?





The need for additional funding and support to capacity strengthening initiatives have been voiced mainly by international actors during the KIs and to a lesser extent by local actors. In fact, this need has increased in the last two years and more specifically with the economic crisis and the Beirut blast. More and more talented people are either leaving the country or moving from local to international organisations in order to seek a better life. This phenomenon is affecting the impact of capacity strengthening that is decreasing with the increase in turn over. Human resources are becoming relatively mobile and volatile, pushing the sector to monitor closely this brain drain in order to better target the CD initiatives.

Trend 3. *The funds allocated for capacity strengthening is increasing but remains unsystematic. Projects dedicated to increase in a programmatic way the capacity of local partners are having better results than scattered efforts.*

Multiple capacity strengthening initiatives have been implemented in Lebanon. Most of the on-line survey international responders (75%) stated that they do provide a comprehensive development plan within their partnership with local actors. Some donors have even mainstreamed capacity strengthening within their funding but this is far from being systematic as stated by L/NAs during discussions.

“We had delivered capacity building initiatives under EU funded programmes through consultancy services by giving trainings limited to “how to write a proposal, how to manage funding...etc.”, these are small initiatives. We don’t want more scattered trainings here and there. As EU Delegation we are now pro-

moting the use of a self-assessment tool for CSOs through Civil Society platforms which provide tailored capacity building programs as per needs. They also offer certification to NGOs which has improved its operational principles. The platforms serve also as knowledge resource centre comprising relevant and reliable material that keep NGOs up-to-date” (Roula Abbas, EU).

Donors highlighted the positive effects that capacity strengthening projects are showing compared to individual one-shot initiatives. Indeed, dedicated projects including punctual results and indicators to analyse the effects on L/NAs capacities have been identified by the majority of the KIs as the most effective way to tackle capacity support. Three initiatives, including the Shabake project, were mentioned by the interviewees (See Box 8).



BOX 8 CAPACITY STRENGTHENING INITIATIVES

Box 8. Capacity strengthening initiatives

Taking the Lead (TTL), an innovative three-year project led by the French NGO Bioforce, the think tank Group URD and the Tripolitan NGO North LEDA, is the first to use the methodological framework of the TTL initiative. Jointly developed by Bioforce and Oxfam in 2017, TTL's objective is to help civil society organisations (CSOs) and the municipalities to identify their own priorities in terms of organisation and collective reinforcement. It aims to be a process driven by the local actors themselves, in order to place them at the centre of the humanitarian response in their own country.

Lebanon Support is coordinating its capacity development program and is setting an example to increase the relevance of the capacity development initiatives. There is no ready-made format for capacity strengthening. Rather, programmes are designed and tailored to respond to the needs of different partners. Capacity development may take the form of a 'traditional' workshop for a group of individuals; or a process of accompaniment – for example, supporting a particular organisation through the process of developing a project concept, applying for funding, building a project team, and so on.

5.4.2 Barriers to provide adequate capacity strengthening support

Barrier 1. *Capacity strengthening initiatives seem to be standardised with limited innovative methodologies.*

The interviewees did not mention barriers to access capacity strengthening support, 70% of the L/NAs participating in the FGDs, stated benefiting abundantly from initiatives and more than 42 capacity strengthening providers were mentioned by them. However, the relevance of the support provided was questioned. The online survey responses had very similar results with 77% of L/NAs declared having received a capacity strengthening support from international organisations. While 100% of international organisations declared the provision of capacity strengthening to national organisations.

Capacity strengthening initiatives are implemented widely but appear superficial and not tailored enough to respond to the structural needs of the LNNGOs. Most local participants agreed that the trainings that were provided for the last years are usually conducted to multiple partners at the same time, making them inefficient and not based on the actual needs of L/NAs. They have been perceived as rather responding to donors' compliance as mentioned by 59% in the online survey circulated.



“We need to target again training topics that make sense for NGOs. We must also demystify certain training courses. We don’t necessarily need training, but rather peer-to-peer support” (Amel).

With regards to the methodologies used by providers in most of the capacity initiatives, the most common ones are trainings, workshops and technical advice. Those seem to be outdated, making the support repetitive, dull and superficial. L/NAs consulted on this study, have mentioned the need to have a greater focus on mentoring, on the job support and peer-to-peer learning. Other methodologies emerged from the discussions during the FGDs. The access to online courses and MOOCs can create a more innovative approach that is more in line with a global and more digital world. Personalised coaching was also mentioned by a large number of FGD participants that stressed on its importance in order to put in practice what has been learned and operationalise the knowledge shared. In fact, LNNGOs need partners that are able to accompany them, explain the system and support them when navigating particular situations - for example, finalising a financial report or negotiating a partnership.

“Capacity building is a journey, not a training” (Anonymous, International Key Informant Interview).

International actors expressed as well the need to have more specialised and advanced subjects such as advocacy, representation, leadership and governance. It seems that trainings are perceived as a solution-for-all-problems and this is not considered realistic. Tailored support based on an individual organisational analysis is the only way long lasting effects will remain within the LNNGOs. It is important to highlight that since the expertise and capacities are diverse within the large panel of LNNGOs, international actors should not aim to provide a unified capacity strengthening program that could fit all needs.

“Capacity building initiatives are meant to help an organisation start and launch and this is very good. The work later is for the NGO to continue developing and growing.” (FGD, Participant, Beqaa).

Recommendations at a glance:

When designing and providing capacity support initiatives, international actors, after a capacity assessment, should ensure complementarity and combination of different methodologies. This has been perceived as more efficient and as better responding to the needs of the organisation as a whole.


There is a need to increase the use of coaching, mentoring or peer-to-peer support as complementary methodologies that should follow any training. It will support L/NAs to implement the learning and use the tools provided. These approaches have been rarely used by international actors across the country.

Survey Findings:

Figure 31 confirms in most cases the data gathered from the FGDs, where technical advice (68%), mentoring (53%), trainings (52%) and on the job support (52%) were the most preferred methodologies for L/NAs. Although the majority of international actors confirmed that they do provide mentoring (88%) and on the job support (63%), very few provide peer support/shadowing (25%). Although peer support is not among the lowest score of the online survey, it was the most mentioned methodology during both the FGDs and the KIs.

FIGURE 31 PREFERRED CAPACITY BUILDING METHODOLOGIES

If you were able to select, which of the following you would choose as the capacity development methodology to be use by your partner?



Barrier 2. *There is no unified clear and purposeful vision for capacity strengthening initiatives in Lebanon.*

The current delivery of capacity strengthening initiatives is perceived as being designed in a top-down approach which is leading to the assumptions that L/NAs do not have the skills and abilities to work in the field. In fact, during FGD discussions, local actors are perceiving this approach as a message of superiority from international actors rather than a recognition of their existing capacity and a reinforcement of their leadership role.

On a more conceptual and strategic note, both international and local actors are questioning the concept of capacity strengthening and its essence, arguing that the terminology is overused and reinforces the systems' paternalistic approach. For instance, ICVA is advocating to change the terminology to "mutual learning" which reinforces the fact that learning is a two-way modality and that international actors need to be more open to learning just like local actors.

Pushing the conversation even further, most of the local and international interviewees and participants are asking to have a deeper and strategic reflection to reimagine the purpose of those initiatives in line with the localisation agenda. If the purpose of the capacity strengthening is to transfer leadership from international to locals and ensure an appropriate exit strategy, then according to local actors, this is far from being achieved.

The whole concept about capacity building is often inappropriate. Whose capacity is there to build? What does it mean, when we are dealing with a NNGO that is based in a solid understanding of local culture and politics? Real partnership accompanies partners and looks for complementarities. And that doesn't necessarily imply capacity building support from the international partner" (Danida).

5.5. COORDINATION

This report uses the NEAR localisation framework definition for coordination that states as a desire change:

Greater leadership, presence and influence of L/NAs in humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms. Strong national humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms exist, but where they do not, L/NAs participate in international coordination mechanisms as equal partners and keeping with humanitarian principles.

Experience from a wide range of humanitarian settings shows that active engagement by humanitarian L/NAs in coordination structures improves the quality and coverage of a response (IASC 2021). The responses and perceptions for this component will be analysed in two segments. The first part analyses the leadership, presence and influence of L/NAs in the humanitarian coordination under the leadership of the HC and the HCT according to the NEAR indicator. The second part analyses the strategies of coordination among L/NAs, their structure, and their dynamics.

5.5.1 Current State

Trend 1. *The inclusion of L/NAs in the international coordination mechanisms has increased.*

Relevant efforts have been made to increase L/NAs participation and, to some extent, their leadership level. The number of L/NAs participating in sectoral meetings has increased. L/NAs are co-leading two sectors under the ERP, and ministries are leading sectors under the LCRP. L/NAs are members of the humanitarian country team (HCT) and hold an equitable number in the representation, three seats are given to international actors and three to national actors. Those LNNGOs who are actively participating in coordination mechanisms have been recognised as highly engaged in making the voice of L/NAs count in the humanitarian response. However, the majority of the L/NAs participating in the consultations have the perception of being excluded from the humanitarian system.

Survey Findings:

82% of the survey respondents declared that the integration of L/NAs in the humanitarian aid system in Lebanon is not enough (see Figure 32).

FIGURE 32 LEVEL OF INTEGRATION OF L/NA INTO THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM

How well are L/NAs integrated into the humanitarian aid system in Lebanon?




Participation is increasing. Most of the survey respondents participate in at least one coordination mechanism (See Figure 33). There is a relevant difference in terms of participation from international respondents. 52% of national actors participate in UN working groups at a national level, 27% participate in UN working groups regionally, and 11% do not participate in any coordination mechanism. The Beirut FER led by the Lebanese Army to coordinate the Beirut Port Explosion is an additional coordination mechanism that was mentioned in the survey responses. In terms of attendance, only 33% of national survey respondents declared attending coordination meetings regularly, compared to 56% of international respondents. 22% of national respondents and 6% of international respondents declared to participate rarely.



FIGURE 33 COORDINATION FORUMS

Which of the following forums does your organisation actively engage with?



Trend 2. A complex humanitarian coordination architecture hinders the level of participation


Internationally-led humanitarian activities in Lebanon fell broadly within the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) and the Emergency response plan (ERP). Activities under the LCRP, a response framework designed to meet the needs of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese, is led by national authorities in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and is coordinated through government-led sectors supported by either a UN agency or an INGO co-lead.

In contrast, the ERP is led by the OCHA-supported Emergency Operations Cell (EOC), which has overseen the Beirut blast and COVID-19. The ERP is structured by sectors led by a UN agency with a national or international organisation as a co-lead.

The humanitarian coordination architecture is complicated. Understanding how it works and how to engage with it is a challenge even for international actors. Knowledge and understanding of the complex coordination mechanisms is minimal for local organisations. Most of the national participants of the study declared feeling excluded from the sector-based coordination. In the survey 62% of the respondents reported their organisation being often invited to coordination meetings. 52% actively contributing ideas and information during coordination meetings and only 41% often report achievements of their organisation actions in coordination meetings. (See Figure 34).

FIGURE 34 THE LEVEL OF ENGAGEMENT OF L/NAs IN COORDINATION MEETINGS

Which of the following statements apply to your organisation?



Trend 3. Coordination among local partners appears to be much more structured compared to previous years.

Coordination among L/NAs is also evolving, a national forum, the LHDF, is active since 2014 and some local forums are operational in the regions (See Box 9).

BOX 9 REGIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS

Box 9. Regional Coordination Mechanisms

It was important for participants of the study to stress that although the LHDF is the most recognised coordination forum, it is not the only one. Numerous individual initiatives exist, and some informal coordination groups were mentioned through the interviews. The study did not manage to identify many of them. However, the NGOs platform in Saida (TAJAMOH) was even mentioned by donors as an example to follow.

The NGOs Platform in Saida is a civil, voluntary and coordination platform composed of around 64 Non-Governmental Organisations working in different fields such as health, protection, education and development. Its members cooperate under a charter of partnerships and sometimes respond to project proposals together.

A similar initiative is being launched in Tripoli, where around 15 CSOs, supported by Bioforce, are gathering together to initiate and consolidate as a forum that aims at englobing all the CSOs of the North and possibly link its efforts to the LHDF.

In Beirut, numerous individual initiatives emerged following the port explosion with little 73 linkages with the typical coordination mechanisms. An effort is necessary to identify them and bridge the gaps with the system.



Since the Beirut Blast additional coordination initiatives were created and some remain. The agility and flexibility of the coordination among LNNGOs mainly for referrals has been recognised as an advantage. However, competition for funding among LNNGOs has been mentioned as an issue.

“Coordination meetings are needed to talk to other local NGOs. The mentality of competition between local NGOs should vanish and this will happen when we create more networking opportunities” (FGD, Participant, Beqaa).

The LHDF is a recognised coordination platform for LNNGOs by international stakeholders and is actively cooperating with the LHIF (See Box 10). Nevertheless, it needs more support to have the resources, to inform, gather feedback, share information, and educate national NGOs that are more numerous than INGOs.

Although coordination among LNNGOs is not lacking there seems to be a disadvantage for LNNGOs that aren't present in Beirut. In the regions there is a need for more structure forums or spaces to make sure the realities of LNNGOs working in the different governorates are also taken into account and their concerns can be conveyed nationally.

“The LHDF is a very advanced local consortium compared to other networks/ local NGOs consortium in the MENA region. It is a great success to have local NGOs coming together in a very well unify position and to work on collective advocacy policy and coordination issues” (ICVA).

BOX 10 THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LHDF AND LHIF

Box 10. The strategic partnership between LHDF and LHIF.

LHDF and LHIF have worked on a number of joint initiatives coordinating and responding to the Syrian crisis, COVID-19 and lately the Beirut Blast, as well as common advocacy for numerous international donor conferences such as Brussels, Paris and Geneva.

With the aim of strengthening long-term coordination and collective NGO position towards key stakeholders, both forums have taken the steps to develop a joint strategy covering a three-year medium-term.

Through this partnership three themes have been selected to tackle the cooperation among the two forums:

1. Coordination and emergency preparedness
2. Localisation
3. Humanitarian ecosystem and how much it is allowing for the participation of local actors


One of the main long-term goals of this strategy is to have a humanitarian ecosystem that is agile, dynamic and driven by communities. An ecosystem where local NGOs are trained to take this role. The idea behind the partnerships entail that the humanitarian ecosystem becomes led by the role of civil society and is supported by international NGOs.

5.5.2 Barriers Hindering The Level Of Participation And Engagement In Coordination Mechanisms

Barriers can be categorised into two categories. The first category concerns practical barriers that prevent willing LNNGOs from participating. The second category covers reputational barriers that do not foster the willingness of LNNGOs to participate actively. In the survey, when asked the main challenges for L/NAs not fully participating in coordination processes, national and international respondents identified the main reason to be that there are too many meetings with 36% and 69% respectively. (See Figure 35)

FIGURE 35 CHALLENGES TO PARTICIPATE ON COORDINATION PROCESSES

Challenges for L/NAs not fully participating in coordination processes?



- The views of L/NAs* are not taken seriously
- Timeframe for coordination process are rushed
- Meetings and other coordination processes are not considered useful for L/NAs*
- Meetings are in English instead of Arabic
- Duplication between government and UN-led coordination structures
- Too many meetings



Barrier 1. *Coordination requires time and resources; more funding is needed to foster coordination and participation.*

In the first set of barriers, resources and time were mentioned as the most critical barriers to attend meetings. The system has multiple meetings, and LNNGOs do not often have dedicated human resources to participate actively. In fact, for many LNNGOs, dedicating a staff to attend meeting is challenging due to the fact that most staff are already overwhelmed and also to the limited number of staff who master the English language. The English predominance and the jargon culture remain a barrier to comfortably navigating the system according to interviews of the study. In contrast, survey's results show, above in Figure 35, that meetings in English did

not appear to be a representative barrier, 53% of national and 44% of international respondents identify this challenge as a low reason. This can be explained by the fact that the other options given were of more importance.

For LNNGOs who are willing to take a more significant role in coordination mechanisms, additional support is needed in terms of funding. Active participation in meetings and co-lead roles have a cost and not all LNNGOs are able to absorb it.

Recommendations at a glance:

- Increase the knowledge and sensitisation of LNNGOs on the added value, benefits and opportunities of participating in coordination mechanisms.
- Consider outreach plans to attain and invite small organisations.
- Ensure the meaningful participation of LNNGOs attending meetings by allocating time for them to address their priorities.

Barrier 2. *The added value of coordination mechanisms is not recognised among LNNGOs.*

The second set of barriers falls under the perception LNNGOs have on the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms. In many cases, LNNGOs do not identify the added value that participating in coordination and sectorial meetings can bring to their organisation, and this is exacerbated for small LNNGOs. For participants of the study, coordination meetings are superficial and not necessary. It is mainly perceived as information sharing rather than actual decision making. Another recurring theme showed that some LNNGOs are unwilling to participate for the lack of trust in the system and the other stakeholders. Trust is one of the pillars of coordination. LNNGOs are reluctant to participate in meetings and even more to share information and needs assessments.



5.6. POLICY, INFLUENCE AND VISIBILITY

This report uses the NEAR localisation framework definition for policy, influence and visibility that states as a desire change:

Increase presence of L/NAs in international policy discussions and greater public recognition and visibility for their contribution to humanitarian response. L/NAs shape humanitarian priorities and receive recognition for this in reporting.

5.6.1. Current state

Trend 1. *It should not be expected that all LNNGOs play a lead role in policy, advocacy and standard-setting.*

As the involvement of L/NAs is increasing in coordination mechanisms, their capacity to influence is expected to increase as well. A small group of LNNGOs are assuming with great involvement their role influencing donor priorities in-country, for example by actively participating in the recent Emergency Response Plan (ERP) design. The participation of LHDF within the HCT ensures that LNNGOs are taken into consideration when discussing advocacy messages or contextualisation humanitarian standards. However, compared to the number of LNNGOs active in Lebanon it is not representative. Participants in the study feel the need to clarify that through this component of localisation it should not be expected that all LNNGOs actively participate in decision-making forums. This is not the case for INGOs and it is unrealistic to think this can be achieved in the Lebanese context. However, LNNGOs and local forums that have the vocation and the willingness to influence the design of the humanitarian action should be supported to increase their advocacy capacities.


“Localisation is not only a privilege; it is a responsibility which requires local actors to further build their capacity and contribution towards enhanced consultation among all actors in the humanitarian decision making” (Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)/representing the LHIF)

Survey findings:

Survey respondents were asked to qualify the level of influence of L/NAs with different indicators from the NEAR framework. The perceptions of national and international respondents are relatively positive and followed the same trends. 77% of national respondents and 75% of international agreed that L/NAs play a key role in humanitarian advocacy. Only 55% of nationals and 75% internationals agreed that L/NAs can influence policy in Lebanon. (See Figure 36)

FIGURE 36 QUALITY OF THE LEVEL OF INFLUENCE OF L/NA's

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?



Trend 2. Humanitarian actions implemented by LNNGOs are visible. However, their position on humanitarian issues is less.

The Beirut Port Explosion fostered the visibility of LNNGOs among international media and there has been wide recognition on their capacity and engagement. For the sector, this is a remarkable advancement. Nevertheless, LNNGOs working in remote governorates do not enjoy this visibility. The reporting of their actions usually is channeled through their INGO partners to donors and stakeholders. LNNGOs participating in the study mentioned remarkable efforts from INGOs to register and disseminate their success stories. From their side, donors interviewed regretted their feeble knowledge of LNNGOs actions. Social media is used by LNNGOs as an accountability tool to showcase their achievements in projects; for them visibility is not an issue. However, when discussing humanitarian issues, the views of LNNGOs are underrepresented. Two aspects were often mentioned among the participants of the study. The first one, is the lack of participation in joint needs assessments and their reluctance to circulate their reports. The second one, is the incapacity to gather the views of LNNGOs from the governorates to be represented at the capital level.

When asked if L/NA's play a lead role in communicating national humanitarian issues, survey's respondents did not completely confirm the qualitative information collected from the interviews. 70% of the national respondents and 69% of the international respondents agreed. 26% of national respondents neither agreed or disagreed and 19% of international disagreed. See above Figure 36.



Trend 3. *The impact of the political instability affects the participation of the national authorities in shaping the humanitarian response.*

Situating national governments at the centre of structures and processes to determine policy direction and coordinate the response is essential for a localised approach to crisis response and recovery (UNDP 2019).

“Local actors should enhance the dialogue with national authorities because they provide the space or shrink the space for the civil society organisations” (ICVA).

With the current political instability, the involvement of the government in the humanitarian agenda is perceived as low and is in a complicated position vis-à-vis donors who are expecting to see results on structural reforms to unblock international aid. Human Rights Watch, in its advocacy paper ‘Ensure Aid Goes Directly to those in Need’, urged the humanitarian community to bypass the Lebanese government and has pro-

vided some recommendations to donors (HRW 2020), including the creation of funding consortiums that include independent Lebanese civil society groups to mitigate the risk that Lebanese government officials use their influence to steer the funds for their own partisan or financial benefit (HRW 2020). Nevertheless, actions to build trust in public institutions need to be undertaken in order to separate the vision of corruption of the whole governmental structure.

“For example, if you go to Jordan, you will see that the Ministry of Planning is there and is negotiating the humanitarian assistance. In Lebanon we don’t have this. It depends on political parties” (Anonymous, International Key Informant Interview).

Recommendations at a glance:

The humanitarian community should acknowledge the importance of local organisations participation in international forums and financially support their representation. The humanitarian country team (HCT) should ensure the bridge between the existing national governmental plan with the humanitarian aid system for more sustainability and ownership.

5.6.2 Barriers in increasing the level of influence and leadership


Barrier 1. *There is a direct link between funding and the ability to influence the humanitarian system.* Interviewees of the study highlighted the importance of funding when wanting to actively influence decision-making in the humanitarian system. Some participants describe the aid system as a world where money talks and large partners speak. This reality is also impacting international actors.

“By default, if they hold more funding, they will hold more power because they will scale up programs, they will increase their outreach, and they will be able to influence the coordination mechanisms” (Anonymous, International Key Informant Interview).

Survey’s participants were asked to identify the factors that prevent L/NAs from having more leadership in the humanitarian action. The majority (79%) selected lack of funding as the main barrier confirming perceptions from the interviews. More than half of the respondents (56%) mentioned limited access to co-chaired meeting while 54% choose the extensive involvement of international organisations/agencies as a preventing factor for leadership. (See Figure 37)

FIGURE 37 CHALLENGES THAT PREVENT L/NAs FROM LEADING

What barriers prevent L/NAs from having more leadership in the humanitarian action in Lebanon?



Barrier 2. *A barrier to enhance the leadership of L/NAs in the humanitarian response is the system itself and how it has been envisioned.*

Five years after the Grand Bargain was conceived aiming to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and transparency of the humanitarian system, most of the international interviewees of the study openly shared their perception that, as it currently is, the system has not been built to promote the leadership of L/NAs. Although efforts in Lebanon are remarkable, major structural changes should happen from the roots of the system. Most of these changes are being, and should be, discussed at a higher level. The overall will to change a system that has been fabricated for decades is not there yet specially that it is a political will more than anything else.

“The role of the international actors is to support and strengthen the existing capacities of local actors, as well as to advocate for more space for local actors in the decision-making, leadership, and leading the response - and this is the true empowerment of local actors” (ICVA.)




Survey findings:

Survey’s participants were asked to prioritise the actions that would increase local and national involvement and leadership in humanitarian action in Lebanon. The majority of respondents (93%) selected to increase longer term support and funds to build L/NAs capacities as the main priority. Followed by 83% who mentioned the need to give at least 25% of humanitarian funding directly to L/NAs. Out of the six options given in the survey, the one pertaining to having more influence in policy, advocacy and standard setting came in fourth place with only 69% of respondents choosing it (See Figure 38)

FIGURE 38 PRIORITISATION OF ACTIONS THAT WOULD INCREASE LOCAL INVOLVEMENT

Prioritise the actions that you believe would increase local and national involvement and leadership in humanitarian action in Lebanon






Barrier 3. *Weak levels of representation and advocacy skills of L/NAs hinder their capacity to influence.*

Local organisations do not have the privilege to build a strategic vision for their work and for the humanitarian response as a whole because they are working on a survival mode. This situation pushed L/NAs to concentrate their efforts on implementation rather than on representation. There needs to be a shift in priorities but this only can happen with more sustainable funding. A common trend mentioned from the participants is the lack of advocacy skills from the L/NAs to effectively share their positions. Some raised the question on the faculty of coordination mechanisms to leave the space to an open dialogue where L/NAs can freely speak. In addition, a perception of a bottom-up approach to determine the real needs of the people was expressed by the participants of the study stressing the fact that international donors and INGOs still impose the thematic and priorities of the call for proposals.

“They need more capacity in advocacy so that they are able to refer to international standards, and international law” (Anonymous, International Key Interview.)



The Inclusion Of L/NAs To The
**BEIRUT PORT
EXPLOSION
HUMANITARIAN
RESPONSE-
CASE STUDY**

6.THE INCLUSION OF L/NA_s TO THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSION HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE- CASE STUDY



6.1 Description of the Beirut Blast (humanitarian impact)

On August 4th 2020, an initial explosion and a subsequent blast in a warehouse at the Beirut Port struck the capital of Lebanon. Known as one of the biggest non-nuclear explosions in history, it affected thousands, destroyed most nearby buildings and directly impacted the already weak Lebanese economy. Around 200 people died, and 6,500 people were injured (including 1,000 children). Damages spread from more than 20 kilometres from the port area (See Map Below). Several cadastres of Greater Beirut were affected (*See Box 11*), some of which were home to vulnerable or poor Lebanese, migrant workers or refugee communities (ACAPS 2020). According to humanitarian reports, around 73,000 apartments were damaged, leaving up to 300,000 people (including 80,000 children) homeless or suffering extensive damage to their homes.

BOX 11 IMPACT OF THE BEIRUT BLAST


Box 11. The explosion significantly impacted Beirut governorate/city, adjacent municipalities, and cadastres in the Mount Lebanon governorate.

- In the Beirut governorate: Saifi cadastre (and, within the cadastre, smaller neighbourhoods such as Gemmayzeh); Medawar cadastre (including the traditionally poor neighbourhood of Karantina, or Khodr, and the bar district of Mar Mikhael); Rmeil cadastre (especially Geitawi neighbourhood); Achrafieh cadaster; Marfaa cadastre, and Marfaa neighbourhood; Bachoura cadastre; Zqaq al Blatt cadastre; Mazraa cadastre; Moussaitbeh cadastre; Dar El Mreisseh cadastre; and Minet El Hosn cadastre.
- In the Mount Lebanon governorate: Municipalities of Bourj Hammoud, Bauchriyeh, Sin El Fil, Aamaret Chalhoub, Jdaidet El-Matn and Zalqa (all in Metn district).
Source: ACAPS 2020.

One million people were identified as needing food and health assistance due to the explosion and the economic crisis, while 300,000 were identified as needing WASH services and shelter assistance (OCHA Flash Appeal 2020). The effects on the economy are vast. An estimated 70,000 people lost their jobs as a result of the blast (OCHA 2020). Numerous shops were damaged. Over 15,000 businesses – some 50% of Beirut establishments were estimated to be damaged (ACAPS 2020). The country's grain reserves stored at the port was destroyed, affecting Lebanese's main food's source as the port handled almost 70% of the country's imports (World Bank 2020). Considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Lebanese society, the consequences of the blast on the health sector were significant. Many health structures were damaged, and the Ministry of Public Health's central warehouse was destroyed. At least six hospitals and 20 clinics were damaged, and at least 80 health-care facilities were severely or partially damaged (OCHA 2020).



Map 1 Damages of the Beirut Port Explosion



6.2 THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

The Government of Lebanon (GoL) held the primary responsibility of responding to the port explosions and leading the overall humanitarian efforts. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was designated as the operational lead following the State of Emergency declared by the Government on August 13th. However, the human consequences of the explosions and the needs arising were beyond the capacity of the government solely. Within less than 24 hours, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), together with a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, deployed experts to support urban search and rescue (USAR) operations (OCHA 2021).

The international community assigned the United Nations, the World Bank and the European Union to assume the responsibility of the response and the disbursement of international donations. Most donor countries distrusted national state institutions, which left most humanitarian support to be deployed through the Army (Beyond Group 2020).

From the onset of the emergency, the focus of the UN-led response was to ensure that assistance and protection reached the most vulnerable. Numerous partners with well-established programmes under the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) quickly expanded and adapted their services. Further, the United Nations released US\$14.1 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF) to support emergency operations (OCHA 2021).

The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) were supported by an Emergency Operation Cell (EOC) at the operational level as the core coordination group managing the humanitarian response. The EOC comprises sector Coordinators and Co-coordinators, UN and I/NGOs, including representatives from The Lebanon Humanitarian and Development NGOs Forum (LHDF) and The Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF). From the government side, The Beirut Forward Emergency Room (Beirut FER), handled by the Lebanese Army, aimed, and still does, to coordinate all efforts of relief and reconstruction following the blast. Beirut FER is supported by the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC), civil volunteer consultants and representatives from public entities. Linkages between the EOC and Beirut FER were reported to be challenging by the participants of the study. Due to a rise in the spread of COVID-19, a national lockdown of two weeks was established on August 21st (ACAPS). Humanitarian actors were exempt from the lockdown in Greater Beirut to continue their emergency interventions, but most coordination meetings were launched online.

The HC led the efforts of the UN-coordinated response, through the issuance of a Flash Appeal and, along with the HCT, held the overall responsibility for the Appeal's implementation (August 14th to December 31st 2020) (See Box 12). In parallel, the World Bank Group, The UN, and the European Union developed a Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF) to provide a roadmap for addressing people's medium and long-term needs through a combination of people-centred recovery reforms. The 3RF, focused on the affected areas from the Beirut Port explosions and was formally launched on December 4th 2020.

BOX 12 THE BEIRUT PORT EXPLOSIONS FLASH APPEAL



Box 12. The Beirut Port Explosions Flash Appeal

The Lebanon Flash Appeal targeted 300,000 people out of one million estimated to be in need. In November 2020, the Flash Appeal was reviewed to consider the work undertaken by actors outside the Flash Appeal and the existence of other frameworks, most notably the 3RF. Following the revision, the updated financial requirement was amended to US\$196.6 million – from the initial US\$354.9 million.

One hundred three projects were implemented, and over fifty-six organisations (including UN agencies, INGOs and national NGOs) received funding under the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2020. By April 2021, the Flash Appeal was 85% funded (US\$167 million) (OCHA 2021).

The day after the Beirut explosion, the first responders were citizens' initiatives, NGOs and civil society organisations working on a volunteer basis. Although the Army was appointed to lead the response, there was a consensus that the Lebanese society replaced the state after the explosion to respond to those in need. The role of the diaspora led to fundraising efforts that rapidly allowed the implementation of individual initiatives. Some volunteer groups, formed to help people through the economic crisis, were ready to respond quickly, organising volunteers to distribute food and non-food items. One of the first responders was the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) who has extensive expertise in responding to bombs and terrorist attacks (URD 2020, p. 17). The Lebanese Red Cross took the responsibility of coordinating a multi-sectoral needs assessment (MSNA) with other humanitarian actors and coordinated the Damage Assessment Needs Analysis (DANA), gathering information of approximately 45,000 households (OCHA 2021). In addition, the LRC worked in close coordination with UN and humanitarian partners by providing data of humanitarian gaps and with the Lebanese armed forces to determine the distribution among stakeholders of the 188 areas of intervention.

The role of the Municipality of Beirut during the Beirut blast was mainly debris removal. Immediately after the blast, more than 1,200 volunteers were recruited. Although the municipality did not receive any international funds from donors, it also restored heritage buildings and provided social assistance to the affected population. The efforts of the Municipality of Beirut were not recognised by the local community, who was expecting more support. However, 10 days after the blast, the lead in the coordination was taken by the Army.


In Lebanon, the international community's humanitarian efforts were mainly concentrated to respond to the needs of the Syria crisis with very timid participation of LNNGOs who were, for most, organised to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable Lebanese. Previous to the blast, some LNNGOs provided healthcare, education, psychosocial support, and other services when public facilities were overloaded. INGOs and UN agencies acknowledge that any humanitarian intervention had to include operating LNNGOs who were more fitted to understand the needs of the Lebanese population.

Survey Findings:

The consequences of the Beirut Blast were greater on the work of the national organisations compared to the work of international organisations. 50% of the international organisations reported little to no effect from the blast. For the national respondents, greater impact has been perceived. 33% have reported a positive effect, while 34% have reported a negative effect. These findings can be explained by the difference in the location, sizes and types of organisations that responded to the survey. According to the participants of this study, being exposed to the humanitarian system has brought them more funding, increased their partnerships, and increased their capacity on specific subjects, such as humanitarian standards, PSEA, among other subjects. (See Figure 39)

FIGURE 39 EFFECTS OF THE BEIRUT BLAST ON THE WORK OF ORGANISATIONS


To what extent has the work of your organisation been affected by the Beirut Blast?



6.3 LOCALISATION TRENDS

Trend 1. *The Lebanese civil society proved incredible mobilisation capacity to respond to the needs emerging from the blast rapidly. However, for some sectors of intervention, the minimal standards were not respected.*

The Beirut Blast mobilised organisations and volunteer groups that rapidly implemented relief using various approaches, tools, and standards. The majority of groups intervening right after the blast were informal and transitory. For the LNNGOs (including grassroots organisations) that were already operational and structured, the Beirut Blast appears to be an opportunity to reinforce their activity. A few LNNGOs emerged to respond to the needs and have established a structure to continue operations.




Survey Findings:

Although the media and the general feeling seems to recognise the leading role of the Lebanese civil society in responding to the needs after the Beirut Blast, a consensus has not been reached on this matter among survey respondents. The majority of national actors (51%) agreed that L/NAs led the recovery and humanitarian intervention of the Beirut Blast, while the majority of international respondents (44%) disagreed. (See Figure 40)

FIGURE 40 L/NAs LEADING THE RECOVERY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OF THE BEIRUT BLAST


To what extent has the work of your organisation been affected by the Beirut Blast?



By September 2020, 351 non-governmental national initiatives were mapped by one of the online platforms created by local actors as a coordination tool (elda3m.com) (See Figure 41). As this is not a traditional reporting tool for the humanitarian system, not many international interventions have been identified through this platform. From its side, around the same period, the Forward Emergency Room (FER) platform registered 409 active organisations implementing field operations in different sectors. There can be some overlapping among these figures, but the aim is to show the proportion of responding actors and initiatives for around a 20-kilometre radio intervention area.

FIGURE 41 TYPE OF ACTORS RESPONDING IN BEIRUT

Type of actors responding in Beirut



As a result of myriads of actors' involvement and the impossibility of coordinating the totality of stakeholders, duplications, overlapping and tensions were reported. In addition, traditional humanitarian partners reported the lack of expertise, knowledge, and respect of the minimum humanitarian standards, which hindered the intervention's quality and efficiency.

"Because of the variety of standards used, some rehabilitations needed to be done two or three times while some had affected structures did not receive any support from partners" (UN Habitat).

LNNGOs interviewed during this study stated that due to the funding dynamics, competition to access funds increased drastically between local actors who systematically retrieved from coordination to preserve and secure funding. The lack of trust to share data and results of needs assessments led to duplication in services and beneficiaries as well as overlapping from some actors who did not follow guidelines and overstepped their designated area of intervention.

The typical humanitarian respondents had to interact with a wide variety of stakeholders with no experience in emergency response, develop-

ment LNNGOs, activists from the October revolution, informal volunteers with little to no experience, charities and political parties. In their recent report, Mercy Corps reported that "religious organisations and local, as well as national, networks of churches and mosques played an important role in relief work after the blast" (EDS 2021). Some reports highlighted the sectarian dynamics and political affiliation in the provision of assistance by some of the initiatives, including the discrimination based on nationality.

From its side, OCHA ensured the capacity strengthening of LNNGOs and INGOs intervening, providing training on PSEA and AAP, aiming to ensure that humanitarian principles and intervention methodologies were included in all projects as much as possible.

" There is a very strong sectarian element in the Lebanese society and local groups are obviously also a reflection of the society within which they operate. There is a degree of awareness that must be raised around humanitarian interventions being grounded in the humanitarian principles to make sure that assistance is – and perceived as – channelled solely on the basis of individual needs and the vulnerabilities of people" (Severine Rey, OCHA).



Trend 2. *Traditional donors showed flexibility in the aftermath of the explosion. However, their procedures hindered the meaningful integration of new LNNGOs organisations with proven capacity to intervene.*

In the aim of transparency, the Government of Lebanon has established the donors' coordination platform, at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, to provide interactive information on the contributions received to respond to the blast. In this platform, 33 countries were reported as supporting the recovery efforts one month after the blast. However, no clear information was found on the amount received. From its side, within the OCHA managed Funding Tracking System (FTS), overall funding of US\$314 million was reported, US\$165 million was funded against the Flash Appeal, and US\$149 million was reportedly received outside the coordinated plan. ECHO (US\$39.9 Million) and the United States of America (US\$30.4 Million) were the principal donors inside the flash appeal and France (US\$26.8 Million) outside the Flash Appeal (OCHA 2021).

In terms of funding, the Beirut Blast promoted a new wave of private funding mechanisms and fundraising strategies that reached humanitarian interventions in Lebanon. Many private initiatives benefited from fundraising platforms that encouraged the diaspora to support the relief efforts while abroad and the private sector to channel funds through national and local organisations. For example, only one month after the blast, it was reported that US\$10 million were raised by a couple of local NGOs. Live Love Beirut has raised around US\$25,000 a month through its Beirut reconstruction relief fund, and there are more fundraising campaigns. The total percentage of this kind of funding has not been analysed in this study. However, the interviewees mentioned this source as innovative, leading to high accountability levels through social media platforms.

"The Lebanese diaspora helped during the COVID pandemic and after the Beirut Blast on the 4th August 2020. They contributed far more than big donors who contributed in a very limited way with small grants" (FGD, Participant, North Lebanon).

One of the critical elements of the response has been linked to donors' capacity to be flexible and facilitate partners' agility to respond. The use of development funds to respond to the explosion was possible by reallocations within existing budgets. For development donors, and for those in the emergency sector, it was possible with "top-ups", which allowed the rapid injection of resources to actors already engaged in various actions, thus avoiding verification procedures.

These mechanisms made possible the disbursement of rapid funds for traditional partners. However, it did not lead to the integration of new local and national partners as recipients. Moreover, for some newly created LNNGOs that are successfully implementing projects and have structured themselves as a humanitarian organisation, structural barriers of the system prevent them from accessing funds from traditional donors. The majority of donors, including the EU commission, in addition to overwhelming due diligence procedures, will request proven time experienced in handling the same amount of funds that they applied for. For these newly LNNGOs, it will take them time to access institutional funds (See Box 13).

BOX 13 THE SUCCESS STORY OF NUSANED



Box 13. NUSANED

NUSANED is a humanitarian, community-based, and volunteer organisation founded two months after Lebanon's October 17th Uprising in 2019. It was created by professionals working in the private sector who, seeing the general struggles of Lebanese's households, shifted their company's commitments towards social work.

Before the Beirut port explosion, most of its projects were implemented in the North of Lebanon, mainly in agriculture and housing. Following the August 4th Beirut explosion, NUSANED remarkably integrated the humanitarian and shelter response, ensuring coordination using non-traditional and traditional approaches, participating in meetings, reporting their actions, sharing needs assessments, creating an application to showcase the actions taken, and acting as a partner.

NUSANED has proven non-affiliation and impartiality when implementing its actions and expertise within its different projects. Their inclusion in the humanitarian system was possible thanks to two international partners who guided and introduced them to procedures and humanitarian standards. CARE and Save the Children provided them support in drafting policies, structuring the NGO and transferring knowledge on PSEA and some technical expertise.

NUSANED has implemented more than US\$4.8 million dollars in humanitarian assistance and shelter in less than a year. A remarkable figure for a new LNINGO. Most of its funding comes from INGOs partnerships, corporate partnerships, diaspora and fundraising initiatives. Although recognised by sector coordinators and some key stakeholders of the humanitarian system, the NGO cannot apply to institutional funding from donors. Some requirements such as two years' financial audits hinder their possibility to access funding directly.

The Lebanon Humanitarian Fund (LHF) has been one of the most accessible donor for LNINGOs. It can be perceived as a stepping stone to improve their due diligence practices and increase their funds' management expertise. Before the blast, under the first standard allocation of 2020, the LHF was allocating 49% of its funding to national partners. At the time, US\$3.4 million were allocated to INGOs and US\$3.3 million to LNINGOs. For 2020, OCHA targeted 50% of the funding to be granted directly to LNINGOs. However, due to the Beirut port explosions, the figure dropped to 35.4%. It was a reserve allocation, and mainly international INGOs were supported due to their capacity to implement at scale operations.

The eligibility process is rather heavy. As such, the LHF was not an instrument to increase direct funding for LNINGOs due to the Beirut blast emergency response (*See Box 14*). In a standard allocation, only selected partners (INGO, LNINGOs, Red Crescent and UN agencies) registered on the grant management system with approved due diligence and finalised capacity assessment, and after a recommendation from the Sector Coordinator, were thus eligible to submit a project proposal.

BOX 14 THE LEBANON HUMANITARIAN FUND



Box 14. Lebanon Humanitarian Fund

Although the LHF was not a tool to increase localisation due to the Beirut Blast, according to humanitarian reports, the LHF encouraged greater participation of national and local humanitarian organisations in decision-making and frontline response. The LHF promotes access to direct funding, as well as through sub-granting programmes, partnerships and consortiums (OCHA 2021).

To access LHF, recipients need to apply to a process of eligibility, passing by due diligence and an internal capacity assessment (ICA) to evaluate the NGOs capacity in terms of institutional, managerial, financial and technical expertise. All this information allows the humanitarian financing unit to determine the risk level of the NGO (high, medium or low). This process was challenging to be done in the aftermath of the blast. Accompanying LNNGOs through this process takes time and effort for them to put the systems in place. However, many LNNGOs have successfully passed the process and the number of LNNGOs funded by the LHF show relevant progress and a positive trend.

In 2020, three allocations of the LHF were carried as a response to the progressive crises impacting the country (the Syrian crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut Port Explosion). As a whole, 21 partners implemented projects funded by the LHF. 11 partners were LNNGOs, 1 UN agency and 9 INGOs. Most funds given to implement under the LHF COVID-19 response were channelled to LNNGOs (US\$5.5 million out of the US\$9 million allocated). However, the trend changed with the Beirut blast as only US\$2 million were allocated to LNNGOs and US\$6 million to INGOs.

For 2021, the 3RF is facilitating the continuation of recovery activities. However, humanitarian needs remain. The humanitarian coordinator has made available US\$15 million for projects under the food security, health and nutrition sectors. For this first standard allocation, 38 projects were submitted (23 from INGOs and 15 from LNNGOs), including 19 projects from new partners. In efforts to increase the link between the LHF and the need to boost LNNGOs participation in co-ordination mechanisms, support has been given to fund the National NGO Forum (LHDF) on three occasions (2018, 2020 and recently again in 2021).



According to the interviewees of this study, the lack of professionalism of some LNNGOs with no structure and procedures in place obstruct their ability to become LHF partner. Furthermore, the direct link between the coordination mechanisms and the LHF's allocation process makes it difficult for LNNGOs not integrated within the system. Strong linkages between sector coordinators and LNNGOs are needed to present relevant project proposals and be the best-placed partner, which can be perceived as a barrier. It can also be the case that there is a lack of willingness among LNNGOs to become part of the mechanisms needed to access traditional humanitarian funding streams. The reason might be the fear of some small LNNGOs to move away from the community-based ethos they are so accustomed to.

Within the willingness of the humanitarian community to increase the integration of LNNGOs in the system, the LHF can be an effective tool.

"The proper balance has to be made between localisation objectives and the mandate of the LHF to direct funding, to best-placed partners to respond to the needs of those most affected" (LHF).

OCHA and the LHF coordinators invest particular efforts to accompany LNNGOs to comply with the requirements. Often there are capacity assessments rounds that allow the diversification of eligible partners. However, more linkages seem to be necessary with sector coordinators to enhance the identification of national partners to integrate the LHF.

Trend 3. *Traditional coordination mechanisms were limited to ensure the meaningful participation of all stakeholders in the response. Parallel coordination mechanisms were put in place, highlighting another way of working.*

Coordination efforts were enormous, and mechanisms, just as the citizens' initiatives, appeared in different ways, shapes and channels. Besides

the official coordination structures, spontaneous coordination took place within the affected neighbourhoods, where local organisations that did not identify the added value of the humanitarian community gathered to coordinate the response through regular meetings and used the WhatsApp application as a coordination tool. To include initiatives and operating organisations within the coordination systems was a challenge for humanitarian coordinators.

"We were in a separate tunnel, we wanted to coordinate, but some LNNGOs were doing their thing. LNNGOs were working where they wanted, with the standards they had" (UN Habitat).

When those coordination initiatives were identified, sector coordinators and the LHDF insisted on bridging the gap by ensuring information sharing on relevant issues, technical advice and inviting them to participate within the system.

" We went to meet some of these initiatives, and some told us, they were inventing humanitarian coordination.

As OCHA, we must look at such efforts with humility and respect, trying to support what is being set up locally and work collaboratively to join up the classic coordination model with those structures" (Severine Rey, OCHA).

In addition, The LHDF tried to put in place a Help Desk in coordination with OCHA to enhance beneficiary access to humanitarian assistance. The objective was to set them in 7 locations.



Concretely by the end of August 2020, 2 Helpdesk were operational, 1 in Geitawi and 1 in Mar Mikhael. An NGO and volunteers have run each Help Desk. A perception of accountability was reported by national actors using different channels to communicate with beneficiaries.

“During the Beirut blast response, efforts were deployed to prioritise accountability towards affected populations which was not very much central during the previous responses” (LHDF represented by Himaya).

Coordination takes time and trust from stakeholders, and at that point of the emergency, the trust was not there. As stated by one interviewee, it still appeared as coordination was made by and for international actors. For instance, within the shelter sector, although the majority of direct implementers were national partners (As of Feb 2021, out of the 108 shelter partners, 27 were international NGOs, 72 local NGOs), most of the participants in the meetings were international actors working through implementing partners and not always aware of their challenges, for example, coordinating with the Beirut FER.

While there was an increase in the number of LNNGOs participating in sectoral meetings and reporting in the FTS, it was difficult for traditional humanitarian partners to trace and include the number of initiatives that emerged. Digital platforms managed by private initiatives contributed to the coordination and information sharing of the response. Two of the most consulted were www.elda3em.com and www.beiruturbanlab.com. Both present a combination of mapping of relief efforts and fundraising tools while providing databases reflecting the ongoing interventions.


Survey Findings:

Regarding the increase in coordination among L/NAs and international stakeholders, there is no consensus on how the blast impacted these dynamics. The majority of national respondents (51%) considered that coordination has increased, while most international respondents (56%) disagreed. This difference of perception can be analysed considering the challenges presented to the international community when trying to include L/NAs, either LNNGOs or government institutions responding to the emergency. (See Figure 42)



FIGURE 42 COORDINATION BETWEEN L/NAs AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS FOLLOWING THE BEIRUT BLAST

To what extent do you agree that the coordination between L/NAs and international organisations/agencies increased following the Beirut blast?



Trend 4. *The Beirut blast put into evidence the willingness of the humanitarian system to increase the leadership of local and national actors in the humanitarian coordination structures.*

Indeed, there is still much to do within the sector to structurally motivate the shift that will allow the complete lead of L/NA of the aid ecosystem. However, following the Beirut Blast, more space was given for LNNGOs to play a crucial role in sectorial leadership and representation. Out of the seven sectors of intervention, two of the co-lead agencies are LNNGOs: Caritas Lebanon for Protection and AMEL for Health. One of the success factors of the process is having LHDF and LHIF coordinate and nominate the most relevant actor in each sector to take up the co-lead role.

In addition, within the 3RF, both forums, LHIF and LHDF, applied to be members in the consultative body. When only one seat was granted, LHDF and LHIF agreed that the LHDF will represent all the humanitarian organisations (international and national) and coordinate with LHIF to ensure information is shared with international actors.

Although a shift in practices is apparent, timid progress has been made in the level of engagement from LNNGOs to take part in these processes. Interviewees reported the need to promote the advantages that taking the lead on coordination mechanisms can provide to LNNGOs. The LHDF constantly advocates this fact, but LNNGOs do not always have the resources to handle this kind of position. When they do, it is not easy to shift the prioritisation of implementation for coordination. More financial support needs to be provided to promote this engagement. Furthermore, the continuous message on the exclusion of Government in the response is more likely to hinder the localisation efforts than boost it. LNNGOs participating in this study mentioned the need to include public institutions in the efforts to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.



CONCLUSION AND RECOM- MENDATIONS

CONCLUSION OF THE CASE STUDY

The Beirut port explosion motivated changes in the system but not enough. Efforts from both sides, international and national, were made to respond to the needs of blast's affected population while increasing the involvement of L/NAs in the humanitarian response. LNNGOs mobilised themselves to respond to the emergency, sometimes shifting away from their mandates, and with some challenges, integrating typical humanitarian procedures. From its side, the humanitarian country team invested efforts and resources to facilitate this integration: More visibility on LNNGOs' actions was given, situation reports were disseminated in Arabic to increase the level of information of all stakeholders, LNNGOs took leadership positions, and in some way, participation in coordination mechanism was strengthened.

In addition, the Beirut port explosion humanitarian response highlighted the lack of consensus on the need and relevance of the humanitarian system among LNNGOs. Traditional partners encountered enormous challenges to engage with actors new to the system and motivate them to actively participate in it. This trend stressed the need of the humanitarian community to foster communication campaigns in the added value of the system that is there to support the delivery of aid to those most in need.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Lebanese humanitarian aid ecosystem is not localised; the localisation agenda is advancing very slowly. The Beirut Port Explosion humanitarian response is definitely a turning point for localisation efforts in Lebanon. It increased the exposure of LNNGOs, including grassroot organisations, to the humanitarian system and thus strengthened the trend towards the integration of LNNGOs within the aid ecosystem.



Considering the complex humanitarian landscape, the numerous active and operational local and national actors and the current humanitarian situation, the localisation trends remain positive and highlighted efforts from local and national actors and the willingness from the international stakeholders to foster the participation of L/NAs.


However, barriers remain, and the results of current initiatives do not reflect the numerous efforts put into the localisation agenda. The recommendations that follow were conceived in a participatory way, considering the views and perceptions of the participants of the study and particularly the concrete actions proposed by the participants during the validation workshop (See *Annex 8*). The recommendations below are summarised using the six components of the NEAR framework used throughout the report.

PARTNERSHIP

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to choose among three recommendations in order to prioritise actions to foster the quality and equitability of partnerships among local and international actors (See *Figure 43*). As a result, it appears that a framework for strengthening partnering accountability and effectiveness is the most important recommendation with 55% of the participants choosing it. This recommendation was followed with 33% of participants choosing the importance to reinforce messages of complementarity between local and international actors when partnering.

FIGURE 43 VALIDATION WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritising Partnerships Recommendations



Recommendation 1. The humanitarian community should disseminate advocacy messages of what constitutes a good partnership. It will increase the awareness of L/NAs to understand their rights within a partnership and understand their ability to raise their concerns.

It is crucial to enhance awareness among all aid actors on the Principle of Partnerships to ensure mutual expectations and transparency. By raising awareness of the vision and concept of localisation, international actors can better approach partnerships and local actors can better understand their rights. Combining that with capacitating local organisations to be better negotiators with a stronger voice and a more solid decision power. In fact, partnerships' equity can improve if the two parties know the expectations and the outcomes of the partnership within the humanitarian sector and have a voice. This will reduce the gap of the perception regarding the aim of localisation from both sides. Building a partnership takes time, trust and requires planning. The humanitarian funding mechanisms usually works on a short terms basis that prevents long-term visibility even for INGOs. Although this structural issue is present, when engaging with international actors in new projects, LNNGOs should systematically discuss their perspectives on the partnership's future and its accountability mechanisms.

Recommendation 2. The humanitarian community (local and international) should disseminate the message of complementarity between local and international actors. Partnerships are more efficient when local actors focus on their expertise and prove their added value in the response.

Local actors have valuable expertise and context knowledge that international partners seek. LNNGOs need to engage in partnerships where they have an added value and should refrain from accepting partnerships outside their mandate for the sole purpose of accessing funds. When LNNGOs accept opportunist funding not relevant to the core of their mission and expertise, their value is not evident, and probably their reputation is a stake. A complementarity approach would foster and enhance the linkages between INGOs and L/NAs when responding to a crisis. INGOs and LNNGOs should find a way to work together, each in their respective specialised sector. For instance, INGOs

that are considered direct implementers, should focus on executing activities that cannot be addressed by local capacities and withhold from implementing activities that local actors can. This knowledge of partners' capacities and expertise requires dedicated time to analyse cross-cutting issues where complementarity can be reached, and sub-contracting situations avoided.

The aspect of complementarity also applies in the local-to-local partnerships. During the validation workshop this point was stressed by the participants, insisting that coordination and cooperation among L/NAs should increase in order to act as one front when negotiating with donors.

One further step is needed with regards to complementarity. In fact, LNNGOs should not only find complementarity with INGOs, but also with the public sector. There is a need expressed by both LNNGOs and the Public Sector to frame partnerships and the aid system in general within the actual national governmental strategy. This will increase the quality of partnerships, making them more sustainable and inclusive.

Recommendation 3. Develop a framework for strengthening partnering accountability and effectiveness.

Accountability means a shared commitment to learning and improving while acknowledging responsibilities towards all stakeholders. The word "shared" has been used here to imply that it is both the responsibility of INGOs and of LNNGOs to work together to achieve excellence while being transparent in their actions and interventions. In fact, some LNNGOs have raised concerns around this issue, and have felt that accountability has been done in a one-way stream since INGOs are not obliged to report from their end of the line. LNNGOs are pushed to report on their tasks, submit deliverables and follow recommendations, having low visibility on what INGOs are reporting to donors. From the donors' side, this is even more blurry since they lack visibility on how partnerships are being implemented with a clear view on roles and responsibilities of both INGOs and LNNGOs.

Establishing and strengthening a mechanism of reporting on partnering accountability to donors, can lead both locals and internationals to increase their ethical obligation to each other as well as better defining the roles and responsibilities within their partnerships. This framework can foster a more solid and transparent governance that would have a positive spill over on the quality of partnerships formed. When partnering, counterparts should insist on the creation of feedback mechanisms within existing partnerships such as a "speak-up" policy that will give space for local organisations to voice their concerns and thus improve the partnerships.

Alongside with the framework, the role of the government and its institutions has been stressed by the participants of the validation workshop, insisting on the regulatory role it should have to monitor the work of LNNGOs and ensure standards in the way of implementing activities.


FUNDING

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to choose among three recommendations in order to improve the quantity and quality of funding for L/NAs (See Figure 44). As a result, it appears that participants gave similar importance to two recommendations that got 43% of the voting. The first one is the need for both donors and L/NAs to seek new alternative funding mechanisms that would foster long-term solutions. The second one is the need to increase communication around funding and project between LNNGOs and donors.

Most of the barriers to funding are structural characteristic of the system that is not prone to change. Nevertheless, there are minor country-based initiatives that all relevant stakeholders can execute to continue promoting the enlargement of the pool of LNNGOs that have access to direct funding.

FIGURE 44 VALIDATION WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritising Funding Recommendations



Recommendation 1. Donors should seek the possibility to allocate a specific amount of funding to support LNNGOs in managing due diligence requirements.

It is idealistic to think that donors can adapt reporting and compliance requirements depending on the size of the LNNGOs. From the LNNGOs side, due diligence processes and requirements have a cost and can lead to inefficiencies. To increase the number of LNNGOs applying to grants and facilitate compliance to procedures, donors could allocate a certain amount of funds within the grant that will support LNNGOs to manage those procedures. Another possible solution is for donors to support the pooling of resources among various LNNGOs to facilitate the execution of due diligence, auditing requirements, accountability mechanisms, and counter-terrorism measures.

Recommendation 2. Donors and L/NAs should seek to create new alternative funding mechanisms and long-term solutions.

There is a need to increase long-term funding to capable local actors who are able to manage grants efficiently. As mentioned during the validation workshop, there is a need to replace the two main eligibility criteria that donors focus on. The first one being that local actors should already have experience and the second one is that it should already have previous large-scale funding. What was proposed is that funding should be rather based on a yearly performance assessment that could better assess the real capacity of the local actor.

On the other hand, local organisations need to think about new financial models that are income generating in order to decrease financial dependency vis-à-vis donors and diversify their sources of funding. For instance, and over the years, many organisations were successful in finding a way to get out of the cycle of aid dependency and were able to self-sustain while still fundraising internationally. Arc en Ciel, Daleel Madani, Sesobel and Chaîne des amis, were cited as concrete examples during interviews. The idea is to combine income generating activities with both international funding and fundraising to be able sustain the mission of local organisations.

Recommendation 3. Increase communication from both sides. LNNGOs to promote their expertise and donors to disseminate the different funding opportunities available to LNNGOs.

Access to funding is directly linked to the professionalisation of the LNNGOs, and they need to continue the work in apprehending procedures and putting in place the necessary structure. But first and foremost, they need to increase their nation-wide and international exposure to promote their actions, expertise, and know-how. This exposure has a cost. The international community should facilitate the improvement of levels of LNNGOs participation in the events they host.

Information about donors' strategies and funding opportunities needs to increase, even before the appeal to include LNNGOs needs assessments and priorities. During the validation workshop, some participants proposed to have a co-designed funding programs which includes as well a discussion on criteria and processes. It is essential to ensure information is transmitted using different channels and reaching all governorates of Lebanon; examples of information could be reports, assessment, mapping, project documents, etc. as mentioned by participants of the validation workshop.

In addition, donors should modify their communication practices to increase their knowledge of LNNGOs capacities. During the Focus Group Discussions, LNNGOs have recommended two main solutions to overcome those challenges. The first one is the development of a platform that would gather all funding opportunities which can be accessed and filtered easily by L/NAs. The second solution is to provide INGOs and donors access to the mapping at the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) so they are more aware of the L/NAs working in some areas which will help them diversify their partners instead of working with the same ones.

It is also crucial to increase donor's presence in the field to increase the visibility of what is being implemented and funded by different actors. Promote donors' exchanges and platforms to discussing strategies and innovating practices and pay particular attention to diversified the pool of LNNGOs each donor supports.

Recommendation 4. The role of local networks and platforms should be fostered and channelled towards advocating for a more equitable share of funding that is accessible to all.

The role of networks and platforms such as the LHDF and Daleel Madani are crucial in advocating for a more equitable share of funding that is accessible to all. They could play an important part and could increase the access of local organisations to information on funding opportunities. This should be complemented by a tailored capacity strengthening initiatives that are focused on learning how to access funds and increase the knowledge of local actors on the humanitarian landscape.

The LHDF is providing a higher visibility for LNNGOs on funding opportunities but is also aware that more outreach is needed to include local actors that are outside the network. This has also been highlighted during the validation workshop where participants stressed on the importance of increasing outreach efforts to include new NGOs, and to share the information with newly created coordination structures. Currently, the LHDF is advocating to increase direct funding by discussions directly with donors and INGOs. The recent partnership that is established with the LHIF is considered to be an important milestone to push for a greater equity in funding. Moreover, other channels are used by the LHDF to advocate and raise the voice of local actors, such as the HCT in which the LHDF is part of the chair and the coordination body of the World Bank.

From their end, Daleel Madani, which is a membership program, is also working on increasing visibility of funding opportunities on their specific page of “calls”. They have also launched an incubation program in order to introduce the local actors to fundraising and financial management. On a more national scale, the “daleel madani goes on tour” was launched across the regions to raise awareness about the civil society in general and about the way to access information and data.




RECOMMENDATION

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to choose among two recommendations in order to prioritise actions to foster the quality, impact and efficiency of capacity strengthening initiatives (See recommendations below). The results of the voting did not provide a clear prioritisation for this component. However, an additional and third recommendation appeared as key to increase the impact: To ensure capacity strengthening support given by an international partner has systematically a participatory assessment where L/NAs define their priorities.

FIGURE 45 VALIDATION WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritising Capacity Recommendations





Recommendation 1. Capacity support needs to be aligned with the maturity⁴ of L/NAs while being as customised as possible.

International interviewees have identified two main types of capacity strengthening initiatives:

- Project driven or compliance support: that included training related mainly to logistics, HR, grants management, among others.
- Structural support: including capacity strengthening approaches to enhance the governance of the organisation and support its professionalisation.

For international actors, both types of support are needed at different levels depending on the maturity of the L/NA. Capacity strengthening programs need to be customised, designed with the LNNGOs and their results monitor. Expertise and capacity are diverse within the large panel of LNNGOs implementing projects. As such, the support needed from international stakeholders in terms of capacity strengthening must adapt and cannot be unified as one capacity strengthening program. Donors identified funding for programs that support partners and accompanying them through a capacity self-assessment as a sustainable mechanism they need to adhere to.

This has been confirmed by the local participants in the study who indicated that the few capacity strengthening initiatives that were successful indeed were tailored to their needs, designed

with and for them and were based on a needs assessment personalised to the organisation. Although the majority of international actors (81%) mentioned in the online survey that their capacity development plan has been done jointly with their national partners, it seems that this is not systematically translating into a tailored support as stated by local actors.

When talking about customisation of support, local actors have specified during the FGD consultations, that capacity strengthening initiatives are better implemented in the early stages of the life of an L/NA; it helps the organisation launch on the right track. Furthermore, the culture and values of an organisation and its attitude vis-à-vis the capacity strengthening determines a lot the impact it will have on the organisation. Capacity strengthening initiatives should be imbedded in an environment that is prone to learning and growth in order to have a long-lasting effect on the local organisation.

Recommendation 2. There is a need to develop a national framework for capacity strengthening in order to increase coordination between actors and avoid duplication.

All actors, both locals and internationals are aware of the duplication that is happening within the capacity strengthening initiatives provided across the country. Some local actors mentioned during the FGDs that some subjects have been provided in the same way and approach for over 20 years.

⁴ Maturity of the L/NAs is understood here by taking into consideration the size, the level of funding, the years of experience and an analysis of their internal capabilities among other elements.



This has also been confirmed from the data of the online survey where 43% of the national respondents mention the issue of duplication. This is the result of a lack of coordination between donors and INGOs both in the planning and the provision of the support which is not leaving a long-lasting effect on the structures they are supporting.

Local actors have raised this concern multiple times during consultations and are urging the aid sector to create a national framework that would bring together all the capacity strengthening initiatives happening across the country. This framework will not only erase duplication, but it will help in the advancement of the sector as a whole through the sharing of best practices and the increase of collaboration between local actors and between sectors as well. Coordination platforms such as LHDF and LHIF can play a crucial role in coordinating capacity strengthening initiatives nationally. They could channel offers, and supply and play a role in avoiding duplication of efforts.

During the validation workshop, participants insisted on the need for a multi-stakeholder involvement when discussing a national approach to capacity strengthening initiatives. The participation of different actors will ensure different perceptions on the methods and approaches to use to respond to the needs of the large variety and typologies of L/NAs operational in Lebanon. Concrete ideas on who should lead this framework were not mentioned among the participants of the study. However, the crucial role that the local forums play in gathering its members' views and needs was highlighted in the FGDs and particularly in the validation workshop. This finding

is aligned with the need to decentralise the LHDF and to ensure the consideration of other local existing forums when analysing the needs of LN-NGOs. The cooperation between LHDF and LHIF is viewed as a positive element to channel this coordination.

Recommendation 3. Capacity strengthening support given by an international partner should systematically pass by a self-assessment where L/NAs define their priorities.

In line with recommendation 1 for the capacity component, which highlights the customisation of the capacity strengthening support, participants of the validation workshop insisted on the need to promote systematic assessments to ensure a deep analysis of the L/NAs systems and technical skills. In this sense, L/NAs should actively participate in the design of capacity strengthening initiatives so that the benefits of those initiatives impact the growth and sustainability of the organisations.

Capacity assessment tools already exist, and few organisations implement programs using self-assessment tools and processes where L/NAs can define their priorities. The results are used to tailor the support provided. However, this practice is not mainstreamed among humanitarian actors. The knowledge of this kind of tool is not widely spread. In addition, some L/NAs could face barriers if a tool like that is promoted to be used without the support of a partner. The participatory element is critical to ensure a proper analysis of the needs. Local actors participating in the validation workshop even proposed to localise the capacity support and increase the role of large LNNGOs in supporting the capacity strengthening of smaller LNNGOs.


By ensuring the use of assessment tools, capacity strengthening initiatives could also be better monitored and accountable. They serve as a way for national organisations to visualise the level of improvement needed and could eventually foster the engagement from their side to absorb the received support. This type of support can be done under the frame of a specific capacity strengthening project or as a component of a much broader project. However, donors should increase funding for capacity strengthening dedicated programs to promote higher levels of commitment towards its results. In addition, monitoring and evaluation of the impact of these activities must be reinforced. Certification and accreditation processes were also mentioned to boost engagement and accountability, but a point was raised to ensure this is not an additional barrier excluding small LNNGOs.

COORDINATION

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to choose among three recommendations in order to prioritise actions that could increase leadership, presence and influence of L/NAs in humanitarian leadership and coordination (See recommendations below). It appears that increasing the knowledge of the coordination structures and promoting the added value of participating in coordination mechanisms, is the most relevant recommendation with 38% of participants voting for it. The two other recommendations received equal scoring 31% each.

FIGURE 46 VALIDATION WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritising Coordination Recommendations



Recommendation 1. Local and national actors should seek the support to promote the creation and/or consolidation of local coordination structures at the regional level.

The majority of interviewees agreed with the importance of funding to support in coordination mechanisms that emanate from the local actors' initiatives. Cooperation among small L/NAs appears to be prudent with low levels of information sharing. To increase coordination at the local level can promote networking and, more importantly, provide the possibility of creating coalitions for grant proposals, while increasing a bottom-up approach in the way humanitarian information is shared.

Several individual initiatives already exist. In some governorates, a mapping of these coordination initiatives might be required. Following the spontaneous creation of coordination structures after the Beirut Blast, humanitarian partners should consider bridging the gap with these structures and include them as much as possible into the international coordination mechanisms.

LHDF has been recognised by the majority of interviewees as a possible catalyst to bring together decentralised coordination structures and support in creating new ones in the regions. However, there seems to be a lack of representation of this structure in the regions. The priorities and needs of LNNGOs depend on their region of intervention. The structure of coordination platforms among local partners at the regional level should be reinforced while ensuring linkages with the LHDF to ensure the views of small LNNGOs are channelled at the national level.

An important weight is put on the LHDF to ensure coordination, linkages and networking among LNNGOs, which is indeed its core mission. However, it is important to put into perspective that the structure is currently governed informally without registration at the Ministry of Interior and Municipality. Having only one staff that coordinates the structure and no other human and financial resources, the forum is struggling to expand and outreach to additional members to join.

Recommendation 2. Donors and international partners should support financially LNNGOs to participate actively in coordination mechanisms and to hold coordination roles.

LNNGOs need resources to participate at ease in the meetings, working groups and international forums. LNNGOs that are willing to hold leadership roles, such as co-leads in humanitarian mechanisms, required additional financial support to secure the necessary resources to assume this kind of role. Donors should support the strengthening of the participation component by ensuring LNNGOs receive sustainable funding and special envelopes for coordination.



Recommendation 3. The humanitarian community as a whole, but particularly, sector coordinators, should aim to increase the knowledge of the coordination structures and promote the added value of participating in coordination mechanisms.

Coordination, information sharing and collaboration in the shrinking humanitarian space requires building trust among parties. For L/NAs to increase their participation it is necessary not only to demystify the coordination mechanisms way of working but also to build confidence in the transparency of the systems' processes. Building trust takes time and requires the appropriate spaces to engage. Humanitarian coordinators should, as much as possible, increase outreach activities to motivate the participation of L/NAs that are strangers to the system.


Capacity support on how humanitarian coordination works is necessary. It can be implemented through the locally-led coordination platforms at the governorate level. In addition, it is essential to evaluate the degree to which coordination mechanisms, meetings, and other decision-making working groups leave the proper space for L/NAs to participate in a meaningful way.

POLICY, INFLUENCE AND VISIBILITY

During the validation workshop, participants were asked to choose among three recommendations in order to increase the presence of L/NAs in international policy discussions and increase their ability to shape humanitarian priorities (See Figure 47). As a result, it appears that providing local coordination forums with the capacity to raise local concerns is the most important recommendation with 42% of the participants choosing it, followed with 31% of participants choosing the importance of providing financial support for L/NAs to increase their representation and to strengthen their advocacy skills.

FIGURE 47 VALIDATION WORKSHOP RECOMMENDATIONS

Prioritising Policy, Influence and Visibility Recommendations



Recommendation 1. Local coordination forums could be effective channels to raise local concerns and share LNNGOs views at a national level. It is necessary to strengthened the communication between different local forums.

Local coordination forums have the capacity to gather and represent LNNGOs views within the aid system to increase the decision-making power. In Lebanon not only the LHDF is gathering L/NAs, there are other initiatives that are serving as coordination platforms at sub-local levels, supporting members with fundraising and with referrals mechanisms. During the validation workshop, it was highly recommended to identify all the current national and regional forums that are active in Lebanon before deciding to form new ones. In addition, to recognise the work done by other coordination initiatives different than the LHDF.

Efforts from the HCT should continue to identify and bridge the gap between the aid system and these informal platforms. Strengthening these structures to enhance collaboration with the LHDF and empower the LHDF to represent the views of the various platforms.

Furthermore, as raised during the validation workshop, there is a need for local actors to sit together and identify the purpose of any coordination mechanism created. Having a unified goal with clear results and needs identification, will ensure that coordination forums have a clear mandate and can effectively raise concerns.


In a way, a common trend in the study highlighted the need of stronger coordination platforms in the different governorates to channel messages to the capital level. LNNGOs participating in the study insisted for the need of decentralised platforms that can increase networking and create coalitions to respond to grants. Indeed, during the validation workshop this trend has also been raised with an emphasis on having for each regional forum a secretariat that will report to the national forum in Beirut. This approach will ensure that concerns are fairly and properly raised and discussed by both regional and local actors.

Recommendation 2. Donors and international partners should provide financial support for L/NAs to increase their representation and to strengthen their advocacy skills.

Representation and participation have a cost. At this stage the financial model of the majority of L/NAs does not allow them to cover those expenses. Initiatives to foster the participation of L/NAs in decision making forums should be duplicated and particular envelopes for representation facilitated to L/NAs that are playing a crucial role.

The results of the online survey go hand in hand with what was emphasised during the validation workshop. In fact, participants have mentioned the need to increase long-term funding for L/NAs. The need for funding could also be on advocacy projects that seem to be very low compared to other thematic funded by donors. Most of the projects that are being prioritised by donors have one very small component that covers advocacy which doesn't support the overall advocacy skills of L/NAs.

The second action that was prioritised by the online survey respondents was the need to reduce the barriers to enable new partnerships between local and international organisations. Indeed, during the validation workshop, participants mentioned two strong ideas pertaining to partnerships. The first one is the need to have more direct communication with donors not only



through international NGOs which will enhance trust and foster more discussions and communication. The second one is the quality of partnerships that should not be based on a “donor-recipient” approach but rather on respect and principles.

Recommendation 3. Continue to invite and promote the participation of Lebanese L/NAs in international forums including IASC meetings and global clusters meetings.

From the perception of the stakeholders interviewed in this study, the representation of Lebanese L/NAs in international forums is still weak. The sector does not systematically include L/NAs in high level discussions and when they can participate, they have often the lack of resources as a barrier. Initiatives from individual organisations and networks allow L/NAs to participate and speak for themselves. An effort is being made within the MENA region to increase the number of L/NAs responding to the Syrian crises in those forums. These efforts need to continue.

FOLLOW UP: MULTI-STAKEHOLDER ACTION PLAN

Most of the findings and recommendations of this report will feed into a concrete multi-stakeholder action plan to be implemented under component 3 of the Shabake project. The COVID-19 pandemic, the rising needs of the Lebanese population and the Beirut port explosion humanitarian response created a momentum where local actors must be at the centre of the country's reconstruction. The humanitarian community in Lebanon is invited to read and analyse this report while reflecting on concrete actions to take within their practice to increase the integration and leadership of L/NAs in the aid ecosystem.



LOCALISATION OF AID IN LEBANON ANNEXES

ANNEX 1

DETAILS OF THE KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS RESPONDENTS



Type	Type of organisation	organisation	Respondent
National	National Research Institute	Crisis Observatory	Nasser Yassin
National	Government Authorities	Beirut Municipality	Yusra Sidani
National	Government Authorities	Ministry of Social Affairs	Abdallah Ahmad
National	LNNGO active in the Beirut Blast response	Nusaned	Ghaida Nawam
National	LNNGO	Lebanon Support	Marie Noelle Abi Yaghi
National	LNNGO	AMEL Association	Virginie Lefèvre
National	LNNGO	Lebanese Red Cross	Kassem Chaalan
National	LNNGO (GB Signatory)	Caritas Lebanon	David Elkins
International	INGO (GB Signatory)	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	Carlo Gherardi
International	INGO	Trocaire	Lisa Jean
International	UN Agency (GB signatory)	UNHCR	Rasha Akil
International	UN Agency (EOC Beirut Blast)	OCHA	Helena Mazarro
International	UN Agency (GB signatory)	OCHA	Severine Rey
International	UN Agency (GB signatory)	OCHA	Craig Anderson
International	UN Agency	UN Habitat	Carolina Mansur
International	International Coordinating Bodies (GB Signatory)	ICVA	Eman Ismail
International	International Coordinating Bodies (GB Signatory)	NEAR	Wedjan Jarrah
International	International Coordinating Bodies	LHIF represented by CORUS International	George Antoun
International	International Coordinating Bodies	LHIF represented by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Ruba Khoury
International	Donor	Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP)	Maysaa Hammady
International	Donor	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)	Beatrice Nicoulaud
International	Donor	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)	Marine Samaha
International	Donor (GB Signatory)	Danida	Thomas Thomsen
International	Donor (GB Signatory)	European Delegation	Roula Abbas

ANNEX 2

DETAILS OF THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS PARTICIPANTS



Governorate	Name of organisation	Participant
Akkar	Akkar Network for Development	Aline Abdo
Akkar	Akkar Baytouna	Ghaliya Taleb
Akkar	Committee of Employee Women Union	Asma Moustafa
Akkar	TAALOUF	Ibrahim Itani
Akkar	Impossible Organisation	Jana Makhoul
Akkar	Sabaya al Jabal Association Akkar	Naima Ali
Akkar	Al Tafawoq wal saadah	Assaad El Hassan
Akkar	Hand to Equip Learn and Protect	Badriah Diab
Baalbek Hermel	USPEAK	Nada Toufayli
Baalbek Hermel	Peace of Art Lebanon	Vera Mawla
Baalbek Hermel	Al Mithaq	Rabih Srour
Baalbek Hermel	Developmental Activity Association	Abdul Nasser Solh
Baalbek Hermel	Developmental Activity Association	Mariam Saad
Baalbek Hermel	The Lebanese Organisation Of Studies And Training	Rabih Allam
Baalbek Hermel	The Lebanese Organisation Of Studies And Training	Ahmad Jaafar
Baalbek Hermel	Baalbeck for the environment and Heritage	Najah Moussawi
Baalbek Hermel	Baalbeck for the environment and Heritage	Joumana Kanbar
Baalbek Hermel	Al Taayoush wal inma2	Mohamed Solh
Beirut	Live Love Lebanon	Eddy Bitar
Beirut	Embrace	Mia Atoui
Beirut	Embrace	Lea Zeinoun
Beirut	Salam LADC	Alice Baker
Beirut	CODI Tech	Jana El Amine
Beirut	The Lebanese Food Bank	Alaa Karanouh
Beirut	Mada	Fanny Kaikati
Beirut	Aie Serve	Yara Ayoub
Beirut	NAHNOO	Dima Tfaily
Beirut	Arcenciel	Nadim Abdo
Beirut	Digital Opportunity Trust Lebanon	Maha Mehdi
Beirut	Mouvement Social	Tamam Mroue
Beirut	Insan Association	Lala Arabian
Beirut	Fair Trade Lebanon	Benoit Berger
Beirut	Leb Relief	Ahmad Ibrahim



Beirut	Najdeh Association	Leila El Ali
Beirut	Basmeh and Zeitooneh	Rachad Maalouf
Beqaa	Efada	Khaled Dirany
Beqaa	Rayyak aal Sekke	Georges Ghazali
Beqaa	Michel Daher Foundation	Perla Saliba
Beqaa	Association Nabad for Development	Hassan kheirddin
Beqaa	Learning through Action	Yasser Faraj
Beqaa	Multi Aid Programs	Bayan Louis
Mount Lebanon	ShareQ Innovating Charity	Elie Matta
Mount Lebanon	Overcome	Cecilia Doumit
Mount Lebanon	Cenacle de la Lumiere	Mia Rouphael
Mount Lebanon	Beity Association	Josephine Zgheib
Mount Lebanon	La Chaine des Amis	Amal Merhi
Mount Lebanon	SESOBEL	Maria bou Saada
Mount Lebanon	Oum el Nour	Pere Toni Abi Azar
Mount Lebanon	LSD Lebanon	Michel Daccache
North Lebanon	Ruwwad al Tanmiya	Reem Haj Ali
North Lebanon	Shift - Social Innovation Hub	Amal al Akoumi
North Lebanon	Rene Mouawad Foundation	Joya Douaihy
North Lebanon	March Lebanon	Roni Zgheib
North Lebanon	Alawite Islamic Charity Association	Mansour El Cheikh
North Lebanon	Smartgov	Ihab Hallab
South Lebanon	Imam Sadr Foundation	Mohammad Bassam
South Lebanon	Sama for Development	Widad al Sabeh
South Lebanon	The National Institution of Social Care and Vocational Training	Mohamoud Jomaa
South Lebanon	Sikka Saida	Mouhamad Ghalmoush
South Lebanon	Social Relief and Welfare Association - Al Moasat	May Hasbini
South Lebanon	Development for People & Nature Association	Raneem Halawani
South Lebanon	Development for People & Nature Association	Nourhane Al Baba
South Lebanon	Alreaya	Malak Hosna

ANNEX 3

DETAILS OF THE ONLINE SURVEY RESPONDENTS



Organisation Respondents	Type of organisation
Bedayati	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Alawite Islamic Charity Association (AICA)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
HIMAYA DAEEM AATAA(HDA)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Proud Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Development for People and Nature Association - DPNA	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Lebanon Family Planning Association for Sustainable Development	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Bilarabiya for language and modernization	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
SIDC	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
DOT Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Spotlight Center for Law and Human Rights	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
TAMANNA (Make a Wish)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
NAHNOO	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Samir Kassir Foundation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Farah Social Foundation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Lebanese League for Women in Business - LLWB	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Bilarabiya for language and modernization	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Marsa Sexual Health Center	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
LRC	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Forever Young	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Sidon Orphan Welfare society	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Al Younbouh association	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
The North Local Economic Development Agency	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
AJIALOUNA	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Committee of Employee Women Union	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
The Lebanese Organisation of Studies and Training	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Openness Development Association	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Adyan Foundation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
OpenMinds	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Al Hadatha	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Association Najdeh	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Tatweer Baladna	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
shareQ	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
l'mpossible	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Aie Serve	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Fair Trade Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
frontline engineers	National/Local organisation (L/NA)

House of Peace	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Humanitarian Energy for Learning & Protection- HELP	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Borderless NGO	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Women's Humanitarian Organisation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Justice Without Frontiers	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Mada association	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Safadi Foundation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Cross Arts Cultural Association	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Children's Cancer Center of Lebanon (CCCL)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Insan Association- Defending Human Rights	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
USPEaK	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Learning through action	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
EFADA	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Hand to Equip, Learn & Protect	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Sikka Saida	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Youth for Christ Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Project Association for Culture and Development	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Center for Development, Democracy and Governance (CDDG)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
International Education Association	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Sharekkna MENA	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
SIDC	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
BASSMA	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Nusaned	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Common Effort Organisation	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Codi	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Salam LADC	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Embrace	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Karagheusian Association for Child Welfare in Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Namlieh Cooperative	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Leadership for Sustainable Development	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Teach For Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
HandShake	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Tabitha for relief and development	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Aie Serve	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Tahaddi Lebanon	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
JAD (jeunesse anti drogue)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Unite Lebanon Youth Project	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
MSD	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
himaya	National/Local organisation (L/NA)



The National Institution of Social Care and Vocational Training (Beit Aftal Assumoud)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية روح الشباب	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية شباب قانا	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
الجمعية اللبنانية الخيرية للإصلاح والتأهيل	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية صبايا الجبل _ عكار	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية العدالة الاجتماعية الخيرية	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية التعاون الاجتماعي والثقافي	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية سما للتنمية	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية المحور اللبناني في سبيل مواطنة جامعة (هيا بنا)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
جمعية العلم والتنمية الخيرية	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
Platform NGOs of Saida تجمع المؤسسات الأهلية في صيدا	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
GATE Lebanon (formerly RET Liban)	National/Local organisation (L/NA)
UNICEF	International organisation/ agency
Mentor Arabia	International organisation/ agency
Diakonia (Sweden)	International organisation/ agency
The European Regional Development And Protection Program (RDPP)	International organisation/ agency
ACTED	International organisation/ agency
Dan Church Aid	International organisation/ agency
COSPE onlus	International organisation/ agency
Actionaid	International organisation/ agency
Stichting SPARK	International organisation/ agency
AFD	International organisation/ agency
UN-Habitat	International organisation/ agency
Trocaire	International organisation/ agency
Norwegian Church Aid	International organisation/ agency
OCHA	International organisation/ agency
UNHCR	International organisation/ agency
USAID	International organisation/ agency

ANNEX 4

GRAND BARGAIN SIGNATORIES



1. ActionAid International
2. Alliance for Empowering Partnership
3. Australia
4. Belgium
5. Bulgaria
6. CAFOD
7. Canada
8. CARE International
9. Catholic Relief Services
10. Christian Aid
11. Czech Republic
12. Danish Church Aid
13. Denmark
14. Estonia
15. European Commission - ECHO
16. FAO
17. Finland
18. France
19. Germany
20. Global Communities
21. ICRC
22. ICVA
23. IFRC
24. ILO
25. InterAction
26. IOM
27. IRC
28. Ireland
29. Italy
30. Japan
31. Luxembourg
32. Médecins du Monde
33. Mercy Corps
34. NEAR
35. New Zealand
36. Norway
37. NRC
38. OCHA
39. OECD
40. Oxfam
41. Relief International
42. Republic of Korea
43. Save the Children
44. SCHR
45. Slovenia
46. Spain
47. Sweden
48. Switzerland
49. Syria Relief
50. The Netherlands
51. UN Women
52. UNDP
53. UNFPA
54. UNHCR
55. UNICEF
56. United Kingdom
57. United States of America
58. UNRWA
59. WFP
60. WHO
61. World Bank
62. World Vision International
63. ZOA Internationala

ANNEX 5

ONLINE SURVEY CONDUCTED WITH LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS



Introduction

The purpose of this survey is to explore attitudes towards localisation of humanitarian action in Lebanon. The survey looks at perceptions of how localisation efforts might affect the sustainability and resilience of national organisations and the quality of assistance and protection for affected people and how effective localisation efforts have been to date. There are 8 short sections in the survey.

Section 1: General

- 1. What is the name of your organisation/agency*
- 2. Do you work for a local/national of international organisation/agency?*
 - National/Local (ie Lebanese) organisation (L/NA)
 - International (ie non-Lebanese) organisation/agency

Section 2: Your organisation's work

- 1. What type of organisation do you work for?*
 - [National/Local] Government authorities at national and sub-national levels.
 - [National/Local] National and local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations, (CSOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) (headquarters in Lebanon only).
 - [National/Local] National and local private sector organisations.
 - [National/Local] National and local research institutions.
 - [National/Local] Local coordination forums that are initiated by a local actor and have only local actors as members
 - [International] International NGOs with headquarters outside Lebanon
 - [International] International donors/ agencies
 - [International] Private Institutions
 - [International] UN Agencies
 - [International] International coordination forums that are initiated by an international actor and have only international actors as members
- 2. You would describe the typology of your organisation as: (Tick all that apply) (question only for L/NA)*
 - National/local NGO non-affiliated to an INGO
 - National/ local NGO affiliated to an INGO
 - Women-led organisation

- Faith-based organisation
- Youth-based organisation
- Affiliated to influential political figures
- Other, please define (Text Box)

3. How would you describe your work and activities (tick all that apply)

- Newly working in the humanitarian sector since the Beirut blast
- Working with migrant workers
- Working in the development field
- Working in the humanitarian sector
- Working to support refugees' population
- Working to support Host Community/ Vulnerable Lebanese
- Other, please define (Text Box)



4. Does your organisation currently fund or implement programmes in Lebanon? L/NA Local and National Actor?

- Implements programmes
- Funds programmes
- Both implements and funds programmes of L/NA*

5. Out of the 8 governorates of Lebanon, in how many of them does your organisation implements its activities?

- Only 1
- 2to5
- 5 and more

6. In which governorates does your organisation fund or implement programmes?

- Akkar
- North Lebanon
- Beirut
- Mount Lebanon
- Beqaa
- Baalbeck-Hermel
- South Lebanon
- El Nabatieh

7. Is your organisation a signatory of the Grand Bargain? (question only for internationals)

- Yes
- No
- We plan to sign it

Section 3: Partnerships

1. Do you have any ongoing partnerships? Yes/No

1.1 If yes, your partnerships are with what type of actors? (Choose all that apply)

- International Organisations/Agencies

- Local and National Organisation (L/NA)
- Private actors



2. How many formal partnerships does your organisation currently have with international organisations/agencies?

- 0
- 1-2
- 3-5
- 6-10
- More than 10

3. How many formal partnerships does your organisation currently have with Local or national Actors?

- 0
- 1-2
- 3-5
- 6-10
- More than 10

4. How would you describe the majority of the partnerships you have with international organisations/agencies or L/NA?

- Strategic (long term partnership)
- Project-focused (some implication within the project objectives)
- Sub-contractor (mainly activities driven)

5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree):

- L/NA have as much decision-making power in partnerships as international organisations/agencies
- International organisations/agencies listen to the concerns of their L/NA partners
- There is a will to shift from sub-contractors' partnerships to strategic ones
- It is difficult for international organisations/agencies to operate in partnership with L/NA*
- L/NA participate in all aspects of the project cycle when they are in partnership with international Organisations/Agencies

6. What factors hinder L/NA from creating new partnerships with international organisations/ Agencies? (Tick all that apply)

- Lack of capacities, knowledge and experience
- Lack of resources
- Lack of opportunity or access to new partnerships
- Rigid policies and processes
- Cultural or organisational differences
- Different values, mandates and goals
- Communication difficulties
- Logistical difficulties
- Other, please define (Text Box)

7. What factors hinder L/NA from forming equitable partnerships with international organisations/agencies?
(Tick all that apply)

- Negative attitudes vis-à-vis L/NA
- Lack of trust
- Lack of transparency
- Lack of equal power and resource sharing
- Different expectations from the partnership
- External factors
- Other, please define (Text Box)



8. What kind of agreement does your organisation use when partnering with L/NA or with international organisations/agencies?

- Partnership agreement
- Project grant
- Long term MOU
- Cost-sharing agreement
- Other, please define (Text Box)

9. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree):

- I have a written agreement with my international partner organisation/agency
- We develop project proposals together with our international partner organisation/agency
- There is a mechanism to raise and report issues within the partnership
- We meet regularly to monitor the partnership advancements
- We have long-term objectives for the partnership
- There is capacity development* support component within the partnership

10. Do you feel the quality or nature of your partnerships has an impact on the support offered to your beneficiaries? (Rate from 1 to 5)

11. Do you feel the nature of your partnerships has an impact on organisational growth and/or improvement? (Rate from 1 to 5)

12. Do you feel the nature of your partnerships has an impact on the personal and professional skills of L/NA staff and/or members? (Rate from 1 to 5)

Section 4: Funding

1. To what extent do you agree that the listed barriers prevent L/NAs in Lebanon from accessing funding from donors?

- Lack of knowledge of available funds and funding mechanisms
- Difficulty in developing funding proposals
- Lack of experience in managing funds
- Rigid application processes
- Lack of sufficient funds available
- Perception of risk

- Other, please define (Text Box)

2. *To what extent do you agree with the following statement that describe the quality of funding provided to L/NAs*

- The funding agreements are not flexible enough
- the operating costs are insufficiently covered
- There are difficulties in the communication with our donors
- There is a difficulty for us in handling or effectively using larger amounts of funds
- Financial transactions are not transparent and clear to all stakeholders
- The funding is unstable and irregular
- Other, please define (Text Box)



3. *If you are working for an L/NA, approximately what percentage of your organisation's funds comes from the below sources: (question only for nationals)*

- Government funding
- International organisations/agencies
- International donors
- Membership fees
- L/NAs
- Private sector
- Private donations
- Revenue funds generated by the organisation itself
- Other, please define (Text Box)

4. *Approximately what percentage of your organisation's funds for Lebanon in 2020 was channelled towards: (question only for internationals)*

- Direct Funding (Fund coming from a donor)
- Pooled fund
- Indirect funding (funds coming through an international organisation/agency)
- Indirect funding (funds coming through an L/NA)

5. *In the last 5 years, what were the main trends in funding from your organisation/agency (decreased, stayed the same, increased) (question only for internationals):*

- The amount of funding to L/NAs has:
- The amount of funding to pooled funds has:
- The amount of funding to multi-year programmes has:

Section 5: Capacity

1. *To what extent do you agree that L/NAs have the ability to respond effectively and efficiently to humanitarian crises? (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)*

2. *To what extent do you agree with the following statements about L/NA?*

- L/NAs are strong in delivering humanitarian action
- L/NAs are strong at engaging with other organisations
- L/NAs have proven their knowledge and practice on humanitarian principles and standards
- L/NAs have strong systems and structures

3. As a L/NA have you received capacity development support from international organisations you have partnered with? (question only for locals)

Yes/No

3.1 If yes, to what extent do you agree with the following statements about the support you have received? Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree) (question only for locals)

- There is a comprehensive capacity development plan within our partnership
- The capacity development plan has been done jointly with my national partner
- As an international organisation/agency I coordinate my capacity development* actions with other actors
- I have mainly provided "one-shot" trainings on specific issues
- I mainly provide capacity development support on compliance with our procedures and guidelines
- I have monitored the impact of the capacity development initiatives I have provided
- I have benefited from the skills my national partner has acquired thanks to the capacity development provided

4. As an international organisation/agency, are you providing any capacity development* support to national organisations? (question only for internationals)

Yes/No

4.1 If yes, to what extent do you agree with the following statements about the support you are providing (disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree) (question only for internationals):

- There is a comprehensive capacity development plan within our partnership
- The capacity development* plan has been done jointly with my national partner
- As an international organisation/agency I coordinate my capacity development actions with other actors
- I have mainly provided "one-shot" trainings on specific issues
- I mainly provide capacity development support on compliance with our procedures and guidelines
- I have monitored the impact of the capacity development initiatives I have provided
- I have benefited from the skills my national partner has acquired thanks to the capacity development provided

5. If you were able to select, which of the following you would choose as the capacity development methodology to be use by your partner? (question only for locals)

- Training
- Mentoring
- Workshop
- On the job support
- Technical advice
- Peer Support/shadowing
- Other, please define (Text Box)

6. If you are providing capacity development activities to your local/ national partners, what was the methodology used for those activities? (Tick all that apply) (question only for internationals)

- Training
- Mentoring

- Workshop
- On the job support
- Technical advice
- Peer Support/shadowing
- Other, please define (Text Box)



7. What are the key areas in which your organisation (national organisations) needs capacity development support in? Please choose the most relevant (Tick all that apply)

- Organisational governance structures
- fundraising and proposal writing
- Needs Assessment
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Designing projects and programmes
- Managing finances
- Humanitarian sectors and coordination
- Humanitarian principles
- Specific technical trainings
- Managing security
- Managing people
- Safeguarding those we work with
- Managing logistics
- Other, please define (Text Box)

8. To what extent do you agree that capacity development initiatives for L/NAs have been (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)

- Relevant
- Effective

Section 6: Coordination

1. Kindly prioritise the actions listed below that you believe would increase local and national involvement and leadership in humanitarian action in Lebanon (high priority, neutral, low priority)

- Increase longer term support and funds to build L/NAs capacities
- Reduce barriers for enabling new partnerships between international organisations/agencies and L/NAs
- Work with national coordination mechanisms
- Give at least 25% of humanitarian funding directly to L/NAs
- Channel more money through pooled funds
- L/NAs have more influence in policy, advocacy and standard-setting
- Other, please define (Text Box)

2. What barriers prevent L/NAs from having more leadership in the humanitarian action in Lebanon? Tick all that apply

- Limited participation because of language barriers
- Limited access to co-chair coordination meetings
- Lack of technical expertise
- Lack of experience in coordination
- lack of credibility from stakeholders

- Lack of funding
- Extensive involvement of international organisations/agencies
- Other, please define (Text Box)



3. How much of a key priority is localisation for your organisation? (1 being a low priority and 5 a high priority)

4. Did your organisation participate in the review and development of at least one of the stated plans: Tick all that apply

- Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP)
- The 3RF (Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework)
- The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)

5. How well are L/NAs integrated into the humanitarian aid system in Lebanon? (very well, not enough, not at all)

6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (question only for locals)

- My organisation receives funds on a regular basis from international donors
- My organisation actively participates in coordination forums or mechanisms
- My organisation is aware of the work of other organisations in the same location or sector
- Relevant organisations and stakeholders are aware of the work of my organisation

7. Which of the following does your organisation actively engage with? Tick all that apply

- UN Working Groups (National Level)
- UN Working Groups (Regional Level)
- Blast Emergency Operation Cell (any coordination group related to the blast)
- COVID-19 coordination groups (any group)
- LH INGO Forum
- LHDF
- LCRP
- Other, please define (Text Box)

8. How often does your organisation attend coordination meetings?

- On a regular basis
- Often
- Occasionally
- Rarely

9. Which of the following statements apply to your organisation (select all that apply):

- My organisation/agency is often invited to coordination meetings
- My organisation/agency attends coordination meetings
- My organisation/agency actively contributes ideas and information during coordination meetings
- My organisation/agency contributes data for inclusion in databases or reports when requested
- My organisation/agency coordinates its actions with L/NAs present in the area of intervention

- My organisation/agency often present achievements of our actions in coordination meetings
- My organisation/agency makes contributions to publications written by coordination platforms
- My organisation/agency authors or co-authors publications on behalf of coordination platforms

10. To what extent do you agree with the following statements: (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)

- L/NAs mix freely with international organisations at coordination meetings
- Most of the ideas and information comes from L/NAs
- L/NAs are able to influence decisions
- L/NAs are in leadership or co-leadership roles

11. To what extent the listed challenges are the reason why L/NAs do not fully participate in coordination processes? (main reason, neutral, low reason)

- The views of L/NAs are not taken seriously
- Timeframe for coordination process is rushed
- Meetings and other coordination processes are not considered useful for L/NAs
- Meetings are in English instead of Arabic
- Duplication between government and UN-led coordination structures
- Too many meetings
- Other, please define (Text Box)

12. Are you aware of the work of:

- Other L/NAs
- Other International organisations/agencies

Section 7: Policy, visibility and influence

1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)

- L/NAs can influence policy in Lebanon
- L/NAs play a key role in humanitarian advocacy
- L/NAs play a lead role in communicating national humanitarian issues - The role of L/NAs is recognised in INGOs/UN reporting.

2. To what extent do you agree that the opinions of Persons of Concern (POC) are taken into account by:

- Local and National Organisations (L/NA)
- International organisations/agencies

Section 8: Localisation

1. If your organisation is involved in any localisation initiatives in Lebanon or the Middle East Region, please list the names of the initiatives and the lead agency:

2. To what extent do you think localisation initiatives in Lebanon will: (to a limited extent, not at all, to a good extent)

- Improve the overall humanitarian responses in Lebanon
- Increase L/NAs involvement in humanitarian action
- Improve L/NAs ability to lead or influence decision making in the response
- Empower civil society capacity with regards to their humanitarian interventions

3. In your opinion, what is the Grand Bargain?

- The 'Grand Bargain' is an agreement between the biggest donors and aid organisations that aims to increase the efficiency between donors and humanitarian organisations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action.
- The Grand Bargain is about increasing funding to national actors
- The Grand Bargain is about a geopolitical agreement between donors and countries

4. Is your organisation using the "Grand Bargain" approach within the accountability and reporting tools and mechanisms?

Yes/No

5. To what extent do you agree that the sustainability and resilience of L/NA would be increased if aid was more localised (ie if national and local organisations had an increased capacity and role in leading, designing, coordinating, planning and delivering aid)?

1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree

Section 9: Resilience and sustainability

1. To what extent do you agree that L/NAs lead the recovery and humanitarian intervention of the Beirut blast? (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)

2. To what extent do you agree that the coordination between L/NAs and international organisations/agencies increased following the Beirut blast? (Agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree)

3. To what extent has the work of your organisation been affected by the Beirut Blast?

- There has been a negative effect
- There has been little or no effect
- There has been a positive effect

4. To what extent has the work of your organisation been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic?

- There has been a negative effect
- There has been little or no effect
- There has been a positive effect

5. To what extent have each of the following been harder or easier for your organisation as a result of the Beirut Blast and the COVID-19 pandemic? (Harder, neither harder nor easier, easier)

- Spending existing funds
- Accessing new funding
- Undertaking planned activities
- Maintaining relationships with existing partners
- Forming new partnerships
- The amount of information receiving from humanitarian partners
- Participation on coordination meetings
- The leadership in coordination meeting
- Accessing beneficiaries

6. To what extent have each of the following been harder or easier for your organisations as a result of the recent economic/ political crisis and civil unrest? (Harder, neither harder nor easier, easier)

- Spending existing funds
- Accessing new funding
- Undertaking planned activities
- Maintaining relationships with existing partners
- Forming new partnerships
- The amount of information receiving from humanitarian partners
- Participation on coordination meetings
- The leadership in coordination meeting
- Accessing beneficiaries

Section 10: Further involvement

1. Would your organisation be interested in participating in a discussion platform on localisation or in developing a multi-agency framework for localisation and capacity development for Lebanon?

Yes/No

2. Are you interested in participating in the validation workshops for the findings of this mapping?

Yes/No

3. If you might be interested in participating, please enter your email address.

ANNEX 6

FOCUS-GROUP DISCUSSIONS

INTERVIEW GUIDE



Section 1: Grand Bargain and the localisation agenda

1.1 What do you know about the Grand Bargain? About the localisation agenda?

Are you aware of any initiatives in Lebanon and in what sector? How many of you are benefiting from a project under the localisation Agenda?
Since the last 5 years, has your organisation perceived any changes in working with international humanitarian partners? (Yes/No) what kind of changes?

1.2 At present, what are the key external and internal challenges that your organisation is facing? Have these challenges arisen as a result of the crises and the pandemic or were these challenges that you faced before?

Did you perceived any additional challenges when responding to the Beirut Explosions Emergency? (Only for FGD in Beirut)

1.3 Do local and national organisations have the capacity (ability and resources) to respond effectively and efficiently to this and other humanitarian crises?

Section 2: National organisations' capacities

2.1 What are the key strengths and weaknesses of your organisation?

Section 3: Quality of the capacity development initiatives

3.1 In the last 5 years have you received any capacity support from another humanitarian partner?

Do you feel this support has been design tailored to your needs? (Yes/ No) Why/ Why not?

3.2 From the capacity development support that you have received, do you feel that the work within your organisation has improved? (Yes/ No) Why/Why not?

Have your personal skills increased? (What subjects are you still using?)

3.3 Are there any examples of good capacity building initiatives - what made them effective?

3.4 From the capacity development support that you have received what methodology have you mainly received? What's the most appreciated to you?

1_Training

2_Mentoring

3_Workshops

4_On the job support

5_Technical advice

6_Peer Support/shadowing

7_Other

Section 4: Perspectives on localisation integration, partnerships and funding

4.1 In what ways are national organisations, like yours, integrated into the humanitarian system in Lebanon?

What does integration mean for your organisation? Do you feel comfortable participating on humanitarian coordination? Yes/no (Why/Why not) (look for barriers here)

Has the COVID-19 pandemic increased the level of integration of your organisation? (Why/Why not)

Did you feel an increased level of participation of your organisation, on the coordination mechanisms for the emergency response? did you feel international actors willing to include you more? (Only for FGD in Beirut)

4.2 Which factors will foster the integration of local and national actors in the humanitarian landscape?

4.3 How equitable do you think partnerships are between national and international organisations? Why/ why not?

Has this improved/ worsened as a result of the current pandemic/ crises? How can we improve the quality of the partnerships?

Do you think that the Beirut blast intervention increased partnerships between international and local actors and why? (Only for FGD in Beirut)

4.4 What are your organisation's main source of funding in 2019 - 2020?

Have these sources changed since the pandemic and the crises? what are your organisation's main source of funding in 2021?

What about the changes after the Beirut blast? (Only for FGD in Beirut)

4.5 What barriers are there in accessing international funds?

Since the crises, have some barriers disappeared/ became less important? How do you think your organisation could overcome those barriers?

4.6 In what ways can national organisations influence the humanitarian landscape in Lebanon? How can the leadership of L/NAs be foster among the humanitarian sector?

4.7 Do you feel that your work is recognised in the humanitarian reporting? Which activities can improve the visibility of your work?

Section 5: Additional questions

5.1 If we were to develop a project around localisation of aid, what kind of activities would you suggest to foster the integration of L/NAs in the aid community?

Do you have any ideas about how these should be organised/ what these should entail in order to be most effective for you?

What would motivate you to attend these activities?

ANNEX 7

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW



Eight groups were selected to identified the type of interviews for this data collection methodology. The questions below are the ones submitted to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Here Below:

- Group A and B_National Coordinating bodies_Research
- Group C_Government Authorities
- Group D_National Non Gouvermental Organisations
- Group E_International INGOs
- Group F_UN Agencies
- Group G_Networks
- Group H_Donors

Section 1: Introduction (5 mins)

- Expertise France is implementing the Shabake Project which has an overall goal of strengthening Lebanese NGO capacity so that local actors can take an increased role in leading responses to crises in general and specifically to the Syrian-refugee crisis in Lebanon;
- As part of this work, EF is conducting an in-depth mapping study in partnership with Bioforce around the status of civil society organisations in Lebanon and in particular, in relation to the role of local actors in the humanitarian sector;

#	Question
1.1	<i>Have you already completed the survey?</i> It does not matter if they have as the focus of the interviews is more qualitative than the survey which was more quantitative) but it would be useful to know for analysis stage
1.2	<i>Do you mind being personally named in the mapping study as a representative of your organisation?</i> If not, their responses can be anonymised and or/ aggregated with other responses
1.3	<i>Ask the interviewee what s/he understands as the localisation agenda?</i> Once s/he has responded you can state to him that we will be using the following definition within this mapping. Localisation: increased leadership of local and national organisations in coordinating and planning aid, participation in decision-making (especially at policy level), forming equitable partnerships with international organisations and an increased share of international funds going directly to local and national organisations or through pooled funds



Section 2: Overall questions on localisation not linked to a specific NEAR component (7 min)

#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
2.1	All	All	<p>To what extent and in what ways do you think aid in Lebanon is localised? Are there differences on the level of involvement at national vs local level?</p>
2.2	All	All	<p>During the Literature Review of this mapping, we have identified that there are challenges to effectively integrate national and local organisations within the aid system in Lebanon.</p> <p>Have you perceived some challenges? (Examples: participate in coordination mechanisms, in decision making, form partnerships, gain funding?). How do you think we can overcome these challenges?</p> <p>Which factors hinder further integration/ involvement of national organisations?</p>
2.3	All	All	<p>To what extent do you think the objectives of localisation can be realized in Lebanon? What is, the agency that you work for (adapt according to the interview) doing to participate in the way forward localisation? Do you take any steps to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the amount of funding to national orgs? • Improve partnerships or coordination? • Inform NOs about your work or gather information about their work? • Increase capacity of national organisations? <p>To what extent is localisation a priority for your organisation at a global level? In the region or Lebanon? Are you encountering any challenges or obstacles to apply your agency's initiative? What are they? What are the procedures which you are adopting to bypass those challenges?</p>
2.4	All	All	<p>Within the Lebanese aid system do you feel that there are mutual expectations from international and national stakeholders on localisation goals?</p> <p>Have you felt any arising tensions (misunderstandings) among the aid actors on localisation goals?</p>
2.5	All	All	<p>Often in discussions about localisations the benefits are assumed to be self- evident and therefore not clearly articulated.</p> <p>If aid were more localised in Lebanon, what do you think the benefits would be? Do you foresee any negative outcomes?</p>

Section 3. Partnerships (NEAR Commitment 1)
(10 mins)



#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
3.1	1. Partnerships	1.1 & 1.2	<p>What is your perception on the quality of partnerships you have or you see in the Lebanese humanitarian landscape?</p> <p>What factors should be taken into consideration to build a good partnership?</p> <p>What factors are preventing good quality partnerships?</p>
3.2	1. Partnerships	1.1 & 1.2	<p>Commitment 2.2 is about reducing barriers to partnerships between national and international organisations.</p> <p>To what extent do you think that national and international organisations are able to form equitable partnerships? Why/ why not?</p>
3.3	1. Partnerships	1.1 & 1.2 & 1.3	<p>Do you have any ongoing partnerships at the moment?</p> <p>In the partnerships that your organisation has with national/international organisations, what sort of roles do you each take? How were these roles defined? On which basis?</p> <p>What are the mechanisms that you have put in place for the partnership to be effective? (try to look for answers like common accountability, meetings often, common objectives and monitoring.... Etc). Do you think that these partnerships are effective? Why/ why not?</p> <p>Are you aware of the IASC guidance notes on partnerships for localisation? (Yes/No)</p> <p>To what extent do your partners participate in the design/co-design of projects and budgets?</p>
3.4	1. Partnerships	1.1 & 1.2 & 1.3	<p>What are the key challenges that your organisation/agency face when working with national organisations?</p> <p>Why do you think they face these challenges? What are the solutions to these challenges?</p>



Section 4. Funding (NEAR Commitment 2) (10 mins)

#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
4.1	2. Funding	2.1 & 2.3	<p><i>In the Grand Bargain, the commitment is that 25% of international funds should be channelled directly to national organisations but in Lebanon the figure is far short of this.</i></p> <p><i>Does your organisation channel funds to national organisations? If no, why not? If yes, what proportion? Is this increasing or decreasing over time? What hinders you from giving more?</i></p> <p><i>Once the funds have been channelled are you facing any challenges? If yes, please cite them. Can you propose any concrete ways to overcome these challenges?</i></p>
4.2	2. Funding		<p><i>In the funding that you are providing are overhead costs provided? If not, why not? / If yes, how has the percentage been decided upon?</i></p> <p><i>In the funding that you are providing, is there any amount to support capacity strengthening of your partner organisation?</i></p>
4.3	2. Funding		<p><i>What would you say is the main barrier for multiyear funding to be available for L/NAs?</i></p>

Section 5: Capacity (NEAR Commitment 3) (10 mins)

#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
5.1	3. Capacity	3.1 & 3.2 & 3.3 & 3.4	<p><i>To what extent do you think that there is national capacity to respond to humanitarian crises in Lebanon?</i></p> <p><i>What are the key strengths and weaknesses of L/NAs?</i></p>
5.2	3. Capacity	3.1 & 3.2 & 3.3 & 3.4	<p><i>What do you think could be done to improve national capacity of L/NAs in Lebanon?</i></p> <p><i>How effective and relevant do you think capacity development initiatives in Lebanon have been? Why/ why not?</i></p> <p><i>From what you are seeing in the humanitarian landscape, what do you think are the weakness of capacity development initiatives being implemented in Lebanon?</i></p> <p><i>Can you give any specific examples?</i></p> <p><i>Which factors could increase the coordination of the capacity development initiatives in Lebanon?</i></p>



5.3	3. Capacity	3.2	<p><i>In the partnerships you have or in the grants you are granting, is there any CD component? Are these CD components systematic? Why/why not</i></p> <p><i>What should an effective capacity development initiative be like? (What topics, methods, locations etc)</i></p>
5.4	3. Capacity	3.2	<p><i>Is your organisation (even for nationals) implementing any capacity development initiatives to support L/NAs? If yes, could you define the CD activities which you are adopting?</i></p> <p><i>How have you perceived the support that you have received/provided to increase your/the capacity of L/NAs?</i></p> <p><i>Have you perceived capacity development to be participatory in the design with L/NAs?</i></p>

Section 6. Coordination and complementarity (10 min)

#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
6.1	4. Coordination	4.1 & 4.2	<p><i>To what extent do local and national organisations participate in coordinating and planning aid?</i></p> <p><i>What are the factors that hinder the effective participation of L/NAs? Can you identify any ways to overcome these factors? What do you think is the consequences of a low participation of L/NAs within the humanitarian response?</i></p> <p><i>Can you identify different levels of participation between different types of actors eg state vs civil society actors, local or national? Why do you think this might be?</i></p>
6.2	4. Coordination and 5. Policy, influence and visibility	4.1 & 4.2 & 5.2	<p><i>According to what you have been able to identify in your practice. To what extent do local and national organisations lead or participate in decision-making (particularly at policy level)?</i></p> <p><i>Do they participate in the forums and meetings that you attend? To what extent do you think that your organisation is aware of the work and priorities of national organisations?</i></p>

Section 7: Beirut Blast and COVID-19 (5 mins)



#	NEAR Component	NEAR Indicator	Question
7.1	4. Coordination	4.1 & 4.2 & 4.3	<p>Have you been able to identify any changes since the COVID-19 pandemic arrived in the inclusion of L/NAs?</p> <p>How can you describe the coordination that happened between local and international actors following the Beirut blast?</p> <p>Do you feel the Beirut Blast changed the practice of humanitarian actors to include more L/NAs?</p>
7.2	4. Coordination	4.1 & 4.2 & 4.3	<p>To what extent and in what ways do L/NAs engage with decision making and planning in the LCRP, 3RF, 3RP?</p> <p>To what extent you/they have participated on the Flash Appeals for the COVID-19 or the Beirut Blast?</p> <p>Can you identify any barriers for this participation?</p>

ANNEX 8

THE VALIDATION WORKSHOP


This study intends to capture the perceptions, views and opinions of the humanitarian stakeholders in Lebanon. Insisting on this aim of engagement, the validation workshop was planned as an appropriate way to gather in a one event, internationals and national actors to validate the main findings of the study and reflect together on possible recommendations and concrete actions to increase localisation in Lebanon.

FORMAT AND PARTICIPATION

The validation workshop was carried out as a virtual event on September 15th 2021. The workshop gathered a total of 54 participants from international and national organisations. An almost equal representation per type of actors was achieved. 58% of the participants were national actors and 43% international actors (See Figure 49).

FIGURE 48 PARTICIPANTS OF THE VALIDATION WORKSHOP

Participants of the Validation Workshop



Two main modules were covered with the agenda. The first module was conducted in a plenary and aimed at presenting the main findings per component which included the trends, the current state and barrier hindering the advancement of each component. During this module, participants were also asked to prioritise the recommendations from the first findings of the report. The second module was conducted in the form of breakout rooms, where participants were encouraged to propose concrete ideas and actions of the prioritised recommendations.

Five breakout groups, each focusing on one of the NEAR localisation framework components, undertook three idea generation exercises, where individual participants stated anonymously their point of view. These exercises were followed by a discussion around the inputs of the participants to elaborate further the ideas.

Results of the validation workshop were integrated all along the report and identified as such to clarify the source of the collected data.

ANNEX 9

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FOOTNOTES

ⁱ The Peace and Resilience Fund “Minka” is a peacebuilding initiative for responding quickly and effectively to Syrian and Iraqi refugees in the Middle-East.

ⁱⁱ Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain-official-website/guidance-notes-localisation-may-2020>.

The Grand Bargain signatories and structure is available for consultation at:
<https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain>.

^{iv} As mentioned in the methodology, Bioforce has conducted a first mapping in 2019 -2020. In this section, the inclusion of questions from the survey in 2019 allows to capitalised and analyse those responses.

^v Grand Bargain Localisation Workstream (undated), ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, IFRC; based on the words of Ian Ridley, Senior Director, World Vision International, speaking at the World Humanitarian Summit Global Consultation quoted in ‘Localisation Examined: An ICVA Briefing Paper’, (2018), ICVA

^{vi} Additional information on funding pertaining to the Lebanese humanitarian response can be found in www.fts.ocha.org

^{vii} For more information on this program consult: www.rdpp-me.org

^{viii} As the definition L/NA includes the government and its institutions, results on this question highlights the fact that a consensus on the leadership has not been reached.

^{ix} Beirut Port Disaster. Situation Report September 2020. Available at <http://drm.pcm.gov.lb/Media/News/Beirut-Port-Disaster-weekly-report-PM-13-Sep-2020.pdf>

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^{xii} Live Love Beirut Relief Fund. <https://livelovebeirut.com/>

^{xiii} Beirut Shelter sector WG coordination meeting report March 2021.

^{xiv} Global Humanitarian Platform (2017), Principles of Partnerships, accessible at:
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